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This thesis focuses on dual practice by physicians, using a developing country setting and 
providing both theoretical analysis and empirical evidences. The term of “dual practice 
physician” in this research refers to physicians who work in public health care facility 
owned by government and at the same time also engaged in private practice. A dual 
practice activity among physicians is a common practice particularly in developing 
countries. From a general perspective, allowing physicians in dual practice activity by 
government has the purpose to provide more health care access under low ratio of health 
care personnel. This practice is usually adopted in developing countries to increase health 
care utilization and promote the using of formal health care, as many people still rely on 
self-treatments or traditional healers.  
 
Previous studies have concluded that dual practice activity among physicians might have 
positive as well as negative contribution for health care system. Besides contributing to 
the increasing health care access, dual practice has an issue mainly related with the 
decreasing quality in the public facility as physician put more attention in their private 
practice. Studies on dual practice mostly discuss theoretical analysis while the empirical 
evidence is still scarce especially evidence from developing countries. Our research fills 
the gap by providing theoretical analysis of dual practice and contributes to dual practice 





Indonesia is one of the countries allowing dual practice physician since 1970’s. One of the 
purposes is providing more services with limited physician so that people can access a 
formal health care which is a treatment provided by health care personnel and not self-
treatment nor traditional healer. The health care utilization is increasing from 15% in 1996 
to 34% in 2006 (Susenas survey 1996 and 2006). The percentages describe the proportion 
of population reporting illness who utilizes health care facilities in the preceding month of 
the survey.  The number of physicians shows increasing trend. The average physician 
ratio is increasing from 16 physicians per 100,000 populations in 1996 to 37 physicians 
per 100,000 populations in 2013. Along with increasing physician ratio to ideal rate which 
is 45 physicians per 100,000 populations based on national target, the policy is concerned 
to some more adaptions when the objective of health care enhancement has already 
achieved. The large area of Indonesia and archipelago characteristic of the country 
indicate that the dual practice policy should be lead into different direction by considering 
geographical difference. For example, the average physician ratio of all 33 provinces in 
Indonesia in 2013 is 37.2 physicians per 100,000 populations. The national average ratio 
seems promising as it is close to ideal rate of 45 physicians per 100,000 populations but 
the interval of the ratio is between 8.9 physicians per 100,000 populations to 151.5 per 
100,000 populations. It means that there is a province with low ratio while there is also 
province with high density of physicians. In term of treatment quality in public facility, 
many informal reports mention that dual practice physician is closely related with the 








Objectives of the thesis 
This thesis uses microeconomic analysis to investigate questions related to dual practice 
mechanism in a developing country setting. We describe the objectives of thesis in Figure 
1.1. The research presented in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 has general topic on the dual practice 
physician role in a health system with different emphasis in each chapter which can be 
read as a separate article. 
 
Figure 1.1 Summary of chapter descriptions in the dissertation 
Chapter 5: 
Conclusions and policy 
recommendations 
Chapter 2:  
Theoretical paper on effects of 
dual practice: assessment on 
price, quality, total welfare, and 
comparison with health 
insurance expansion  
Chapter 3:  
Individual choice of health care 
facility by patients under dual 
practice option.  
(demand for health care). 
Chapter 4:  
Physician’s decision involving 
dual practice activity. 
(supply for health care) 
Policy experiment: 
Compare dual practice with 
health insurance subsidies 
Chapter 1:  





Chapter one is the introduction of the dissertation that covers the background of the 
research and the motivations behind the study of dual practice by physicians. This chapter 
also explains the importance of dual practice physicians in health care systems, 
particularly in developing countries.  
 
We first focus on the impact of dual practice on patients (the demand side) and then the 
physician’s decision regarding dual practice (the supply side). Chapter two is a theoretical 
work that investigates health care access by examining how public-private sector 
determines price under dual practice policy in the system. The chapter examines policy 
implications regarding access to health care through dual practice and insurance. We 
adjust the model by involving the insurance into the system to provide a policy 
implication related to health care access enhancement. Our theoretical framework 
considers dual practice as one of the tools to make health care more accessible. We will 
assess the dual practice policy by comparing with insurance coverage policy which also 
relates with health care access. The essential principle of the insurance in this research is 
that patients will only pay a certain percentage of treatment fees in public or private 
facility. The insurance situation also represents the developing country specification 
where the insurance coverage is still low. The analysis provides comparison of four 
situations where there is no dual practice-no insurance in the system, no dual practice-
with insurance, dual practice-no insurance, and dual practice-with insurance. The 
assessment of each scheme is represented using total welfare to see which scenario 
provide optimal benefit for the health care system. The chapter also analyses the reaction 
on the private price when the population with insurance is increasing. Our theoretical 





the next two chapters. The two means of health care access enhancement: dual practice 
physicians and insurance will appear again in empirical study at Chapter 3 as part of 
policy explorations to see how dual practice affects the health care system. We complete 
the study with the analysis of quality treatment in public and private sector to see how 
dual practice will benefit quality of treatment.  
 
In chapter three, we provide the empirical analysis on dual practice from the demand side 
using Indonesian data of Indonesian Family Life Survey 5 (IFLS 5). The chapter explains 
how patients decide in which facility they are willing to visit during the illness periods 
with the existence of dual practice in the system, whether dual practice could switch 
patients from non-formal treatment into public or private facility. In this case we 
differentiate the choice into: public facility, private facility, and other facility. The latter 
option includes the non-physician attendant facility such as midwives practice, nurse 
practice and traditional healer. We are also interested to see how monetary factors such as 
income, price and insurance as well as non-monetary factors such as travel cost and 
waiting time affect patient’s choice. We provide two policy experiments by simulating the 
additional number of dual practice physician and the number of people with insurance 
coverage under the same budget to see which one is directly affecting individual decision 
to choose health care facility. The objective of doing the policy experiment is to measure 
the magnitude of each policy affecting the access to health care.  
 
The fourth chapter of the thesis provides the empirical evidence on the supply side using 
Indonesian data that collected from Indonesian Family Life Survey 5 (IFLS 5), 





In this chapter we analyze the determinant factors for physician choosing to work in 
public sector only, work in private sector only or work in both sectors as dual practice 
physician. We analyze what factors make a physician to be involved in dual job activities. 
Our main argument based on previous literature is that additional income is the primary 
factor involved in the physician’s decision. Our case study emphasizes the importance of 
geographical location in physician’s working decision. The result supports the indication 
of development gap which is a usual characteristic of developing country. We complete 
our supply side analysis with the direct relationship between price of treatment, dual 
practice physician, and insurance coverage. Our study provides a simulation on public 
salary to estimate the minimum salary for physician if he works only in public sector and 
leaves the dual practice. 
 
The two empirical analyses in this study use secondary data in novel way by combining 
household and community data. Our study has used the available data to provide analysis 
on dual practice physician although this activity is not regularly monitored by the health 
authority. Our analysis overcomes the challenge from the limited dual practice physician 
data especially in identification process. The detail of data sources is available in the next 
sub section below.     
 
The final chapter contains the conclusions of the dual practice study from the theoretical 
discussion and empirical evidence of demand and supply side. This chapter summarizes 
our policy recommendations for dual practice physician continuation policy in Indonesia 
that comes from our findings. The chapter mentions possible general developments for the 





Finding relevant data 
 
The major challenge in our research is to find a relevant data for the empirical work of 
dual practice demand and supply in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Our study is specifically 
dedicated to analyze the dual practice policy as a part of health care access enhancement 
in Indonesia. The main data needed in our research is a dual practice physician data. The 
available data on annual physician monitoring report from Ministry of Health has never 
mentioned formally about the dual practice activities. This practice actually can be 
identified from physician registration process in every regional health office in Indonesia. 
Physicians have to register in regional health office if they want to start practicing in 
public or private facility. However, data from this office is only for administration purpose 
and it is not fit for our research due to the complexity in collecting data from each 
regional health office.  
 
We decide to use a secondary data from Indonesian Family Life Survey wave 5 (IFLS 5) 
that was held by RAND and Survey Meter Indonesia. Data from this survey allows us to 
identify dual practice physician activities and also provide data for the demand of health 
care in Chapter 3. The IFLS 5 survey was held in period at the end of 2014 until 2015. 
The survey is using households as the unit observations to collect information on socio 
economics, education, working labors and health. The survey also collects facility 
information available in the community, particularly on health and education such as 
schools, public community health care and private health care facility. For our research 






The IFLS 5 was held in 23 provinces among 34 provinces in Indonesia. The IFLS 5 has a 
total 16,204 households and 50,148 individuals being interviewed. We use the particular 
individual sample of 5,695 that are visiting health care facilities for the outpatient in the 
last four weeks prior to survey. The outpatient care is used because its occurrence in the 
survey is more often compared to inpatient care, hence we can get a sufficiently large 
sample size. To avoid possible health care decision bias, we only include individuals aged 
15 years or more and the visit that indicates the first visit. We assume that adult 
individuals have their own decision regarding health care. The first visit data avoids 
physician intervention on the individual decision. We get 2,686 selected individuals in this 
step. The sample is then being matched with dual practice physician identification and 
becomes 1,326 individuals. The other matching process is between individuals with the 
corresponding health care facility being visited. The IFLS data allows us to track which 
individuals visit which facility but not all facilities are being interviewed, hence the 
matching sample is 1,116 individuals. The main problem in the matching process is on the 
high rate of missing values especially from private facility. For example 47 percent of 
private facilities do not fill the quality questionnaire completely.  In public facilities the 
missing value rate is quite low. The percentage comes from the fact that the main purpose 
of IFLS 5 is to get facility information so it is not mandatory to interview physicians as 
facility representative. The potential bias might come from the low response of quality 
information hence we take the strategy by using area identification to match the quality 
information of facility with the household area residency. As long as the information is 






Data on physicians for Chapter 4 comes from two questionnaires of IFLS: public 
community health center questionnaire and private health care facility questionnaire. Both 
questionnaires have slightly different structures of physician descriptions. We identify 
dual practice physician from public community health center questionnaire as the 
physicians who work in public community health center and also work in private practice. 
From private facility questionnaire, dual practice physicians are physicians who work in 
private facility but has primary job as government workers in government health care 
facilitates. The detailed physician information will be captured during the survey if the 
interview process involves physician but unfortunately in some cases the interview 
process were attended by non-physician staff such as front desk officer, nurses, or 
midwives. Based on IFLS guidelines, the interview process for the health care facility 
questionnaire does not require physicians as respondents because the primary purposes of 
the survey is more related with health care facility information and the more appropriate 
person to answer the questionnaire is the administrative staffs or medical personnel with 
administrative knowledge. The total physician in our sample for the analysis in Chapter 4 
is 920 physicians. 
 
Our attempt to manage data from different sources of questionnaire to analyze dual 
practice in Indonesia is up to our knowledge, the first of its kind. The data preparation is 
one strong point in the study because the regular data available cannot possible be used 
directly in the analysis of dual practice physician in Indonesia. A careful process has been 








We present a brief summary of each chapter and an overview of the results. 
 
Chapter 2: Dual Practice Physician in a Developing Country Health System 
 
This chapter will analyze the relationship between public and private provider under dual 
practice regulation in term of price and quality setting in the public facility. This 
theoretical work is vital to link dual practice from demand and supply side that also 
appears in chapters three and four. The research wants to answer particular questions on 
how a private provider selects its price and quality level after knowing the public price 
and quality set by government under dual practice compared to non-dual practice 
regulation. The model also emphasizes the existence of insurance scheme in the system. 
Health care access enhancement in developing country usually takes one of two forms 
increasing the supply through allowing physicians to have dual jobs and increasing 
financial access through insurance coverage. We use both mechanisms in the analysis to 
capture patient’s decision on accessing health facility and physician’s decisions on 
working place under several situations: no dual practice-no insurance, no dual practice-
with insurance, dual practice-no insurance, and dual practice-with insurance. The last 
issue is justifying in which situation provides the highest benefit by taking total welfare 
that comes from patient’s utility, providers’ revenue, insurance company and government 
transfer. We consider two kinds of welfare; the first is welfare in the long run where the 
price and quality has longer time to adapt to its equilibrium. The second is the welfare in 
the short run where we examine the immediate effect of having dual practice or insurance 





We develop a model based on Hotelling’s work on spatial competition to analyze price 
and quality in private facility under dual practice regulation and insurance policy. The 
health care system consists of public and private health care provider is similar with what 
represented in the Hoteling model. Both facilities offer similar treatment and patient can 
only consume one treatment from a specific facility. This research follows Brekke (2006) 
and Kuchinke (2015) with some adjustments. It holds similar ideas on using the Hoteling 
model to construct the interaction between health care providers. Our model assumes that 
sick patients always look for treatment from public or private health care facility. The 
latter might refer to private traditional healer or non-physician practice for some patients. 
We use a similar model to explain price competition when one of the providers sets a 
standard price and quality. In our work, public price and quality in the public facility will 
be set by the government in the first stage. The private sector then will respond by setting 
its price and quality of treatment. 
 
The dual practice has a role to lowering the private price driven by demand shift from 
patient’s perspective and with dual practice there are more health care provided in the 
public system. So that patients can have more options on selecting facility. The insurance 
as predicted has different direction with the price, that insurance availability driven to 
higher price in private sector. The more massive insurance coverage to population also 
impact on the higher price in private sector. The comparison on total welfare shows that 
welfare under dual practice might be higher or lower than insurance regime. In the long 
run, insurance policy offers higher welfare than dual practice policy when demand of 
public and private facility are high, driven by the easier access from the insurance. Dual 





depends on parameter values. In the short run, dual practice policy might have higher 
welfare compare to insurance policy, when demand in public facility is higher enough to 
still cover the loss from the private sector caused by low demand in private facility.   
 
Chapter 3: Dual Physician Practice and Health Care Demand in Developing 
Country Study Case in Indonesia Using IFLS Data  
 
This chapter describes the patient’s decision on selecting health care choices to reflect the 
demand aspect of our dual practice study. The primary motivation comes from the fact 
that the initial purpose of having dual practice in the system is for people to utilize more 
the formal treatment rather than non-formal treatment such as non-physician base 
treatment and traditional healer. Under dual practice existence, we expect that patient will 
be more likely to visit formal care provided by physicians in public and private health 
care facility. We investigate that dual practice existence influence individual decision’s to 
visit facility. The dual practice here is a proxy measurement by the percentage of dual 
practice physician in the area where individuals live. We suggest that monetary factors 
such as income and price of treatment as well as non-monetary factors such as travel cost 
and waiting time have importantly affected the individual decision in the facility choice. 
We also include individual characteristics which is a social and demographic factor in the 
study. The additional important factor is that individuals are also concerned about the 
facility quality when visiting health care facility.  
 
The study uses IFLS 5 household information and takes the individual as our unit of 





seven categories available in the questionnaire: private health care facility, public health 
care facility, and other. The first two are health care facilities that provide formal 
treatment by physicians. The last category captures the non-formal health care facility that 
attended by non-physician such as midwifes or nurse and traditional healer.  
 
The first estimation addresses the question on how dual practice influences individuals on 
deciding which health care facility to visit. We run a multinomial regression model with a 
categorized dependent variable of individual visit to health care facility. It consists of 
three categories: public facility, private facility, and non-physician practice (midwife 
practice, nurse practice, and traditional healer). The main independent variables are 
percentage of dual practice physician in the area and insurance coverage. We also include 
geographical identification, price of treatment, travel cost, and waiting time.  Our research 
has also considered other estimation methods that might fit the health care demand model 
such as a nested multinomial logit. A likelihood ratio test suggests that the nested 
multinomial logit in our case is not better than multinomial logit model as it is usually the 
case in the previous literature of health care demand model. The bias might rise from the 
insurance variable to individual choice of health care facility. We employ the two-stage 
residuals inclusion (2SRI) for the model after correction bias and compare with the initial 
model of usual Multinomial logit for the model before correction bias. The second 
estimation is using logit regression to see how quality aspects influence individual 
decisions, where individual will only select between public or private facility. A different 
estimation process has to be taken as the quality information is only available for the 
public and private health care facilities while there is none for the non-physician facility 





The result shows that dual practice is more important in switching patient from private 
facility into public facility rather than switching from non-physician facility and 
traditional healer to public facility.  Furthermore, the increasing percentage of dual 
practice physician in the area drives individuals to less visit the private provider. On the 
other hand, insurance ownership shows a significant effect on driving people from 
traditional healer to public facility. Monetary factors as well as non-monetary factors 
significantly affect individual choice on health care facility. We compare the analysis of 
proposed policy to increase access to health care facilities through two policy instruments: 
insurance coverage and dual practice. The results show that extending insurance coverage 
gives higher impact on the health care demand compared to increasing the number of dual 
practice physician. The increasing number of health care insurance beneficiaries can shift 
people from visiting traditional healer into formal practice, in this case is the public health 
care facility that receives more patients. The increasing number of dual physician 
practitioner seems only to shift individuals from private facility to public facility. 
Insurance coverage might show higher effect to individual health care demand than dual 
practice policy because insurance only benefits the single user of insurance beneficiaries 
only. On the other hand, a dual practice policy might have larger effect in term of 
community level because the existence of dual practice physician will be utilized by 
groups of people.  
 







The research questions in this research are related with what motivations drive physicians 
on selecting a working sector. Physicians reflect the supply side of health care system that 
likely effects of a dual practice policy stated by the government. We include the indirect 
effect on equilibrium price of private sector from dual practice existence and health 
insurance coverage.  The result will be crucial for determining dual practice policy in 
Indonesia.  
 
The paper estimates factors influencing physicians on being dual practice physicians 
versus being private physicians or being public physicians. The additional income is an 
important motivation that drives physician to engage in dual practice. We emphasize that 
geographical characteristics such as urban rural and island identification might 
significantly affect physician because of the particular situation in Indonesia. Physician 
decision might also consider the health care need and competition, while we also believe 
that individual characteristics such as experience, male, education, and origin also have 
important role on physician decision. We provide the analysis with experiment on the 
public salary in order to evaluate the dual practice physician regulation in Indonesia. We 
estimate the probability of physician being dual practitioner using the main model of 
alternative specific conditional logit and the alternative of multinomial regression that 
regress physician working choices (private, public, or dual practice) on independent 
variables (gender, education, language, urban-rural, Java-Non Java island, income, years 
of experience, percentage of elder population, and physician ratio). The main model 
consists of two models that have different estimation process of physician’s alternative 
income. The first one is using the linear regression and the second is using instrumental 






We use physician’s data from IFLS 5 community facility questionnaire to estimate the 
model. The merging data from public community health center and private facility 
questionnaire is the first attempt ever done in the dual practice study under the limitation 
data of dual practice physician activity in Indonesia. After identification process on dual 
practice activity and imputation on some variables due to missing values, some of the 
results confirm a previous indication on the crucial variables influence physician’s 
decision. Additional income still becomes the core variable that drives physicians on 
being dual practice. Physicians with higher income will less likely working as dual 
practitioner. We can differentiate the physicians’ probability being dual practice based on 
the geographical characteristics, that physician in rural and Non-java Island has higher 
probability engaging on dual practice. The dual practice also has positive correlation with 
the health care need and competition among physician, when there is more potential need 
on health care and less physicians in the area, the probability being a dual practitioner is 
also rising. We find that male physicians and more senior physicians are less likely 
working as dual practice compare to being a private physicians.  The policy experiment 
shows that government will need more than five times current public salary level if they 
decide to diminish dual practice in Indonesia so that physicians only work either in public 
or private sector only. The indirect effect of dual practice appears in our study as the 
existence of dual practice is a downward pressure on the price of treatment in private 
provider. Our policy recommendation will concern on keeping dual practice physician 
under some limitation such as only allowing dual practice in specific region as indicated 
in this research, rural and Non-java Island.  Allowing dual practice is a reasonable policy, 







Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and policy recommendation from the dissertation. Our 
research uses two policies to improve health care access, dual practice physician and 
insurance coverage. The dual practice physician is a public physician who works in 
private practice or private clinics after his public working hour. The dual practice in the 
system is associated with additional supply of health care. The insurance on the other 
hand, provides access by lifting the financial barrier to health care. Our theoretical 
framework suggests non-dominance regime between dual practice and insurance. In 
general, the dual practice policy will have higher welfare effect because it lowering downs 
the price in private sector. The insurance policy will have lower welfare effect as the price 
of treatment in private facility is increasing along with the insurance coverage.  
 
The empirical results however suggest that individual’s choice of health care is more 
sensitive with the additional insurance compare to directly adding dual practice physician 
into the system. The insurance coverage level is able to switch health care demand from 
non-formal treatment (traditional healer, nurse and midwife practice) into formal 
treatment (public or private health care facility). The effect of insurance is at individual 
level because it benefits only the people who have insurance coverage. The dual practice 
effect might be larger at community level because more people can be served with the 
existence of more dual practice physicians in health care system. 
 
The supply side analysis in our research supports the argument that additional income is 





mechanism to keep physicians working in public sector under low public salary. Our 
simulation shows that diminishing dual practice from health care system is too costly for 
the health authority in order to compete with private sector for physicians. 
Chapter 2 
 
Dual Practice Physician in a Developing 




















This research analyzes how public and private sector determine price of 
treatment and quality level under dual practice regime and insurance 
coverage policy. We examine policy implications as alternative policy 
interventions regarding access to health care through dual practice and 
insurance by standard welfare analysis in the long run and the short run. We 
find that the dual practice decreases the price in private operator. The 
direction of the price in private facility follows the public price set by health 
authority. Insurance coverage triggers the increasing price in private sector. 
The higher percentage population covered in full insurance leads the private 
facility to respond by increasing the price of treatment. The quality of private 
facility is following the increasing or decreasing price itself. The welfare of 
policy interventions comparison in the long run (after price adjustment) and 
in the short run (before price adjustment) provides similar results. We 
conclude that there is no dominance welfare effect between dual practice 
regime and insurance coverage but in general dual practice effect can be 
expected to have higher welfare compared to insurance effect in long run and 
short run.  
 









This research will focus on how dual practice regulation will affect patient’s decision on 
the facility choice and how private sector reaction in term of price and quality treatment 
being offered in the facility. Our study will analyze the effect of dual practice and 
insurance coverage in short run and long run. The study uses a developing country as a 
background particularly for the primary care or non-emergency care. Hence we construct 
the model by using some features that appear in most of developing countries. These 
features are dual practice physician and insurance coverage that represent health care 
access situation in developing countries and suit with our research purposes. The first one 
is dual practice policy where in most cases, dual practice physician practice is allowed 
with a loosely restricted regulation. The second characteristic is the limited insurance 
coverage among its population. This research also examines the policy implications 
regarding access to health care through dual practice and insurance coverage. The policies 
represent instrument to increase health care access as the initial purpose of launching dual 
practice policy. We calculate the total welfare in each regime in order to justify the effect 
of dual practice and insurance in the short run and long run. The theoretical framework in 
this paper is also an initial step before we explore the empirical analysis on demand and 
supply side related dual practice using developing country data as study case.  
 
Physicians in providing health care services can work in two sectors; government-owned 
facilities or private health care facilities. In the mixed health care system, there are also 
physicians who work in both sectors, and this phenomenon is called dual physician 
practice. Previous literature mentioned it as “moonlighting” that refers to doctors who 
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work in private clinics after office hours in the public health care facilities. Garcia-Prado 
and Gonzalez (2011) describe many forms of dual jobs in related activity for a physician 
in the field of education, training, sale, and practice where the latter is the most common 
seen and considered to have a significant effect in health care system. Russo et al. (2013) 
in research of dual physician determinants in three African cities find four distinction 
characteristics of dual physician practice related with public health care facility: private 
practice outside, beside, within and integrated into public practice. The dual practice 
appears not only in developing countries but also in more developed economies countries. 
In Austria, 100 percent physicians work as dual practice in public and private facilities 
while in Ireland more than 90 percent physicians are engaged in both sectors. In the 
United Kingdom, about 60 percent doctors who have contracted in National Health Care 
System also work in private facilities. The dual physician practice is widely recognized in 
African countries such as Egypt, Mozambique, and Zambia. The practice is also common 
in Asian countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and many more.  
 
Dual physician practice is mostly regulated in more developed countries. Dual practice for 
physician is categorized as illegal practice in Canada. The government in Spain, Portugal, 
and Italy offer rewards for physicians who work solely in public. In Austria and Ireland, 
physicians are encouraged to perform private activities. The earning limitation is applied 
in countries such as UK and France where 10 percent of physician’s gross income is 
coming from private practice for UK and 30 percent of total physician’s income is the 
limit for private practice income in France. However, the practice is still unregulated in 
most developing countries although it is getting more attention from policy maker 
because its massive practice and potential effect on health care system. The unregulated 
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dual practice physician usually takes place without particular limitations from the health 
authority compared to the regulated one. The lack of human resource and poor monitoring 
are usual reasons behind the unregulated practice. Having dual practice being regulated is 
claimed that it creates more conducive physician’s workplace and leads to the better 
quality and patient’s welfare from the provision of treatment. 
 
The broad scale of dual physician practice is contrary to basic labor a supply theory 
(Lang, 1994) that predicts individuals would work more hours in their highest paying job 
rather than hold multiple jobs. It also contradicts the theory of incentive design (Holstrom 
& Milgrom, 1991) who shows that employers would want to constrain employee 
temptation to divert time and attention. In other words, the ordinary workers cannot work 
in two firms at the same time. There are motivations on why physicians want to work in 
dual practice. Income added is usually the primary motivation while the other motivations 
are: expanded or complementary use of professional skills, clinical autonomy, broader 
professional contact, reputation building, and flexibility of private practice (Garcia-Prado 
& Gonzales, 2011). Humphrey and Russel (2004) identify the motivation behind the dual 
practice is to access alternative facilities. They also mention that physicians engaged in 
dual practice to relief from high pressure and low appreciation in public environments. 
 
Economists agree that dual practice has positive and adverse impacts on health care 
provision in the country. Shorter waiting times to get treatment and better access to health 
care are some of the positive implications of the dual practice. A public sector usually 
provides free treatment that has made a long queue for individuals to get treatments in 
public. Dual practice makes other options for people who want to get faster treatment with 
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additional cost by providing care in private sector. The more people get treatments in 
private, the sorter a waiting time in the public sector might be. In most developing country 
where public facilities still scarce, physicians work in private clinics despite their primary 
duty in public facilities to expand health care treatments in remote areas. Dual practice 
contributes an adverse effect on health care provision. The areas that are initially served 
by public health care facility during working hours now can have alternative option from 
the public physicians who decide to open private practices. Profit from private sector 
becomes main attractiveness for physicians to involve in dual practice. The activities in 
private sector indicate affecting their performance in public such as skimp on public 
working hours, financial interest by diverting patient to private service, compromising the 
efficiency and quality of public health service and tend to neglect the poor (Hipgrave & 
Hort, 2013). Despite the fact that dual practice is a standard feature in health care system, 
there is still no consensus on its net effect. The argument is reflected by different 
regulations on dual practice among countries, although the discrepancies also more 
related to the heterogeneity of health care system and environment. Regulation of dual 
practice is needed to optimize the health care system where public and private work side 
by side. Lessons learned from developed countries where they have already regulated the 
practice showed that dual practice regulation could function with support from other 
components such as public funding, physicians supply, and technology. In the developing 
countries where the priority is in the health care provision, dual practice arrangement is 
considered less important so that it is still unregulated in most cases. Beside that empirical 
study related dual practice is still lack. Therefore research related dual physician practice 




In health care system where government is funding the public provider, a constraint in 
government budget makes limited treatments offered in public health care facilities. The 
government is also interested in controlling public health care demand, for example by 
providing limited number of physicians and practice hours in public facility. The 
government determines the price of treatment in public sector and obliges to provide 
health care treatment with certain level of quality. One of the emerging issues in the health 
care system is the health care access, whether people can get treatment without difficulties 
from financial and non-financial factors. The government might eliminate the financial 
barrier by offering a standard treatment in public provider that usually has a lower price 
than its competitor in private sector. The non-financial factor related to access to health 
care is a cost that paid by the patient outside the treatment cost, such as travel cost. In the 
remote areas where still lacking transportation means, the travel cost is a tremendous 
obstacle to access health care.  
 
Dual practice policy in developing countries is closely related to health care enhancement. 
The practice is expected to overcome difficulties on access and mainly to provide more 
health care treatment in the system. A physician who involved in dual practice will work 
in private sector by opening a private practice or working in private clinics after public 
working hours. Patients have more options to decide which provider they want to visit in 
getting health care treatments. The dual practice mechanism seems an ideal tool to 
guaranty access to health care. However, is it so? Different point of view on the dual 
practice regulation shows that the practice indeed increases the supply of treatment in the 
system, but do all individual afford to get it? We mention before that dual practice 
physician will open a private practice and it usually offers treatment in higher price 
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compare to a public provider. From a non-financial perspective, such as travel cost, does 
dual practice can reduce the financial cost borne by the patient to access health care?  
 
One tool to minimize the financial barrier of getting health care treatment is by providing 
insurance or government subsidized insurance for the poor income group. The usual 
insurance scheme commonly refers to a sharing risk mechanism between insurer and 
insurance provider where insurer pays premium and will get health care benefit such as 
full or partial reimbursement of fee treatment.  Government might intervene the insurance 
scheme by taking over the premium payment for a specific population. This mechanism 
can be found in health care system where government has obligation to provide health 
care for the residents, but the sources are limited. Instead of providing free care, the 
government can combine between providing low price treatment in public facility and 
giving access to insurance for the people who are unable to afford the treatment fee. The 
insurance scheme will levy the burden of treatment fee, although there is a possible 
situation when individual also suffered from non-treatment cost such as travel cost. Low 
income patients might suffer from paying travel cost to health care facility that prevents 
them in getting health care treatment. The further research that combines the dual practice 
benefit and financial as well as non-financial aspects is needed to fully explain how health 
care access has been developed in the health system. 
 
Access to health care has been a focus of the research related with health care policy and 
health services. The term access itself has been translated into different definitions. 
Penchansky (1981) in his research defines an access as degree of fit between user and 
provider and specified access into five dimensions: availability, accessibility, 
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accommodation, affordability, acceptability. The decomposition of access is claimed to be 
useful from political point of view that it concentrates into specific policy actions on 
overcoming obstacles of health care service. In the research related with equity, Waters 
(2000) defines an access as the use of health care by individuals with a need for care and 
he measured the need using a self-reported morbidity. The similar definition appeared in 
the researches by Gilson (1988), Mooney (1987), Menzel (1993) and Mapelli (1993).  A 
different definition of access can be found in (Culyer & Wagstaf, 1993) as they describe 
access as a cost for receiving care, the highest feasible consumption, or as foregone utility. 
Goddard & Smith (1998) emphasize the access as a supply consideration so that similar 
services are available to patients with similar need. The more recent research mentioned 
access as the composite from the previous research. Evans, Hsu, and Boerma (2013) 
emphasize access as the primary key when mentioned it in discussion about universal 
coverage and universal access. According to their paper, access has three dimensions. The 
first is a physical ability that can be referred to supply of reachable health care services 
such as the health care facility, opening hours, and other organizational aspect that allows 
people in need to get the services. The second is financial affordability which is a people’s 
capability to pay the treatment without difficulties. It is also including the indirect and 
opportunity cost to get the treatment such as transportation cost and time lost from 
visiting health care facility instead of working. The third is the acceptability that is related 
on how people willingness to seek care in the case of sickness happened.  
 
Research on dual practice has been developing in recent years. Among the previous 
researches of dual practice, none of them directly links the dual practice with health care 
access, theoretically or empirically. Some of the previous researches that motivate this 
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research are summarized in Appendix, Table 2A.1. Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002) 
compare the effects of three reimbursement rules (no insurance, insurance with a 
preferred provider, fixed reimbursement rate) on the prices and qualities chosen by 
competing healthcare providers, and hence on social welfare. Two alternative assumptions 
on the timing of decisions are considered whether it is a simultaneous decision between 
qualities and prices for primary care sector or sequential decision with quality is taken as 
first decision then is followed by price for specialized health care sector. Brekke, 
Nuscheler, and Straume (2006), where the objective is to characterize the socially optimal 
exogenous (regulated) price common to two competing providers, when they choose only 
the quality of their respective products, or both the quality and their location. This is done 
with two alternative assumptions on the ability of the regulator to commit to its chosen 
price. Kuchinke, Zerth, & Wiese (2009) study the competition in the case of 
standardization in regional health care markets where there is no price competition. They 
consider about the timing when health care providers will compete on vertical (quality) 
after the scope of medical treatment is determined. 
 
The oft-heard argument in the researches about dual practice is whether the dual practice 
has an impact on public service quality. Bir and Eggleston (2003) suggest that dual 
practice may increase or decrease public service quality depends on whether the benefit of 
dual practice attracts highly skilled physicians and another social cost. Physicians as a 
central role in health care system contribute to the quality of the treatment and have a 
particular interest in their profit. Gonzales (2004) shows that public sector quality 
improves as physicians who work in public sector are improving their effort to gain 
reputation to get more private practice revenue. Physicians have incentives to over-
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provide public treatments. Health authority can use policy of limiting physician’s earning 
from private practice to reduce over-provide treatment in public practice. The other policy 
mentioned in the paper is an exclusive contract that applies optimally in the low salary 
situation. Besides quality treatment, dual practice closely relates to physician’s incentives 
and patient selection to get benefit from physician’s private practice. Biglaiser and Ma 
(2007) study the incentives of dual practice which public physicians can refer their 
patients to their private facilities with concerning to the quality of care provided and 
welfare.  Their model differentiates physicians in their degree of motivation. Their study 
suggested that dual practice limitation by price ceiling reduces the adverse effect on the 
public sector and increase quality. Delfgaauw (2007) studies the provision of public and 
private health care with altruistic physician found that allowing dual practice can benefit 
all patients but allowing physician to transfer a patient from public to private practice 
reduces the patient’s benefit especially patients that categorized as poor. 
 
Research by Brekke and Sorgard (2007) analyze dual practice from the perspective of 
physician’s labor supply and health care provision in public and private sector. They study 
the role of competition among physician that affect the health care treatment in both 
sectors. They find that allowing dual practice physicians “crowds out” public provision 
and results in lower overall health care provision. The health authority can offer a higher 
wage for physicians to decrease the adverse effect. The result also suggests policy 
implication of banning or allowing dual practice in health care system. Banning dual 
practice can be optimal in the case where physician’s competition is weak or treatment 
between public and private is strictly substituted. In the case when physician’s 
competition is strong, the mixed health care system with dual physician practice is 
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preferred. Kuhn and Nuscheler (2013) use a different approach and setting to analyze the 
effect of the waiting list in the excessive supply of private care. They assume that free but 
regular treatment is provided to the public while intensive treatment with payment is 
available in private sector. The result shows that the physicians shift waiting time for the 
cost of public patients to increase the willingness to pay for private treatment. Waiting 
time turns to be socially optimal, over the provision of private care happens if and only if 
the waiting cost is sufficiently high. In the second best allocation, health authority chooses 
physician reimbursement in the public segment without any control over private 
provision. Their research suggests policy for dual practice regulation, banning dual 
practice may improve in the second best allocation, but it depends on the welfare weight 
the health authority attaches to physician profit. 
 
The importance effect of dual practice in health care system leads health authority to 
regulate the dual practice. A recent paper that provides theoretical frameworks on dual 
practice regulation is Gonzales and Stadler (2013). They compare three dual practice 
regulations in the presence of physician’s ability: banning the dual practice, rewarding 
physicians who work exclusively in public, and limiting dual practice in term of 
involvement and earning. They show that banning dual practice is never optimal since the 
benefit from the lower salary needed to retain doctors working in public hospitals is 
always smaller than the cost which arises from the distortion associated with the dual 
practice. Offering exclusive contracts is optimal only when there are limits in enforcing 
policies that restrict the dual practice. Limiting involvement in private is optimal then 




The dual practice situation can be captured using the Hoteling model. The original model 
is in Hotelling (1927), it is known as Hotelling’s linear city model where he explains the 
spatial competition between two firms that selling similar product. The work of Hotelling 
has already expanded in many forms to accommodate economics extensions. A research 
of D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, & Thisse (1979) shows that the solution in Hotelling’s, 
where firms located in the middle of the line is incorrect. After choosing location and 
price, both firms will move a part to reduce the price competition.  The adjustment of the 
model also involves the price competition. The intensity of price competition is 
decreasing with the product differentiation as showed in Picone, Ridley, & Zandbergen 
(2009).  
 
We will explain some of the latter Hotelling framework that is relevant with health care 
especially closely related to our work. Brekke, Nuscheler, & Straume (2006) analyze the 
general case of competition where the product price is exogenous. They compared the two 
results where regulator can set the price before the location selection (full commitment) 
and when the regulator is not committing to set the price after choosing the location 
(partial commitment). The result showed that under full commitment, there is 
overinvestment on quality because of the optimal (second-best) price. The horizontal 
differentiation is insufficient if the transportation cost is high.  The optimal price is the 
first best under partial commitment, but again the horizontal differentiation is high. 
Kuchinke, Zerth, & Wiese (2009) use Hoteling model to explain the competition in health 
care markets mainly in the standardized regional health care market with no price 
competition. The competition is in deciding the level of quality treatment or vertical 
quality after the scope of medical treatment is set (horizontal quality). They constructed 
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the next step of comparison by letting one of the providers to set the level of vertical 
quality first then see how the other companion reacts to it. The result suggested that there 
is more variation in the supply but the standard follower has to leave the regional health 
care market.  
 
This research emphasizes the importance of health care access policy that has main 
purpose to ensure people can get treatment in time needed. From health care access 
framework, our research adopt the definition of access by Evans, Hsu, & Boerma (2013) 
using the first two dimensions of physical ability and financial affordability and excluding 
the acceptability dimension. Dual practice physician is the physical ability that allows 
health care system to have more services available for the people. Dual practice might 
offer more services in term of making the distance of services closer to people and 
offering services in different opening hours. For example, dual practice physicians might 
open their private practice in different opening time with the public facility. The second 
dimension of access in our research is the insurance coverage. We use insurance as the 
mechanism that enables people accessing treatment in health care facility by relieving 
financial burden.   
 
We use Hoteling model to represent the dual practice situation but we do not explore the 
location determination as happened in the Hoteling original work. Our research defines 
providers in the market consists of public facility and private facility. Also, the private 
facility later will be differentiated into the private facility with a private physician and 
private facility with dual practice physician that we will call them private facility and dual 
practice facility for short. In our framework, all patients will get treatment and they only 
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consume one treatment from a specific facility. The treatment of primary and non-
emergency care provided in both facilities is similar.  This research is following the papers 
of Brekke, Nuscheler, and Straume (2006) and Kuchinke, Zerth, and Wiese (2009) in 
some different ways. It holds same ideas on using the Hoteling model to construct the 
relationship between health care providers. Kuchinke, Zerth, and Wiese (2009) emphasize 
the competition between private providers by setting the provider to determine the scope 
of medical treatment then decide on the quality of treatment. Our model points out the 
dual practice mechanism in the health care system using Hoteling model in its original 
form. We use the similar model to explain the price and competition when one of the 
providers sets a standard price and quality. In their framework, one private provider acts 
to be a standard leader in quality of treatment. In ours, providers are public and private 
providers, while price in public sector and quality of treatment in public facility will be set 
by the government in the first stage. The private sector will respond by setting its price 
and quality of treatment in the next stages.   
 
The findings and their implications of this study will redound to the benefit of decision 
makers and providers (public and private) considering that dual practice is a common 
practice in developing country health system where health care provision is provided by 
public sector alongside the private one. Our study analyzes the public facility and private 
facility interaction in term of price and quality in providing treatment under dual practice 
regime and insurance coverage. Both regimes represent developing country situations 
where dual practice is allowed without strict regulation and low coverage of health 
insurance is present. The private sector reaction after health authority sets the price and 
quality on public sector will determine how health authority might manage to increase or 
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decrease the price and quality level. We evaluate the advantage and disadvantage of 
having dual practice and insurance in health care system in terms of welfare. The long run 
welfare is the evaluation when we assumed that price and quality need time to adapt after 
regimes are authorized and the short run welfare is the immediate effect right after the 
policy on dual practice and insurance is launched. Access to health care is the motivation 
of this study and it works as a complement to the previous study on dual practice 
theoretical framework and contributes to dual practice research as it has many different 
settings to consider. The result will contribute suggestions for policy makers to gain 
optimal performance of dual practice and bring benefits to all. 
 
In the sub chapter 2.2, we describe the time line of decision and patient’s demand as the 
basic of our theoretical framework. The sub chapter 2.3 and 2.4 explain the price 
determination and quality determination under dual practice and insurance scheme. The 
sub chapter 2.5 and 2.6 are the calculation of welfare effect in long run and short run; the 
interpretations are included in both sub chapters. Continuing on sub chapter 2.7 is a policy 
implication and sub chapter 2.8 is the discussion. The final sub chapter of 2.9 presents 
conclusion.  
 
2.2 The model 
 
We provide here the summary of model specification of this study while further 
explanation is available in sub chapter 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. In our model, we have two 
facilities, facility 1 and facility 2 that are located in the extreme point of zero and one. The 
cost parameters such as cost to produce a treatment (𝑐) and cost of quality treatment (𝜑) 
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are specific to these facilities, 𝑐𝑖, 𝜑𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. Health care providers can be active in two 
separate market segmented based on working hours as we described as “morning” and 
“afternoon”: 
 In the morning in all circumstances there is public provider in facility 1 and 
private provider in facility 2. 
 In the afternoon, there are two circumstances related to whether dual practice is 
authorized or not in facility 1, there is: 
- either a monopoly with private provision in facility 2 (because dual practice is 
not authorized so facility 1 does not supply), 
- or a duopoly with private provision both in facility 1 and in facility 2 (because 
dual practice is authorized in facility 1). 
One more consideration is the existing insurance in the system, therefore four regimes are 
considered as: No dual practice-No insurance (NN), No dual practice-With insurance 
(NI), Dual practice-No insurance (DN), Dual practice-with Insurance (DI). However by 
construction the NN regime is a particular case of NI and DN of DI with insurance 
variable (𝑠)   equals to one. The analysis will compare the two structurally different 
versions of model, depending whether outcomes of private provision of health care in the 
afternoon is assumed to be monopolistic or duopolistic, both with0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 1. 
 
2.2.1 Time line of decisions 
 
The theoretical framework can be summarized as several steps of decision from different 
agents in the system. The time line of decisions in Figure 2.1 starts with the government 
institution that has authority in deciding health regulation and policy. We will call it health 
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authority or government for short. It will regulate policy for access to health care. Health 
authority has a right to allow dual practice physician or to ban the practice in health care 
system. As happens in most countries, government mostly funds the public sector 
including public health care facility. Besides that, health authority is also responsible for 
providing a health insurance subsidy which allows people getting treatment with a 
reduced treatment fee in public or private facility. Health authority decides on general 
policy of the price in public facility (or treatment fee from patient’s perspective) and the 
quality of treatment in the public sector. In our timeline, we assume that policy on access 
using dual practice regulation and insurance subsidy are easier to manage by government 
so that the price and quality level in public sector will not differentiated based on the set 
of government regulations. 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 Timeline of decisions 
 
There are three providers of health care in the model. The first one is a public health care 
facility; a government owned facility and consists of public physicians. The second 
facility is a private health care facility where private physician provides services. The 
facility is managed by private physician or private company. The last one is a dual 
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practice facility, a private health care facility where dual practice physician serves 
patients. The dual practice physician is a physician working in public facility in the 
morning and providing services in private health care facility in the afternoon. The phrase 
dual practice in general can be expanded into dual job combination between non-practice 
job and practice job but our case is specifically related with a dual job that requires 
physician to have practice or providing health care service in different sector, public and 
private. One should be noted that morning working time and afternoon working time are 
not intersecting each other. 
 
There will be two settings where health authority will regulate the dual practice. In the 
first setting, health authority does not allow dual practice where physicians can only work 
in public or private sector only. In this setting, the providers consist of public facility and 
private facility. In the morning, providers are public and private, and in the afternoon, 
patients are getting treatment from private facility only. We assume that both facilities 
provide primary and non-emergency care. For the second setting, the health authority 
allows dual practice where a physician can choose to work in public, private, or both. In 
the morning, providers are public and private facility; while in the afternoon, provider 
consists of a private facility with private physician and a private facility with dual practice 
physician. We use the term of private facility for referring the first provider while the 
latter is called dual practice facility for simplicity. 
 
Our framework will compare between a situation without insurance and a situation with 
insurance available in the system. The insurance refers to health insurance that is provided 
by government. The insurance mechanism in our study is simplified into direct subsidy so 
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that health authority provides insurance for people without paying any premium. This is a 
similar situation in most of developing countries where the rate of insurance participation 
is still low especially for the low income group. The government usually subsidizes the 
poor ones, while in our case the government provides insurance subsidy for everyone 
when we frame the situation with insurance in health care system. The insurance subsidy 
relieves a part of treatment fee when people decide to visit public or private health care 
facilities. It is important to mention that in our frame work, people can use insurance to 
get treatment in both public and private facilities. Health authority then decides the level 
of health insurance subsidy as percentage of treatment fee that will be paid by the 
government while the rest will be paid by patients. By this description, there is no issue of 
patient’s moral hazard from using insurance to get treatment. We assume that health 
authority is capable in providing a certain amount of subsidy. We do not involve further 
aspect of mechanism to fund the public sector such as taxation. 
 
The next two stages are natural selection on sickness and private provider selects price 
and quality. These two steps can be executed not in sequential order and we put different 
lines (red dash) to describe the unordered process in Figure 2.1. Their positions in the 
time line can be exchanged one another with no effect in the analysis. When natural 
caused occurred, an individual might suffer from illness and he will need a treatment. We 
categorize sickness as a random event. On the other side, the private provider will select 
price and quality of treatment without observing the nature move. Private provider cannot 
observe physician’s information of illness condition during selection of price and quality 
level. The provider cannot identify which individual gets sickness or the level of severity 
but it only sees sick people who showing up for treatment. The model assumes that 
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patients always consume one treatment of health care in the chosen time and chosen 
facility. 
 
The final stage is when people decide in which provider they will take a health care 
treatment. We differentiate the health care need in two periods of time, morning working 
hours and afternoon working hours. This division can be interpreted into different 
perspective, for example people might visit health facilities during public working hours 
(regular working hours) and the extended working hours (after regular working hours). 
We will use morning and afternoon term for simplicity. People can choose between public 
and private provider in the morning; this is a usual time when public facility offers 
services during office hours. In the afternoon people can choose from private provider 
only when dual practice is not allowed in the system. When dual practice is allowed in the 
system, patient can choose between private facility and dual practice facility. One should 
note that patient’s decision to choose health care facility will be taken after people have 
illness and decide to seek care. The model neglects the possibility for people doing self-
treatment or taking no care during illness period. Our research frame works more 
appropriately in the case of non-emergency care and specifically the primary care where 
the decision of health care choice more depends on the patient side rather than influence 
of medical advice from physician.  
 
The model also takes physician decision to involve in dual practice as a taken as given 
decision and not included in our theoretical framework. Our initial attempt has explored 
the possibility to include the physician’s decision into the model but it only adds 
complexity without implying the precision on overcoming research question. While we 
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have to focus on our study to analyze the trade-offs between two alternatives policies, 
dual practice policy and insurance coverage. We specifically analyze the physician’s 
decision later in our empirical study at Chapter 4.  
 
This research only focuses on the last two stages while the first three stages are treated as 
taken as given. Our research is a sub game from a larger multi stage game as some parts 
of the game are being set, and the solution is solved using backward induction. We 
provide summary of actions for each agent of our analysis in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2. 1 Agent’s decision in the last two stages of timeline decision 
Private provider Patient 
Determine: 
 Price 
 Quality of treatment 
Select health care facility between: 
 Public facility 
 Private facility 
 Dual practice facility 
 
 
2.2.2 Demand for treatment 
 
The general idea of allowing physician having dual job in public and private sector is to 
allow people to have more access to health care. The public facility usually has limited 
capacity to provide services for all people. Gonzales (2005) initiates her work by 
assuming capacity constrained in public facility. The dual practice enables public 
physician to open additional practice apart from the usual opening office hours. We model 
this description using differentiation of demand into two categories; demand at regular 
schedule and demand at after hour schedule. Usually regular schedule of the facility 
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follows the usual working hours during the day while the after hour schedule refers to 
after public working hours or afternoon opening hours. For the consistency with previous 
explanation, we will call the demand at regular schedule as demand in the morning, and 
demand at after hour schedule as demand in the afternoon.  
 
When dual practice is allowed in the system, a patient selects health care facility based on 
visiting time to get treatment in the morning or in the afternoon. In the morning he can 
choose between the public provider or private facility. In the afternoon, he can choose a 
private facility with a dual practitioner (dual practice facility) or private facility with a 
private physician (private facility). This is a capacity increase in dual practice facility 
while it is decreasing capacity for public facility. Without dual practice in health care 
system where physician only works in public or private facility, the patient chooses 
between public and private facility in the morning visit, while in the afternoon, all patients 
go to private practice only. To simplify the presentation of main effects, patients do not 
choose the period in which they demand care. The model assumes that all patients 
consume only one treatment in selected facility and selected time period.  
 
The detailed of patient decision on selecting health care facility is described in Figure 2.2. 
The patients choose health care facility based on the existence of dual practice regulation 
and working hours. The decision in the morning will be the same between two regimes 
that people may choose between public facility and private facility. The difference appears 
for the afternoon’s option, under dual practice regime, patient can choose between dual 
practice facility and private facility, while under no dual practice regime, all patients go to 







Figure 2. 2 Detailed decisions based on the regulation and working hours 
 
In this research, patient’s utility consists of individual income to represent goods other 
than health care treatment that can be afforded using the income, 𝑦. By putting income in 
the model, we define the price or treatment fee from health care provider (𝑝𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2,  
that should be paid by patient and it cannot exceed the income. The specific purpose of 
getting treatment in health care provider is for patient’s benefit from health care treatment 
and it is measured in term of quality of treatment from different providers (𝑞𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2. 
Cost component from patient’s perspective is travel cost, 𝑡, that depends on the patient’s 
distance from the facility, 𝑥 . We assume that the total distance is normalized to be equal 
to one. All patients are looking for care treatment and they are uniformly distributed in the 
line between providers, with maximum one. Patient will select between two health care 
providers that are located at the endpoint of segment length of one. The public facility is 




Morning: public facility 
vs private facility 
Afternoon: dual 
practice facility vs 
private facility 
No Dual Practice 
Morning: public facility 





Patient choices based 
on time and facility 
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All patients eventually will get care and will be treated in one of health care facility: 
public facility, private facility, or dual practice facility. We realize that this is a strong 
assumption because under some circumstances not all patients can be treated in health 
care facilities. In the initial version of the model, we made some patients not being able to 
receive treatment due to financial constraint. That model had the same basic insight as the 
current one which has the merit of being simpler.  
 
Patient’s utility from public facility (𝑈𝑝𝑢𝑏) is: 
 
𝑈𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑦 + 𝑞1̃ − 𝑝1̃ − 𝑡𝑥     (2. 1) 
 
Patient’s utility from private facility (𝑈𝑝𝑣) is: 
 
𝑈𝑝𝑣 = 𝑦 + 𝑞2 − 𝑝2 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥)      (2. 2) 
 
The 𝑞1̃ and 𝑝1̃ are quality and price in public facility that will be set at fixed value by 
government at the beginning of the game. Public sector facility is assumed to have 
enough capacity to seize all demand at equilibrium prices, The setting of 𝑞1̃ and 𝑝1̃ are not 
drained the public capacity since changes in 𝑝2will also change the demand for the public 
sector in the morning. The 𝑞2 and 𝑝2 are quality and price in the private provider that will 
be solved for the purpose of this research. 
 
We compose demand for treatment based on time periods; the first one is the demand for 
treatment in the morning, and the latter is demand in the afternoon. The working time 
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division captures the situation when public provider usually serves during the morning 
working hours, especially for providing primary care and non-emergency treatment. The 
feature of the model is implying that private facility has longer working hours than public 
facility. Private facility provides services in both times, in the morning and in the 
afternoon.  The public facility is closed in the afternoon and the only provided facility for 
the patients is a private one.  
 
Now we will define the demand function of health care provider where a patient seeks the 
treatment for each time period. We assume that patient only consumes one treatment 
during sickness episode from a particular provider (public, private facility or dual practice 
facility). It is also assumed that patients do not move between morning or afternoon 
working hours. The patient chooses between public or private provider in the morning 
working hours. We will write the demand notation as 𝑥𝑖
𝑎𝑚 for morning demand of i-
facility. Our framework define that in morning and afternoon working time, there are two 
facilities: public and private (morning) and private and dual practice (afternoon if dual 
practice exist) or only private facility (if dual practice does not exist). The demand in the 
other facility in the morning is denoted as 𝑥𝑗
𝑎𝑚 = (1 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑎𝑚). The afternoon demand in 
the-i facility is 𝑥𝑖
𝑝𝑚 .  The other facility demand in the afternoon is represented by 
𝑥𝑗
𝑝𝑚 = (1 − 𝑥𝑖






𝑡 + 𝑞1̃ − 𝑝1̃ − 𝑞2 + 𝑝2
2𝑡
 (2. 3) 
        






𝑎𝑚 = (1 − 𝑥1
𝑎𝑚) =
𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ + 𝑞2 − 𝑝2
2𝑡
 (2. 4) 
 
Patient visits private provider in the afternoon as the public provider has already closed 
after the morning working hours. The demand function when dual practice exists in the 
health care system means that patient can choose between private provider with dual 
practice physician and private provider with private physician. The private provider with 
dual practice physician, we called it dual practice facility for short, is a private practice 
where the physician is a public physician, or working in the public facility during the 
morning working hours and open a private practice in the afternoon. It is assumed that the 
dual practice physician provides services in the same location with the public facility. In 
the usual case; for example; public physician usually has housing facility in the same 
location with the public provider. He serves in public community health center in the 
morning working hour then in the afternoon he opens private practice in the same 
location.  The dual practice physician might have benefit because patients have already 
recognized the facility location as the same place as public facility (in the morning). On 
the other hand, this physician might have higher workload because he worked in the 
morning and after hour services so he cannot provide optimal services to patients. 
Regarding this, patient in the afternoon might consider coming to private facility and 






𝑡 + 𝑞1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑞2 + 𝑝2
2𝑡
 (2. 5) 
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The (𝑝1, 𝑞1) is the choice of price and quality in dual practice facility. The demand of 




𝑝𝑚 = (1 − 𝑥2
𝑝𝑚) =
𝑡 − 𝑞1 + 𝑝1 + 𝑞2 − 𝑝2
2𝑡
 (2. 6) 
      
In the case when dual practice is not allowed in the system, all patients will visit private 
provider with a private physician (private facility) in the afternoon. 
 
In the next explanation, we will show when insurance takes part in the model. The 
insurance, in this case, is a percentage of treatment fees that should be paid by the patient, 
while the insurance company will pay the rest. Since the insurance is paid ex-ante, the 
insurance only influences income, 𝑦 , but not the decision to look for a health care 
provider, public or private. We assume that insurance will cover whatever provider the 
patient decides to visit, whether it is public or private. Patient’s utility from public facility 
with insurance is:  
 
𝑈𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑦 + 𝑞1̃ − 𝑠𝑝1̃ − 𝑡𝑥    (2. 7) 
 
Patient’s utility from private facility with insurance is:  
 
𝑈𝑝𝑣 = 𝑦 + 𝑞2 − 𝑠𝑝2 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥)   (2. 8) 
 
We can define the demand of public facility in the morning as:  
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𝑡 + 𝑞1̃ − 𝑠𝑝1̃ − 𝑞2 + 𝑠𝑝2
2𝑡
 (2. 9) 
   




𝑎𝑚 = (1 − 𝑥1
𝑎𝑚) =
𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑠𝑝1̃ + 𝑞2 − 𝑠𝑝2
2𝑡
 (2. 10) 
 
By including the insurance component into the utility function, we arrange the demand of 
treatment in the afternoon under dual practice regime. The demand of dual practice 





𝑡 + 𝑞1 − 𝑠𝑝1 − 𝑞2 + 𝑠𝑝2
2𝑡
 (2. 11) 
 
Demand of private facility in the afternoon is 
 
 𝑥2
𝑝𝑚 = (1 − 𝑥1
𝑝𝑚) =
𝑡 − 𝑞1 + 𝑠𝑝1 + 𝑞2 − 𝑠𝑝2
2𝑡
 (2. 12) 
 
The next step is to solve the price and quality in private facility in different combinations 
of dual practice and insurance coverage. We will explain and compare between the four 
cases that are given at the beginning of the game: when there is no dual practice and no 
insurance in the system, no dual practice but insurance in the system, dual practice but no 
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insurance in the system, and the last one is when dual practice and insurance both appear 
in the system. 
 
2.3 Price in the private provider 
 
In this sub chapter, we will show the decision of private provider in setting the price in the 
responses of regulation on dual practice and insurance existence in the system. There will 
be four cases in the analysis: the case of no dual practice-no insurance (NN), the case of 
no dual practice but insurance is existed (NI), the case of dual practice but no insurance 
(DN), and the last case will be the case with dual practice and with the insurance in the 
system (DI). The private provider in facility 2 chooses the same price and quality in the 
two market segments (morning and afternoon). The equal price of private facility in the 
morning and the afternoon is in line with observed reality that private doctors/facilities 
required to announce/post their prices either by regulation or by management decision 
(reputation). It also related with ethical reasons. The difference price usually applied if it 
relates with different services such as emergency services which is beyond our scope of 
study. The equality of private facility is related to fixed elements of the facility. The sum 
of profit earned in the two segments is maximized. This does not hold for the competitor 
which is the dual practice facility, because in the afternoon (with dual practice), the price 
and quality in facility are obtained by maximizing the afternoon profit only. The morning 
price and quality for public sector is regulated by government and taken as given. The 
equilibrium price (𝑝1
𝐷𝑁)  and quality (𝑞1
𝐷𝑁)  or  𝑝1
𝐷𝐼  and 𝑞1
𝐷𝐼  depend on 𝑝1̃ and 𝑞1̃ 




2.3.1 Price in the private provider when dual practice is not allowed and no 
insurance scheme 
 
We define the profit function for the private provider, 𝜋, as a function of demand, price, 
and cost. The demand of treatment in private provider consists of demand in the morning 
working hours and in the afternoon after working hours. The subscripts equal to 2 denotes 
the private provider. The cost component of 𝑐2 , measures the cost of providing a 
particular treatment for a single patient in private facility. The 𝜑2 is a quality cost, a cost 
to improve treatment quality for private provider.  The quality level of treatment, 𝑞2 , will 
depend on this cost. We put abbreviation of NN attach on profit, price and quality for the 
no dual practice-no insurance scheme. 
 
The profit function of private provider consists of health care demand in the morning 
where public and private provider are available and demand of health care in the 
afternoon where there is private provider available. The demand then multiplied with the 






















𝑁𝑁 − 𝑐2) + 𝑥2
𝑝𝑚. (𝑝2






























= 0. This 
is a first order condition for profit maximization of private provider. Hence from the profit 




3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ + 𝑞2
𝑁𝑁 + 𝑐2
2







 (2. 15) 
 
By replacing the 𝑞2
𝑁𝑁 in (2.15) to the  𝑝2
𝑁𝑁  (2.14) and then moving the  𝑝2
𝑁𝑁 into the 

















The complete steps to get 2.16 is available in the Appendix 2A.1. The following 
proposition results from the analysis. 
 
Proposition 1: The price of treatment in private facility is positively related with the price 
in public sector set by health authority. The higher the price in public 
facility is, the higher the price in private sector.  
 
Based on the solution of price equilibrium under no dual practice-no insurance regime in 
(2.16), the price of public facility, 𝑝1̃, is a positive nominator and has direct positive 
impact on the price of private facility. To confirm the Proposition 1, we conduct the 
comparative statics that shows the effect of increasing and decreasing price in public 


























) > 0 
(2. 17) 
 
The second order condition confirms the result that the price in public facility has positive 





















The general specification for valid conclusions are that 𝑝2 > 0, 𝑝1̃ ≥ 0, 𝑞1̃ ≥ 0, 𝑡 ≥
0, 𝑐2 ≥ 0 , and 𝜑2 > 0  . This also applies for other propositions. The higher the 
government sets the price in public, the higher private provider will set the price. Private 
sector gives common response in dealing with the public price as part of the competition. 
By offering higher price, private sector still attracts patient because patients in the 
afternoon will definitely go to private provider. High price in private facility also implies 
a high level of quality in private facility as it is indicated in (2.15), so that there are 
patients who still visiting private facility in order to get high quality.  
 
Proposition 2: The price in private facility is negatively related with quality in public 
sector. 
 
Using the comparative statics of quality 𝑞1̃ by solving the second order conditions that 




















At the beginning of the decision stage, if the government sets the higher level of quality 
treatment in public facility, the private sector responses by lowering the price while it is 
assumed other things constant. The high level of quality in public sector must attract more 
patients, and private sector lowered the price in order to get more patients. The decreasing 
price might be followed with the decreasing quality, but in this case, the marginal profit 
by lowering the price is still attracts more patients and gives more profit for private 
provider. 
 
Proposition 3: The high (or low leve)l of price in the private sector is related with high 
(or low level) of patient’s travel cost.  
 
The comparative statics (see Appendix 2B.1) shows that travel cost has positive relation 
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> 0 (2. 20) 
 
The travel cost plays an essential role from the provider’s perspective, and it must be 
greater than zero 𝑡 > 0. The result shows that the higher the travel cost faced by the 
patient, the private sector decides to increase the price. As it is mentioned in the previous 
sub chapter, the t describes the location differentiation between patient and provider. This 
can be translated further into different aspects such as distance or travel cost. We use the 
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last term for our purpose. High travel cost usually associates with far distance between 
patients from health care provider. It indicates that there is limited number of provider in 
the system hence the competition between provider is low and private provider can set 
higher price without losing attractiveness from patient.  
 
Proposition 4: The price of treatment will be set into high (low) level when the private 
facility has high (low) cost to provide treatment.    
 
The analysis on cost of treatment 𝑐2 provides a proof that when private facility needs a 
higher cost to produce a treatment then the price level will be increasing. The relationship 
between price and cost is consistent with the standard economics. The increasing price is 
a logic respond from private providers when they have high cost level in order to keep the 
profit margin. Besides the direct relation to the price, the cost of treatment also has an 
indirect effect to the price. It goes through the quality of treatment, where cost of 
treatment moves into the same direction with the quality. The quality will increase as the 
price also increases. The comparative static to support the claim is following and the 


















> 0 (2. 21) 
 
Proposition 5: The cost of quality treatment in private facility has direct and indirect 
effects to the price in the private facility. The relation between cost of 
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quality and price in private facility might be positive or negative depends 
on other parameter values.  
 
The difference effect appears for the cost of quality treatment, 𝜑2, that has indirect effect 
to the price through quality. The effect of 𝜑2 is closely related with other variables of 
𝑡, 𝑞1̃, 𝑝1̃,  and 𝑐2 . When the 
1
2
(3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ + 𝑐2) < 𝑐2 , the increase in 𝜑2  will be 
followed with an increase on the price of the private provider (
𝜕𝑝2
𝜕𝜑2
> 0). When the  
1
2
(3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ + 𝑐2) > 𝑐2, an increase in 𝜑2 will be followed with a decrease in the on 
price of the private provider (
𝜕𝑝2
𝜕𝜑2
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<> 0 (2. 22) 
 








𝑁𝑁 − 𝑐2) + 1. (𝑝2




. When cost 
of treatment equal to zero (𝑐2 = 0), and 
𝜕𝑝2
𝜕𝜑2
< 0, it means that the high cost of providing 
quality treatment makes private provider will have less net benefit because private 
provider cannot charge high price. The private provider prefers to expand quantity which 
has less cost of production (small value of 𝜑2). Patients will attract to this facility because 
it offers low price. The provider still gets profit from this additional increase of demand.  
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> 0. The private provider prefers not producing more services because of 
high cost. The facility chooses to set high price in order to get better profit margin. The 
increasing cost associates with the increasing quality level so that private facility still 
attract patients who are concerned with the quality rather than price. On the other hand, 
the increasing price potentially causes a decrease in number of patients, but the losing 
demand is not as important as when cost of treatment is equal to zero (𝑐2 = 0) because 
provider has already get better margin from the increasing price.   
 
2.3.2 Price in private provider when dual practice is not allowed but an insurance 
scheme does exist 
 
In the second case, we introduce an additional variable to measure the effect of insurance. 
We take the basic idea of insurance that patient shares the financial risk to the other party. 
When insurance scheme exists in health care system, it means that patient will not pay full 
treatment fee to health care provider, but the insurance company reimburses a part of 
treatment fee instead. We define s as proportion of treatment fee that will be paid by the 
patient, the (1 − 𝑠) is the proportion of treatment fee paid by insurance company. The 
s=0 implies that patient gets full coverage from insurance coverage, while s=1 means no 
insurance coverage or patient has to pay the entire treatment fee by himself. We simplify 
the role of insurance by focusing on the reimbursement mechanism by insurance 
company and ignoring neither the premium payment mechanism nor the individual 




We compose the profit function in private provider by putting the demand function with 
the insurance variable, 𝑠, in it. The 𝑠 attaches with price component whether it is the price 





























































= 0, we get the 
solution of price in private facility as (see Appendix 2A.3) 
 𝑝2
𝑁𝐼 =












3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑠𝑝1̃ − 𝑠𝑐2
4𝑠𝜑2𝑡 − 1




Proposition 6: The equilibrium price in the private facility is higher for more insurance 
coverage. 
 
The value of s must be between zero and 1, 0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1. We analyze how insurance role in 
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< 0 (2. 26) 
The result shows that the less insurance will be followed by the decreasing price in private 
provider or in other words, the increasing level of patient’s insurance, the higher the 
private sets the price. The general conditions for the results are 𝑝2 > 0, 𝑝1̃ ≥ 0, 𝑞1̃ ≥
0, 𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑐2 ≥ 0, 𝜑2 > 0, and 0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1. 
 
We provide simple simulation in Figure 2.3 to show the role of insurance in the system. In 
this point, we have no guidance to set the values for the simulation.  There is no definition 
on how variables involved in our model will be measured in real life nor a certain scale 
for each variable. The main goal in doing simulation is to assert this possibility exists and 
no claims about the empirical facts. The simulation uses the solution of price in private 
facility. The point A indicates low insurance coverage so that the private provider sets low 
price. The point B indicates high level of insurance coverage and private facility will have 
high price. As the percentage of treatment fee covered by insurance is increasing, the 
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price is slowly increasing. The figure in 2.3 uses fixed values of 𝑐2 = 1,𝜑2 = 1, 𝑡 =
5,0.1 ≤  𝑠 ≤ 1, 𝑝1̃ = 1, 𝑞1̃ = 0.1 but in general the results do not depend on the selected 
sets of values as long as we keep 𝑝2 > 0, 𝑝1̃ ≥ 0, 𝑞1̃ ≥ 0, 𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑐2 ≥ 0, 𝜑2 > 0 , and 
0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1 also second order conditions are hold.  
 
 
Figure 2. 3 Price and Insurance Relationship 
 
The more 𝑠  towards one, 0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1 that indicates people are having less insurance, the 
price of private facility will be decreased. The result implies that the more insurance 
covers the treatment fee, the private provider will set higher price. The result in 2.6 holds 
for general cases.  
 
Proposition 7: The price of treatment in private facility under no dual practice-with 
insurance (NI) is related in the same way with the remaining variables 
such as price of public facility, quality of public, cost of treatment in 
private and cost of quality treatment in private sector as in the previous 
case of no dual practice-no insurance in the system (NN).  
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The detailed proof using second order conditions is available in the Appendix. The price 
in public sector has important effect on the price setting by private facility. Private facility 
reacts into same direction with the price in public facility set by health authority. The 
increasing public quality leads to the decreasing level of price by private sector. This 
behavior can be translated that price is not the only component that involve in the 
competition between public and private sector. Private sectors still might attract patients 
although they provide treatment with higher price and offer higher quality of treatment. In 
the sub chapter of 2.4 that specifically discussing on quality determination, we will 
provide the detailed relationship between price and quality.  
 
The cost components which are cost of treatment and cost of quality give the same 
direction as previous regime. The explanation will be straightforward that when facility 
provides treatment with the higher cost, the direct consequence to maintain the revenue is 
by increasing the price. The cost of quality might have positive or negative relation with 
the price depends on which variable that has higher domination among others.  
 
2.3.3 Price in private provider when dual practice is allowed but an insurance 
scheme does not exist 
 
Dual practice existence in health care system allows people to have more options 
regarding health care provider. In the morning working hours, people can only choose 
between public and private provider, but in the afternoon, people now can choose private 
provider with dual practice physician (we call it dual practice facility for short) and 
private provider with private physician (private facility). 
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The 𝑝1̃ and 𝑞1̃ represent the price and quality in public facility. While the price and quality 
for private facility are 𝑝2
𝐷𝑁 and 𝑞2
𝐷𝑁. The new components that appear in this scheme 
and not in the previous two schemes are the components of price and quality in dual 
practice facility, 𝑝1
𝐷𝑁 and 𝑞1
𝐷𝑁. The rest of variables represent cost components, such as 
travel cost to facility, t, cost of providing treatment in private facility and dual practice 
facility, 𝑐2 and 𝑐1. We assume that the cost of providing treatment in dual practice facility 
is similar with cost of providing treatment in public facility, hence we use the same 
symbol of 𝑐1. The cost of quality treatment in private and dual practice facility are 𝜑2and 
𝜑1. The same case with cost of treatment, the cost of quality treatment in dual practice is 
equal with in public facility, hence we use the equal symbol of 𝜑1for both facilities. The 
assumption is based on the fact that we model the dual practice facility as a private 
practice that located in the same location as public facility with the same public physician. 
Hence the cost of producing treatment with certain level of quality might be the same with 
the cost of providing treatment in public provider.  
 
We solve the solution of the price in private facility, 𝑝2

















= 0. The result also provides 
solution for the price in the dual practice facility, 𝑝1
𝐷𝑁. We focus on analyzing the price in 
the private facility, 𝑝2
𝐷𝑁 so that the result can be compared with the result from other 
regimes, but we provide the complete works of  𝑝1
𝐷𝑁 in the Appendix. The solution of 






























) 2 (2 −
1
𝜑2𝑡





































) 2 (2 −
1
𝜑2𝑡










Proposition 8: The price in private facility under the dual practice-without insurance 
scheme (DN) is affected by variables of  price in public, quality in public, 
travel cost, cost of treatment, and cost of quality in the same direction as 
the relation in the no dual practice-no insurance regime (NN).   
 
The detailed comparative statics are presented in the Appendix 2B.3. It is confirmed using 
second order condition that the increasing price in public facility will be followed with the 
increasing price in private sector under dual practice-without insurance scheme. The 
additional facility in the afternoon which is dual practice facility allows patients to choose 
between private facility and dual practice facility. But the options are still the same for the 
health facility in the morning which is between public facility and private facility. The 
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price setting for the private facility comes from single price equilibrium so that the price 
for private facility in the morning working hours will be the same with the price in private 
facility in the afternoon working hours. The general conditions to guarantee the 
consistency of the results are 𝑝2 > 0, 𝑝1 > 0, 𝑝1̃ ≥ 0, 𝑞1̃ ≥ 0, 𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑐2 ≥ 0, 𝑐1 ≥ 0 , 
𝜑2 > 0, 𝜑1 and 0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1. 
 
Remark 1: The price in dual practice facility under the dual practice-without insurance 
scheme (DN) positively relates with the price in public facility that is set by 
health authority in the beginning of the game. The comparison between price 
in dual practice and price in private facility shows that in general price in 
private facility will have higher price compare to price of treatment in dual 
practice facility although in some cases the comparison shows the contrary. 
The results will depend on the other variables that appear in the model.  
 
The price in dual practice facility has indirect relation with the public price facility 
through price in private facility because from the demand formation, the dual practice 
facility only competes with private facility in the afternoon.  The increasing price in 
public facility will be responded with the increasing price in private facility. This situation 
will impact the equilibrium price in dual practice facility.  
 
The Figure 2.4 uses fixed variables of 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 1,𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 1, 𝑡 = 5, 0 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤
100, 𝑞1̃ = 0.1 to show the comparison between price in private facility (𝑝2
𝐷𝑁) and dual 
practice facility (𝑝1
𝐷𝑁) along with the increasing value of price in public, 𝑝1̃. Both prices 
are increasing along with the increasing value of price in public facility. In the afternoon, 
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the demand of private facility is decreasing as the price in private goes up. People might 
favor dual practice facility so that demand of dual practice is increasing although the price 
in dual practice is going up but not as fast as the increasing price in private provider. The 
difference phase of changing demand and price between private facility and dual practice 
facility cause the price in dual practice is higher than the price in private facility in the 
beginning but after sometimes the price in private facility becomes much higher than the 
price in dual practice.  
 
 
Figure 2. 4 The comparison between price in dual practice facility and price in 
private facility 
 
2.3.4 Price in private provider when dual practice is allowed and an insurance 
scheme does exist 
 
The last case in our framework is the situation where there are dual practice physician and 
insurance coverage in the system. The dual practice allows patient in the afternoon to 
choose between private facility with dual practice physician (dual practice facility) and 
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private facility with private physician (private facility). The insurance component, 
𝑠, represents the proportion of treatment fee that been paid individually to the health care 
facility by the patient. The (1 − 𝑠) represents the insurance coverage that will relieves a 
proportion of treatment fee paid by patient. The value of s is between zero and one,  
0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1. 
 
The profit function for each provider in this scenario is the additional form of profit in the 
morning and profit in the afternoon as appeared before in the previous regimes, but now 
we include insurance component in demand function and dual practice facility option in 
the afternoon working hours. In the morning, the private facility will provide treatments 
together with the public provider, while in the afternoon private facility and dual practice 
facility are the providers that will serve the patients. The profit function for the private 
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The next is the profit function of dual practice facility that consists of afternoon demand 








































The  𝑝1̃  is a public price, 𝑞1̃  is a treatment quality in public, 𝑝2  and 𝑞2 are price and 
quality treatment in private facility, 𝑐2 is treatment cost in private facility,  𝑠  is the 
percentage of treatment fee that paid by the patient, 𝑡 is travel cost, and 𝜑2 is quality cost 
in the private facility. The 𝑝1  and 𝑞1 are price and quality treatment in dual practice 
facility. The 𝑐1and 𝜑1  are cost of treatment and quality cost in private-dual practice 

















= 0. The solution of price in private facility is obtained using the same way as 
in the previous regime. We provide the complete work in the Appendix 2A.7. The solution 
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Here we directly put the result for the solution of price in dual practice facility while the 
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Proposition 9: Under dual practice-with insurance scheme (DI), the variable of price in 
public facility has the positive relationship with the price in private 
facility, while the quality of public facility has negative relation with the 
price of private facility.   
 
Using a comparative statics (Appendix 2B.4) to see how the price in public, 𝑝1̃, affects the 





> 0, where the increasing of public price set by government is followed by 
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The comparative statics of quality in public provider shows that whenever the quality in 
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Proposition 10: The variables under dual practice-with insurance regime (DI) such as 
the price of public facility, 𝑝1̃, the quality of treatment in public facility, 
𝑞1̃, travel cost, t, insurance coverage, s, have the similar effect to the 
price of private facility under no dual practice-without insurance 
regime (NI). 
 
The travel cost measures the distance of patient from the facility. It shows that the higher 





> 0, the detailed formulation is in Appendix 2B.4. We assume that travel 
cost is positively related with travel distance to health facility. It can be interpreted as the 
scarcity of facility so that patient needs to go far distance to get treatment. The facility has 
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higher bargaining position to determine higher price level. The travel cost shows identical 
behavior in affecting price setting in private facility. Under dual practice and insurance 
regime, the travel cost has positive relationship with the price of private facility.  
 
The insurance ownership by the patient that indicates the insurance existence in the 
system leads to the increasing price in private facility. In our model, the 𝑠 is the part of 
treatment fee paid by the patient, while the (1 − 𝑠) is the percentage of treatment fee paid 
by insurance company. Using insurance term, this mechanism is also known as 




< 0 . The complete 
equation of insurance comparative statics is available in the appendixes.  The more 
insurance coverage available for patients, the price level in private facility will go up.  
 
The cost components in the model are cost of treatment and cost of quality treatment. The 
first one relates with a unit cost to provide a single treatment in the facility, while the 





> 0, the more costly the cost to produce a unit of treatment, the higher 
a private facility sets its price. The cost of quality indicates the relationship with the price 




<> 0. The positive or negative relationship depends on other 
variables involved, particularly the travel cost, price in public, and quality in public. The 
increasing cost of quality treatment makes private facility to increase the price. The 
number of patients might decrease because of this increasing price. In this case, the cost 
of quality has a positive relationship with the price. In order to recover the demand level, 
the private facility might reduce the price although the cost of quality is still high. The 
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provider might think that regaining demands level will have larger profit margin compare 
to profit margin from the increasing price. In this case the relationship between quality 
treatment cost and the price is negative.  But in general, the cost components behave 
exactly as expected, the more cost needed to produce a particular treatment then the price 
of treatment will increase. 
 
2.4 Quality of treatment 
 
The quality of treatment in public facility, private facility, and dual practice facility will be 
discussed in this sub chapter. In general, quality is related with price and cost components 
such as cost of treatment and cost of quality, and travel cost. The solution of quality is 
solved simultaneously with the solution of price. From equation (2.15), the quality of 






 (2. 37) 
 
The solution of price in quality treatment is obtained by substituting the 𝑝2  in above 
expression using 𝑝2 solution in each scenario. The price has important role in the quality 
determination and it shows that the price and quality moves in the same direction. The 
other three variables are characterized the cost variables in quality and moves in different 
direction, as the cost increase, the quality will decrease.  The cost component underlines 
the fact that the more costly to produce the treatment, the cost will directly reduce the 




We show the complete solution of quality for each scheme in the Appendix of 2A.2, 2A.4, 
2A.6, and 2A.8. We write the final result in this sub chapter by adding the superscript to 
differentiate situation of no dual practice-no insurance (NN), no dual practice-with 
insurance (NI), dual practice-no insurance (DN), and dual practice-insurance (DI).  The 





















3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ − 𝑐2
4𝜑2𝑡 − 1
 (2. 38) 
 
We show the positive relationship between price and quality in no dual practice-no 
insurance regime in Figure 2.5. The pattern also appears in quality in private provider for 








Figure 2. 5 Price in public and price in private 
 
Using the same method, the quality for the private facility without dual practice but under 





3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑠𝑝1̃ − 𝑠𝑐2
4𝑠𝜑2𝑡 − 1
 (2. 39) 
 
The quality of private facility with dual practice but without insurance (𝑞2
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Proposition 11: Quality of treatment in private facility is positively related to price. 
 
In general, the quality of treatment is determined by the level of price in private provider. 
A high price means that private provider has more incentive to provide treatment with 
high quality. The decreasing price on the other hand makes private facility to reduce the 
level of quality treatment. The mechanism describes rational decision of private provider 
to maintain the profit while considering the quality level. The high price in private 
provider might reduce patient’s interest to visit the facility. In order to maintain the 
number of patients, the private provider has to increase the level of quality. Hence some 
patients still consider coming to private facility although price is high, especially patients 
who think that quality of treatment is matter and they still can afford it.  
 
The relationship between quality of treatment and the price is showed in Figure 2.6. It 
describes the quality in private under four regimes. In this simulation, we set all variables 
constant except the price in public facility. From the previous chapter, we have already 
concluded that the price in private facility is positively related with the price in public. 
Whenever there is an increasing or decreasing price in public provider, it will be followed 
with the increasing or decreasing price in private facility. From the Proposition 11, the 
quality in private facility is affected by its price. These two connections imply that the 
increasing price in public facility leads to the increasing quality in private sector. Private 
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facility gives similar reaction under four regimes.  In the graph, we set the values of 
𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 1, 𝑡 = 100, 𝑠 = 0.5, 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 1; 0 ≤ 𝑝1̃  ≤ 100.  
 
The Figure 2.6 shows that the first regime of no dual practice-no insurance (NN) has the 
lowest level of quality treatment among others. While the highest level of quality 
treatment is at the dual practice with insurance regime (DI). Although this is not the 
general conclusion for the comparison among four regimes, the result in Figure 2.6 can be 
explained as follows. Private facility might charge high price when insurance coverage is 
in the system. The more competitive situation under dual practice regime can be 
considered by the private facility to reduce the price. But in this case the increasing price 
from the insurance effect gains more so that private provider will set high level of quality 








Remark 2: Introducing dual practice to the system irrespective of existence of  insurance 
might increase or decrease quality of treatment. 
 
We provide proof for the Remark 2 by finding the difference between quality in the 
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The result simulation shows that the difference might be larger or smaller than zero. 
Moving into dual practice situation when the system available is already with or without 
insurance has positive or negative consequence to quality of treatment. The level of 
quality might be higher or lower along with the introduction of dual practice.  
 
2.5 Welfare effects in the long run 
 
We have mentioned in the earlier sub chapter that our framework of access involves dual 
practice and insurance coverage as physical ability and financial affordability. However in 
our timelines decision, we focus on the patient and physician relationship under dual 
practice regime and insurance coverage. To justify which regime performs better among 
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the other, we compose a standard welfare analysis in the long run and short run. In general 
we calculate the sum of surplus from all agents involved in the framework.  
 
The first agent in the model is the patient. The surplus of patient is the total utility of 
patient from getting treatment when visiting one of health care facilities. The crucial 
element in the dual practice regime is that dual practice creates competitor of health care 
providers. We differentiate demand of treatment based on the opening hours, morning 
working hours and afternoon working hours for easier interpretation.   
 
The second agent is related with health care facility that represent physician’s working 
place between public facility, private facility, and dual practice facility. The surplus of 
health facility is a profit function from each facility that involved in each regime by 
considering demand from each working hours. When dual practice physician allowed in 
the system, the available facilities in the morning are public facility and private facility 
while in the afternoon the available facilities are private facility and dual practice facility. 
When dual practice is not allowed in the system, the available options in the morning are 
public facility or private facility while in the afternoon consists of private facility only.  
 
The next agent is the insurance company and government. We model the insurance 
scheme as a subsidized insurance provided by the government. The insurance company 
will pay a percentage amount of treatment fee to health care facility and receive the exact 
reimbursement from the government. Hence the insurance company is in null state. The 
government will transfer the amount of treatment fee directly to insurance company only 
when the insurance scheme exists in the system. We assume that the government has 
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sufficient budget for covering the insurance subsidy and transfer to the insurance 
company.  Our study will not look further into how government collecting funds to 
finance the insurance, for example trough taxation. The limitation has main purpose for 
the simplification of the study. When we refer back to our time line decision, it is clear 
that our study starts with health authority decision on dual practice regulation without 
mentioning funding mechanism.  
 
We construct the welfare function to compare four conditions of dual practice and 
insurance combination: no dual practice-no insurance (NN), no dual practice-insurance 
(NI), dual practice-no insurance (DN), and dual practice-insurance (DI). The welfare 
effect in the long run, is a function of economic variables that are involved in the system.  
The construction involves the adjusted price and the adjusted quality in the equilibrium 
state. We assume that in the long run, the private sector has enough time to adapt the price 
and its quality after the government sets the price and quality in the public sector.  
 
The welfare function measures total benefit and cost of six elements in the system: patient 
in the morning, patients in the afternoon, the private facility, the public facility, insurance 
company and government transfers. We will discuss the welfare function in the long run 
for each condition of dual practice and insurance in sub chapter of 2.5.1 to sub chapter 







2.5.1 The long run welfare effect of no dual practice-no insurance 
 
The total welfare function of no dual practice and no insurance is the summation of six 
elements in the system:  
 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑁𝑁)
= 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 − 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟 
(2. 43) 
 
The welfare function of patient is a patient utility from getting treatment in the health care 
facility. In the condition of no dual practice without insurance, the welfare function of the 




𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔




+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝑁 − 𝑝2






The first part consists of several variables,  𝑦 is the individual patient income, the 𝑞1̃ is 
quality in public facility, 𝑝1̃  is price in public facility, 𝑡  is the travel cost, and 𝑥  is a 
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distance to facility. The second part consists of 𝑝2
𝑁𝑁  and 𝑞2
𝑁𝑁 which are price and 
quality in private facility. 
 
In the case of no dual practice, the patient only visits the private facility in the afternoon. 
Patient’s welfare comes from the benefit of getting treatment in the afternoon from a 
private facility.  
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛
= ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝑁 − 𝑝2






The next welfare component comes from provider’s welfare. It counts benefit and cost 
from the health care facility, public and private provider. We include the profit function 
from each facility. The function is basically the total revenue of price subtracted with the 
cost to provide treatment and multiplied with the quantity which describes the number of 
patients but in this case we use the demand of care. The other cost component is the cost 
related to the quality. Each provider’s welfare involves all demands related to each facility 
based on provider’s opening hours. The public facility uses the demand of public facility 
in the morning, while the private facility uses demand of private facility in the morning 
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The insurance company welfare function is null in this case as the insurance does not exist 
in this regime. So that the insurance company will not receive subsidy or pay treatment 
fee to health care facility. 
 
The last part of welfare function is government transfer. In our model, the government is a 
party who will pay the percentage of treatment fee as an insurance scheme to insurance 
company. In the first case of no dual practice-no insurance, there is no insurance coverage 
and the government transfers zero amount to insurance company. The detailed 
explanation of insurance company role and government transfer will be appeared in the 
next sub chapter of no dual practice-with insurance scheme. 
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2.5.2 The long run welfare effect of no dual practice-insurance 
 
The welfare function of the second regime of no dual practice-with insurance (NI) has a 
similar form of total welfare function with the first regime, no dual practice-no insurance 
(NN). The difference mainly occurs on the additional insurance variable, s, which attaches 
to the price variable. The other distinction is on the government transfer where in the 
existence of insurance coverage, the government will transfer a certain percentage from 




The total welfare under no dual practice-with insurance scheme is: 
 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑁𝐼)
= 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 − 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟 
(2. 49) 
The welfare of patient in the morning comes from the patient utility by visiting public and 
private facility and patient has insurance coverage that will relieve parts of treatment fee. 
The insurance component attaches to price variables. 
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔




+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2







The welfare of patient in the afternoon is a utility of patient by visiting private facility 
only with additional insurance component in the function.  
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛
= ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2







The welfare of private facility is a profit function of private facility that includes demand 
in the morning and in the afternoon as this facility opens in both opening hours.  
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= ∫ 𝐷2
𝑎𝑚(𝑝2






+ ∫ 1. (𝑝2













𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= ∫ 𝐷1
𝑎𝑚(𝑝2
𝑁𝐼 , 𝑝1̃, 𝑞2









The related variables appear in welfare function can be summarized as follows, the y is 
patient’s income, the s is the insurance component, the 𝑝1̃ and 𝑞1̃ are price and quality in 
public facility. The price and quality in private facility are 𝑝2
𝑁𝐼  and 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 . The cost 
components are travel cost (t), cost of treatment (𝑐2), and cost of quality treatment (𝜑2).  
 
The insurance company in our construction is the third party that will pay the part of 
insurance scheme, in the amount of (1 − 𝑠) component that attach at price variable. The 
company will pay the part of treatment fee to facility. We simplify the case by putting the 
assumption that the government subsidized the insurance, (1 − 𝑠) of all patients who 
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demand health care. This assumption is a quite strong but it is not imaginary one. A 
government subsidy usually appears in developing country health system. The limited 
budget is made it impossible to provide free health care for all citizens. In consequence, 
the government will pay insurance premium for a certain group of people in the country, 
usually people from the low income level.  In our case, the welfare of insurance company 
is set to break-even because the amount of payment paid by government to insurance 




𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
= (∫ 𝐷1
𝑎𝑚(𝑝2















































𝑁𝐼) = 0 
(2. 54) 
 
The government transfer, in this NI regime only consists of government transfer to the 
insurance company. We should go back to our decision stages that we do not include the 
government behavior in financing the health care system. We simplify the mechanism by 
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making government pays the insurance part without further analysis on how government 
raising the funds that usually in the form of tax. The government is assumed to have 
sufficient budget in providing the insurance subsidy for the entire demand of health care. 
In principal, the government transfer is a part of the cost that will reduce the total welfare 
of the system. 





































+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2




+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2











+ ∫ 1. (𝑝2








































2.5.3 The long run welfare effect of dual practice-no insurance 
 
The welfare function of dual practice without insurance (DN) also consists of six 
elements. The welfare function of the patient in the morning is the utility function of the 
patient from visiting public and private facility. This is similar to the previous conditions 





𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔




+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑁 − 𝑝2







In the existence of the dual practice, the public physician provides service in the dual 
practice facility. The welfare of patient in the afternoon then comes from the patient 
visiting dual practice facility and private facility. This part is the main difference with the 




𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛






+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑁 − 𝑝2







In the regime of dual practice without insurance, the private facility welfare is the 
additional form of profit function of the dual practice facility in the afternoon and private 














































The welfare of public provider is the profit function of the public facility and similar to 
the situation without dual practice (NN):  
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= ∫ 𝐷1
𝑎𝑚(𝑝2
𝐷𝑁 , 𝑝1̃, 𝑞2











The patient’s income is y, while price and quality in public provider are 𝑝1̃ and 𝑞1̃. The 
price and quality in private facility are 𝑝2
𝐷𝑁 and 𝑞2
𝐷𝑁. In the regime where dual practice 
exists in the system, the price and quality component of dual practice facility are 𝑝1
𝐷𝑁 
and 𝑞1
𝐷𝑁. The cost components are following the previous regime that consist of travel 
cost (t), cost of treatment in private facility (𝑐2), and cost of quality treatment in private 
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facility (𝜑2). The cost component of 𝑐1 in this case represents cost of treatment in public 
facility and dual practice facility. The 𝜑1describes the quality cost in public provider and 
dual practice facility. The welfare of insurance company is null because there is no 








+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑁 − 𝑝2










+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑁 − 𝑝2



























































2.5.4 The long run welfare effect of dual practice- insurance 
 
The last case is the case of dual practice with insurance (DI) which also consists of six 
elements. The first one is the welfare function of the patient in the morning which is the 
utility function of the patient from visiting public and private facility with the 
involvement of insurance in the function.  
 
 
𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔




+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2







The welfare of patient in the afternoon covers the patient’s welfare from dual practice 
facility and private facility. 
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛






+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2







In dual practice-with insurance situation private facility in the afternoon consists of 
private facility and dual practice. Hence the private facility welfare is the additional 
function from profit of private facility in the morning, private facility in the afternoon, and 
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the dual practice facility in the afternoon. The dual practice-with insurance regime 









































The welfare of public facility is the profit function of the public facility, similar with the 
function of no dual practice-with insurance (NI):  
 
 














The variables in the welfare function of dual practice-with insurance regime (DI) are the 
variable of insurance (s), the price and quality in public facility (𝑝1̃, 𝑞1̃), the price and 
quality in private facility (𝑝2
𝐷𝐼 , 𝑞2
𝐷𝐼), and the price and quality in dual practice facility 
(𝑝1
𝐷𝐼 , 𝑞1
𝐷𝐼). The remaining variables are the travel cost (t), the cost of treatment (𝑐1, 𝑐2), 
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and cost of quality (𝜑1, 𝜑2 ). The subscript of 1 in cost component represents cost 
component in public and dual practice facility. The subscript of 2 represents cost 
components in private provider. 
 
We set the revenue and cost in the insurance company is equal. The company receives 
insurance transfer from the government, and the company will pay the same amount to 
the health care providers so that the remaining fund in insurance company is zero.  
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
= (∫ 𝐷1
𝑎𝑚(𝑝2
















































































































































+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2










+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2






























































































2.5.5 Important note regarding welfare effects in long run 
 
In this sub chapter, we discuss the essential findings regarding long run welfare functions 
in different regulations of dual practice and insurance that we described in 2.5.1 to 2.5.4. 
We analyze the general effect of dual practice and insurance in total welfare.  
 
Proposition 12: Dual practice effect might be positive or negative to total welfare 
depending on parameter values. 
 
The complete proof is available in Appendix 2.C.4. We will measure the effect of dual 
practice using variable 𝑑 by first calculating the new equilibrium price for private facility 
(𝑝2
𝐷𝑃)  and dual practice facility (𝑝1
𝐷𝑃)  when dual practice is allowed in the system. 
Assume that now we have variable of 𝑑 that represents part of population who able to 
access dual practice physician, while the (1 − 𝑑) is part of population that is unable to 
access dual practice physician. The profit function of private facility (𝜋𝑝𝑣
𝐷𝑃) consists of 
profit in the morning and afternoon demand. The dual practice effect, variable of 𝑑 will 




















































𝐷𝑃 − 𝑐2) + 𝑑. 𝑥2
𝑝𝑚. (𝑝2
𝐷𝑃 − 𝑐2) + (1
− 𝑑)𝑥2
𝑝𝑚. (𝑝2


























































= 0 , we get new 






2 − 𝑞1̃𝑥2𝑡 + 𝑝1̃𝑥2𝑡 − 2𝑐2 + 2𝑐2𝑥2𝑡)(2𝑥1𝑡)(4𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(2𝑥2𝑡) + (𝑐1𝑥2𝑡)(4𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(2𝑥2𝑡)
(4𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝑥1𝑡)(4𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(2𝑥2𝑡) − (2𝑥2𝑡)(2𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(4𝑥1𝑡𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)
+
(𝑥2𝑡)(2𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(2𝑥1𝑡
2 − 𝑐1 + 2𝑐1𝑥1𝑡)(2𝑥2𝑡) + (𝑥2𝑡)(2𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(2𝑐2)
(4𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝑥1𝑡)(4𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(2𝑥2𝑡) − (2𝑥2𝑡)(2𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(4𝑥1𝑡𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)
 
(2. 70) 








2 − 𝑐1 + 2𝑐1𝑥1𝑡)(2𝑥1𝑡)(4𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝑥2𝑡) + (2𝑐2)(2𝑥1𝑡)(4𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)
(4𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝑥1𝑡)(4𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(2𝑥2𝑡) − (2𝑥2𝑡)(2𝑥1𝑡 − 1)(4𝑥1𝑡𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)
+
(4𝑥1𝑡𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝑥1𝑡)(2𝑥2𝑡
2 − 𝑞1̃𝑥2𝑡 + 𝑝1̃𝑥2𝑡 − 2𝑐2 + 2𝑐2𝑥2𝑡) + (4𝑥1𝑡𝑥2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(𝑐1𝑥2𝑡)




Next step is to compose total welfare (TW𝐷𝑃) that contains dual practice effect of 𝑑. The 








+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑃 − 𝑝2










+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑃 − 𝑝2















































 𝑇𝑊𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = ∫ (𝑝2
𝐷𝑃, 𝑝1̃, 𝑞2







 (2. 74) 
 
 
For each agent’s welfare we analyze the sign of  
𝜕𝑇𝑊
𝜕𝑑









 when 𝑑 = 0. We summarize the sign for each part of 
total welfare in Table 2.2. 
 













+ - +/- 
 
The increasing percentage of dual practice in the system will increase the consumer 
welfare. The explanation comes from the more dual practice means more physicians and 
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lower price. This benefits the consumer. The increasing dual practice involvement in the 
system will bring negative effect to private facility welfare. The facility suffers because 
they offers lower price due to dual practice, which now competes with it. The ambiguity 
appears in public facility welfare. The facility might get positive or negative effect with 
the increasing dual practice. The ambiguous sign in total welfare comes from this 
component. Public facility gets less benefit from indirect relation with dual practice 
facility. It gets less benefit if private facility offer lower price (due to competition with 
dual practice in the afternoon), hence in the morning, most people will shift to private 
facility.  Public facility still gets benefit if the demand shift to private facility due to lower 
price in the morning not caused severe loss and it is covered from the price margin. The 
sign for total welfare that is a summation function of welfare of consumer, welfare of 
private facility, and welfare of public facility,   
𝜕𝑇𝑊
𝜕𝑑
 when 𝑑 = 0  can be positive or 
negative. The results suggest that increasing dual practice involvement in the system (we 
can associate as increasing population percentage who can get dual practice), may lead to 
increasing or decreasing of total welfare. 
 
The impact of dual practice to total welfare is closely related with the changing demand. 
In the situation when patient in the morning mostly visit private facility so that demand in 
public facility is very low, while in the afternoon most people visit dual practice facility 
and only small portion goes to private facility. If the loss of public facility in the morning 
and private facility in the afternoon can be compensated from high demand from private 
facility in the morning and dual practice in the afternoon, then dual practice effect leads to 




Proposition 13: Increasing insurance coverage from no insurance state in general might 
increase or decrease the total welfare because of market interaction between public 
facility and private facility. 
 
We analyze the effect of insurance to total welfare by first arranging total welfare function 
which allowing insurance presents in the system and ignoring dual practice. We 
decompose the total welfare function based on consumer welfare, private facility welfare, 
public welfare, and government transfer. 
 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑇𝑊𝑁𝐼)
= 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦








+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2




+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2














+ ∫ 1. (𝑠𝑝2










𝑇𝑊𝑁𝐼 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (𝑠𝑝2
𝑁𝐼 − 𝑐2) −




























 (2. 79) 
 
 
We assume that in this point, there is no quality choice in public facility and private 
facility and it is assumed equal qualities to make the analysis simpler and more intuitive. 
Hence 𝑞1̃ = 𝑞2





. The last part of the total welfare function, 
is the part of the price that covered by insurance. When we recall back our total welfare in 
sub chapter 2.5.2, the part of the price that is covered by insurance will be paid by 
insurance company, while the insurance company will get the same amount from the 
government. In this case, the government will pay the deficit between price paid by the 
individual and amount of money received by public or private facility. In sub chapter 




From equation 2.24, we have equilibrium price for private facility in no dual practice with 










. We use this values to replace the 𝑝2
𝑁𝐼 
in 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑇𝑊𝑁𝐼) function. Then we calculate the 
𝜕𝑇𝑊𝑁𝐼
𝜕𝑠
 when 𝑠 = 1 for each 
agent in total welfare function. The consumer welfare, private facility welfare, and 
governed transfer give ambiguous sign. Public facility is the only agent which always gets 
benefit with the introduction of insurance. Consumer, private facility, and government 
transfer might have benefit as well as suffers from loss when insurance is present in the 
system.   
 




Consumer Private facility Public facility Government transfer 
+/- +/- + +/- 
 
The result for total welfare is 
𝜕𝑇𝑊𝑁𝐼
𝜕𝑠
<> 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑠 = 1. Remember that 𝑠 is variable that 
represents percentage of price that paid by patient. The insurance component is (1 − 𝑠). 
The introduction of insurance to the system might bring positive or negative effect to total 
welfare. Consumers benefits from insurance because although the price of treatment is 
higher than price without insurance, they do not pay at full price. Private facility also 
enjoys the insurance because insurance makes price higher and all individuals will come 
to private facility in the afternoon. But the higher the insurance percentage, the 
government transfer is also getting higher. The loss from paying the government transfer 
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is higher than the consumer benefit and private facility welfare; hence the total welfare is 
lower with the increasing of insurance coverage. 
 
We also provide the results using simulation to see how each components of social 
welfare are affected by variables in the system and the welfare comparison among four 
regimes: no dual practice-no insurance (NN), no dual practice-with insurance (NI), dual 
practice-no insurance (DN), and dual practice-insurance (DI). The welfare effect in the 
long run uses the adjusted price and adjusted quality after reaching the equilibrium state. 
We assume that in the long period, the price and quality in private facility will have 
enough time to adapt to the price and quality in public facility that set by government. The 
comparison is especially needed to provide a judgement on the dual practice and 
insurance policy. 
 
The simulation uses sets of values and must fulfill with several requirements when finding 
the price and quality equilibrium. Basically the requirements are that the cost and prices 
components should be more than zero. The cost of quality in the public and private 
facilities are larger than zero, 𝜑1 > 0, 𝜑2 > 0. The price and quality in public facility are 
larger than zero, 𝑞1̃ > 0, 𝑝1̃ ≥ 0, although for public facility, we allow the public to have 
zero price to represent a particular situation where public facility is served in zero price as 
a government’s commitment to provide public goods. The general setting of price and 
quality that larger than zero is a guarantee for the facility to be functioned properly in 
serving health treatment. The same condition applies for the equilibrium price and quality 
in private facility, 𝑞2 > 0, 𝑝2 > 0. The price has to be greater than zero because we 
assume that private facility needs a non-zero price to gain profit and maintain the 
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sustainability of practice. The cost of treatment in public and private facilities is greater 
than zero because it would be impossible to produce treatment at zero or negative cost, 
𝑐1 > 0, 𝑐2 > 0. The other components such as travel cost and income also should be 
larger than zero, 𝑡 > 0, 𝑦 > 0. Travel cost describes patient’s consideration to health care 
facility that also influenced by other factor than price.  These two components also 
represent patient’s characteristics. 
 
In order to guarantee the result of total welfare, we limit the result where all welfare 
components are non-negative and the demands are between zero and one. The positive 
welfare such as welfare in health care facility illustrates that the facility can properly 
function for providing health care in the system.  To illustrate the welfare components 
with the price of public facility set by government, the next illustration uses these 
particular values of: 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑡 = 40; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1; 𝑐1 = 5; 𝑐2 = 5; 𝑦 =
200, (1 − 𝑠) = 0.4; 0 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 100 . The public price interval that met the conditions 
under NN regime is 45 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 100. The welfare of patient comes from patient’s utility 
function, which involves individual income, the price of treatment, quality of treatment, 
travel cost and distance to the facility. By keeping other variables are constant and 
increasing only the price in public facility, the welfare of patient in the morning and 
afternoon are decreasing along with the increasing of the public price. Patients have less 
welfare from paying higher price in both facilities when public facility increases its price 
while private facility also follows to increase up the price. 
 
The Figure 2.D.1 in Appendix 2D shows two welfare functions of patient in the morning 
and afternoon with the relationship of price in public under regime without dual practice 
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and insurance in the system. The price equilibrium shows that when the price in public is 
increasing, the price in private is also increasing. The demand for public health care goes 
down when the price in public is increasing. In the morning, the patient can choose 
between public facility and private provider. The patient’s loss from the increasing price 
in one of the facility can be covered with the adjustment to choose another provider from 
the patient perspective, in this case patient can go to private facility. The demand for the 
private sector is increasing along with the decreasing demand for public care. The 
alternative between public and private functions as shifting demand between two 
providers but the increasing price in general gives decreasing welfare for patient. In the 
afternoon, patient can only visit the private facility; the rising price in private sector is a 
consequence of the increasing public price in the long run.  The increasing price is a loss 
from a patient perspective because he has to pay a higher price and reduce his net income, 
but still, the private sector is the only place the patient can get the treatment in the 
afternoon.    
 
The provider’s welfare comes from public and private facility profit function. It mainly 
consists of demand, price, and cost. The price, in the long run, uses the price and quality 
in an equilibrium state. The Figure 2.D.2 in the Appendix 2D shows health care facility 
welfare function related to the price in public in the regime without dual practice and 
insurance. The welfare of health care facility is in line with the increasing price both in 
public and in private sector. We should note that the private price is increasing as the 
public price is also increasing. The increasing price in public is followed by the drop in 
demand for the public facility. The decreasing demand is still covered with profit margin 
from the increasing price in public facility; hence the welfare in public is still increasing. 
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In private facility, the demand for private is going up with the increasing of the price in 
public facility. This increasing demand adds to the increasing price in private accumulates 
the increasing of welfare in private sector. The higher price in private leads to higher 
profit for a private facility, hence the welfare level is high in this situation.  
 
The different trend of facility welfare can be appeared in different situation, for example 
in the regime with dual practice-no insurance. The increasing of public price will be 
followed by the increasing of the price in private facility. Patients might still visit public 
facility and it has increasing profit from the increasing demand of public facility at the 
beginning. After some time, patients could change their choice to visit private facility, and 
the number of people visiting public facility might become lower. The public facility now 
has profit loss due to this demand shift. On the other hand, some patients might keep 
visiting private facility and would pay the increasing price because they realize that they 
will get more treatment in term of quality. The private facility has the increasing welfare 
because it still gets profit from the increasing price and relatively escalating demand for 
private health care. It is illustrated in the Figure 2.D.3 in Appendix 2D. 
 
Remark 3: The insurance coverage in the system gives more welfare for patient in the 
long run compared to the no insurance situation. 
 
We compare the patient welfare between two regimes to justify the role of insurance in 
the welfare functions: no dual practice-no insurance, and no dual practice-with insurance. 
We should go back to our previous finding on the relationship between the level of 
insurance and the price in private facility. The higher level of insurance makes private 
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facility sets the higher price. Patients might shift demand from public facility to private 
facility in the morning, so that the demand of public facility will decrease while demand 
of private facility will increase. In the afternoon, people only could visit private facility so 
there is no shift demand in the afternoon.  
 
The existence of the insurance will lighten part of treatment fee although in our case the 
price effect seems more dominant so that the patient’s welfare will decrease along with 
the increasing price. But between with and without insurance situation, patients benefit 
more from having insurance so that the welfare of patient under insurance is higher than 
without insurance.  The price of private facility might be higher but patients with 
insurance have more protection and can afford the price. This can be translated that 
patients gain more in term of welfare. Patient without insurance will pay the whole part of 
treatment fee so the patient’s welfare will be more sensitive to price. This is a loss from 
welfare point of view. The Figure 2.D.4 of Appendix 2D shows increasing price in public 
and welfare of patient in two regimes without dual practice, with and without insurance. 
The patient welfare in the morning with insurance is higher than patient welfare without 
insurance. The same thing also applies for the welfare of patient in the afternoon.  
 
Remark 4: The private facility gains higher profit when the insurance coverage exists in 
the system. 
 
The Figure 2.D.5 in the Appendix 2D shows the welfare of private facility between the 
initial cases of no dual practice-no insurance with the current case of no dual practice-with 
insurance. Under insurance regime, the private facility enjoys the higher price than 
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without insurance regime. Although having higher price, the demand for private care is 
not disturbed because people can pay the treatment using insurance protection. The 
private facility gains more profit this means higher level of welfare.  
  
Remark 5: The higher percentage of insurance covers the treatment fee, the total welfare 
of no dual practice-with insurance regime will be lower compare to the base 
case of  no dual practice-no insurance regime.  
 
The total welfare of no dual practice-with insurance regime shows the decreasing trend 
along with the percentage of insurance. In Figure 2.D.6 of the Appendix 2D, we compare 
the total welfare of the initial situation, no dual practice-no insurance, compares to no dual 
practice-with insurance with two different levels of insurance coverage. Having a 
relatively small percentage of insurance (1-s) makes the total welfare going down from 
the initial level where there is no insurance in the system. The higher percentage of 
insurance, the total welfare decreases more. From patient’s perspective, the increasing 
insurance rate has increased the price of private sector. However, the increasing price does 
not reduce demand for private care as patients pay less of treatment fee. The more insured 
patient, the less sensitive those to the increasing price in private sector. The harm of 
insurance to welfare system is due to government subsidy for the patients. Under 
insurance regime, government has to transfer part of treatment fee to insurance company. 
The more insurance coverage means that the government has to provide more subsidies 




Remark 6: In the long run, welfare of patient under dual practice regime is higher than 
nondual practice regime.  
 
Allowing dual practice in the system also means that private sector now divides into the 
private facility and dual practice facility. Patient in the afternoon chooses between those 
two facilities. The added facility is a new competitor as the private sector is not dominated 
by one player only. The private facility reduces its price hence it benefits patients because 
they pay less price than before. The Figure 2.D.7 of Appendix 2D shows the welfare of 
patient in the morning with dual practice-no insurance and without dual practice-no 
insurance compare with the price in public. The welfare of patient under dual practice has 
a higher level than no dual practice regime. 
 
The Figure 2.D.8 in the Appendix 2D shows the welfare of patient in the afternoon at the 
initial case and the one after dual practice been introduced in the system. The patients 
view the existence of dual practice as the one that lowered the price of treatment fee and it 
means the increasing of welfare level.  
 
Remark 7: The profit of public and private facility in the long run under dual practice 
regime is lower than non-dual practice regime. 
 
The increasing of public price makes the profit of public facility increases as well. In 
Figure 2.D.9 of the Appendix 2D, we show the comparison between the profit of public 
facility in the first regime (no dual practice-no insurance) with the dual practice-no 
insurance regime. The graph describes the moving of public facility profit after dual 
practice has been applied to the system. Allowing dual practice adds another competitor in 
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the afternoon hours with the dual practice physician offering his service in the dual 
practice facility. The additional competitor reduces the price of private facility level. In 
the morning, when a patient chooses between public or private facility, the decreasing 
price shifts patient from the public to private, then the public demand decreases. Hence 
the profit level in dual practice-no insurance is lower than no dual practice-no insurance 
situation.  The similar result occurs for the private facility as it appears in Figure 2.D.10 of 
the Appendix 2D. The private facility might gain profit from increasing demand because 
patients are shifting from public to private but the decreasing price gives more dominant 
effect to the reducing of total welfare. Besides that, the dual practice facility makes 
private facility no longer a sole choice in the afternoon. This means reducing demand of 
private facility so that the profit of private facility under dual practice-no insurance is 
lower than welfare of no dual practice-no insurance.  
 
Remark 8: In the long run, where we use the adjusted price of private facility and quality 
of private facility, introducing insurance or allowing dual practice in health care system 
shows that no regime dominates each other in term of total welfare and the result depends 
on the parameter values. 
 
To illustrate the comparison between the total welfare of long run from having dual 
practice only and insurance only, we focus on interior equilibrium solution using the 
parameters of, 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 5;  𝑡 = 15; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1; 𝑐1 = 2;  𝑐2 = 15;  𝑠 = 0.6;  0 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤
60. In general, by keeping other variables constant and the same interval of price in 
public, total welfare in dual practice-no insurance (DN) and no dual practice-with 
insurance (NI) have similar patterns along with the increasing values of price in public set 
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by government. Total welfare first goes up then goes down after reaching a peak point. 
The difference lays on the increasing speed as the NI gives slower speed compares to DN. 
The total welfare of DN reaches peak point earlier than total welfare of NI. In the Figure 
2.6A, the total welfare of DN reaches its maximum point at point C, then decreasing 
along with the increasing of price in public facility. The total welfare of NI reaches its 











We put conditions to guarantee the result. Some of the conditions are: the demand is 
between zero and one, while the price, the quality and welfare components are larger than 
zero. Using the same variables and interval of price in public, the combination of 
variables that met the conditions are in between EF for the total welfare of DN and GH 
for the total welfare of NI, or 40 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 48.  Please note that the points H and F almost 
coincide each other due to the slower rate of increasing total welfare NI compare to total 
welfare DN. The Figure 2.7B is the zoom out of the Figure 2.7A that highlights the points 
to describe the Figure 2.7A more clearly. 
 
Comparing between two health care access policies whether having dual practice or 
increasing insurance coverage gives the highest total welfare means that we are 
comparing two welfare function between regime of dual practice-no insurance (DN) with 
the no dual practice-with insurance (NI). The detailed description of simulation result is 
provided in Table 2.4. The total welfare of DN is higher than total welfare of NI at the 
beginning of range values of 𝑝1̃ in Figure 2.7A, and we take example of two points of 
point E and point G that represent point where DN>NI. Under dual practice regime, most 
people in the morning visit private facility and the level of public demand is low, while 
the demand of private facility is high. The afternoon pattern shows that most patient visit 
dual practice facility instead of private facility. The loss from public sector due to the low 
level of demand is compensated from the welfare of private facility and dual practice 
facility. Hence the total welfare under dual practice regime is still high. On the other hand, 
under insurance regime, the demand of public facility is very high compares to the 
demand of private facility. Although all patients in the afternoon visit private facility, but 
in total welfare, the dual practice shows higher effect compares to insurance effect. 
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Table 2. 4 Parameter values on total welfare of dual practice and insurance in long 
run 
Variables DN>NI DN<NI 
E(DN) G(NI) F(DN) H(NI) 








𝑝1̃ 40.00 40.00 48.00 48.00 
Demand of public in the 
morning 
0.20 0.99 0.001 0.92 
Demand of private 
(morning) 
0.80 0.01 0.999 0.08 
Demand of dual practice 0.73 - 0.77 - 
Demand of private 
(afternoon) 
0.27 - 0.23 - 
Patient welfare in the 
morning 
162.26 168.60 159.40 163.91 
Patient welfare in the 
afternoon 
169.73 153.72 168.31 151.33 
Welfare of private facility 33.22 50.11 40.19 58.46 
Welfare of public facility 7.50 37.83 0.27 42.10 
Transfer - 42.17 - 47.60 
Total welfare 372.70 368.14 368.17 368.20 
 
The opposite situation depicts in the point of F and point H where total welfare NI is 
larger than total welfare DN. Under everything keeps constant, the points where DN< NI 
are the starting points where all the values of NI will be lower than DN. Our simulation is 
using interval of   0 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 60, the point is in 𝑝1̃ = 48. We increase the level of accuracy 
into double decimal digits and the points that fulfilled requirements are 48.00≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤
48.25. These are the points where total welfare of DN<NI and the conditions are still met. 
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Hence the result is reliable. Beyond this interval, the total welfare of NI is always higher 
than DN, although the conditions are no longer met. 
 
Under dual practice, the demand in public facility might be low in contrast with the very 
high demand of private facility. The high price of public facility cannot lift up the profit 
from the low demand. Hence the profit in public facility will get lower and only 
contribute small portion to the total welfare. At the same time, under insurance regime, 
the demand of public facility might be very high and demand of private facility in the 
morning is very low. The public facility will get optimal profit from the high demand 
along with the high price in public facility. Under insurance regime, however, the private 
facility still gains profit because all patients only visit private facility in the afternoon. 
Under dual practice regime, the amount loss in public sector significantly affected the 
total welfare, and the result is that the total welfare in DN will be lower than NI situation.  
 
Remark 9: Although the comparison between four regimes does not show dominance 
effect of one policy among the other but in general, having dual practice 
provides higher welfare compare to having insurance coverage in the long 
run.  
 
The comparison of total welfare between four regimes will be concentrated to analyze the 
involvement of variables such as price and demand. In general, having dual practice in the 
system will bring higher benefit compare to no dual practice situation, regardless of the 
insurance situation. When we simplified the comparison only between having dual 
practice or no dual practice, it is shown that having dual practice in the system increases 
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the total welfare of the system. The dual practice and insurance give different directions 
on how they both affected the total welfare. As mentioned before, the magnitude of dual 
practice is increasing the welfare by push down the price in private sector. The patients 
benefit the price effect as they pay a lower price in private sector among the four 
situations. In contradiction, the insurance makes the price in private goes up and private 
facility enjoys the higher level of welfare.  Patients are not suffered much from the higher 
price because they pay lower cost under insurance but the government has to pay the 
transfer. Hence it reduces the total welfare under insurance regime. When patient’s 
welfare from having insurance is higher than the government transfer to subsidize 
insurance, then having dual practice provides more benefit compare to no insurance.  But 
when government has to pay higher insurance subsidy compare to patient welfare from 
having insurance, then in general we can say that having insurance is less benefit compare 
to no insurance regime.  
 
Figure 2.8 shows the relationship between price in public facility and welfare level. The 
higher the price in public sector, the higher the price in private facility, the higher the 
quality provided in the facility. The dual practice will reduce the price in private while the 





Figure 2. 8: Total welfare and public price 
 
The comparison of the total welfare in the long run among four different regimes 
suggests that the regime of dual practice with insurance benefits the most in term of 
welfare. In general, having dual practice gives more benefit in term of welfare due to a 
lower price from a patient’s perspective. The welfare in facility gains more under 
insurance regime, as the facility enjoys the high price and increasing demand because of 
insurance coverage on treatment fee.  The transfer in our model only occurs when the 
government transfers the amount of insurance coverage to the insurance company. The 
government has to compensate more insurance transfer under the system with insurance.  
Our example shows that total welfare under dual practice-with insurance might be the 
highest level because the combination of benefit from patients and providers is higher 
than the government transfer to insurance subsidy. Patients benefit comes from lower 
price due to dual practice in the system and insurance coverage. While provider enjoys 
more benefit from profit of higher price and undisturbed demand because patients are 
covered with insurance. 
118 
 
Ones should note that in our theoretical approach, we use the adjusted price in 
equilibrium that represents the long term situation rather than short term. We refer to the 
fact in real case that price and quality cannot suddenly change under some 
circumstances, such as regulation, socialization, and supply availability. The primary 
consideration in our recommendation about dual practice and insurance in this chapter is 
based on our construction of the total welfare assessment in four regimes. For example 
the government transfer is assumed will cover the whole insurance subsidy in the 
system while later in our empirical study it will not be the case. The welfare analysis 
will not appear in the next chapter when we discuss the dual practice in demand of 
health care. We will use our general framework of dual practice and insurance health 
care policy when analyzing the patient perspective on which facility he visited during 
the illness period: public, private or non-physician facility (traditional healers).   
 
2. 6 Welfare effects in the short run 
 
In this sub chapter, we will analyze the effect of dual practice and insurance in short run 
using welfare function framework. The principal idea is to measure the change in welfare 
function immediately after dual practice and insurance are being introduced in the system. 
We basically compare the total welfare under the first case of no dual practice-no 
insurance to the case with dual practice and the case with insurance, separately. We 
assume that private provider will take longer time to adopt the price and quality 
equilibrium. Allowing dual practice and insurance is a shock to the system. The short run 
welfare describes the impact of that shock under no reaction of the other players during 
the period right after the policy is launched and the new price and quality equilibrium, 
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being applied. Thus the magnitude of each effect will be more clearly to justify. In the 
short run welfare there is no change in equilibrium values (which means that if the 
equilibrium is the same, there is no change in welfare either). After the shock which is 
after adjustment in all decisions to the new context, the long run equilibrium will have 
different values for the variables as explained in previous sub chapter (2.5).  
 
2. 6.1 The short run effect after introduction of insurance 
 
We recall the demand function in the morning for the initial case, no dual practice-no 












𝑎𝑚 = (1 − 𝑥1
𝑎𝑚) =







In the case when dual practice is not in the system, all patients will visit private provider 
with a private physician in the afternoon. 
 























 (2. 83) 
 
To calculate the short run effect caused by insurance, we replace the equilibrium 𝑝2
𝑁𝐼 
with fixed price and quality from the initial case of no dual practice-no insurance, 𝑝2
𝑁𝑁 
and 𝑞2








𝑁𝑁 (2. 85) 
 








 (2. 86) 
 
 𝑥2
𝑎𝑚∗ = (1 − 𝑥1
𝑎𝑚)∗ =




 (2. 87) 
 
Patient in the morning can choose between public or private facility. The demand in the 
afternoon is one because all patients visit the private facility. 
 
The total welfare in the short run consists of patient’s welfare in the morning and in the 
afternoon, the welfare of private facility, the welfare of public facility, the welfare of 
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insurance company, and government transfer. We will first explain for each element of 
total welfare.  
 
The welfare of patient in the morning comes from the patient’s utility when they decide 
to visit the public or private facility. The price of the private facility comes from the 
initial case of no dual practice-no insurance to describe that the private facility has not 
adapted to equilibrium price in the short run. The welfare of patient in the morning now 
contains the effect of insurance that is seen through the insurance rate.   
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑁𝐼∗)




+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼∗ − 𝑠𝑝2







Patients only visit the private facility in the afternoon so that the demand of patient will 
be equal to one.  
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛(𝑁𝐼∗)
= ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼∗ − 𝑠𝑝2










𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑁𝐼∗)
= ∫ 𝐷2
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𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑁𝐼∗)
= ∫ 𝐷1
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The welfare of insurance company is a break even condition because the government is 
assumed to pay all part of insurance to the insurance company and the insurance 





𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦(𝑁𝐼∗)
= (∫ 𝐷1
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𝑁𝐼∗) = 0 
(2. 92) 
 
The last part of the total welfare is the government transfer. We include the government 
transfer that consists of transfer to the insurance company. In our setting, we do not 
include the government activity on financing the public facility in the timeline of 
decisions. Usually, the government raises funds by collecting the tax to pay health care 
expenditure. While the citizen pays the tax and in returns, they get totally free or partly 
subsidized health care treatment. In our framework, we simplify the case by making 
government pays all insurance coverage to the insurance company without any 
additional cost of distortion. We refer to the decision stage in the sub chapter of 2.2; the 
government decision only on selecting health care access policy using dual practice and 
insurance and also setting the price and quality level in public provider. Those decisions 
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are taken as given in our framework. Furthermore, the insurance part is an additional 
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𝑁𝐼∗) (2. 94) 
 
2. 6.2 The short run effect after introduction of dual practice 
 
We show the demand of health care construction again in order to demonstrate the short 
run effect of dual practice in the system. Demand in the morning in the case of dual 
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Demand in the afternoon (DN) now consists of demand for dual practice facility and 




















 (2. 98) 
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 (2. 102) 
 
To calculate the short term welfare caused by dual practice, we replace the equilibrium 
price with the fixed price from the no dual practice-no insurance (NN). In this case we 
use the price and quality in base case 𝑝2
𝑁𝑁 and 𝑞2








𝑁𝑁 (2. 104) 
 
We then recalculate the price and quality in dual practice facility 𝑝1 and 𝑞1 for the short 
term using the 𝑝2
𝐷𝑁∗and 𝑞2














































 (2. 108) 
 






















 (2. 110) 
 
We compose the total welfare function that now consists of private and quality that come 
from the fix price and quality of the initial case, no dual practice-no insurance. The 
welfare of patient in the morning in the dual practice (short run) will be equal to the 





𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝐷𝑁∗)




+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑁∗ − 𝑝2







The welfare of patient in the afternoon comes from the patient’s utility visiting dual 
practice facility and private facility.  
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛(𝐷𝑁∗)
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The welfare from public health care facility is: 
 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐷𝑁∗)
= ∫ 𝐷1
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𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐷𝑁∗)
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There is no insurance in the system so that the welfare of insurance company will be 
equal to zero from the construction. The government will not concern to do any transfer 
and in this case the government transfer is zero. The total welfare function for short term 
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2. 6.3 Insurance or dual practice? 
 
The comparison of total welfare between no dual practice-no insurance (NN), a short 
run of no dual practice-insurance ( NI∗ ), and a short run of dual practice-no 
insurance(DN∗) will provide explanations in which policy has the optimal effect in short 
run in term of welfare.  
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Remark 10: In short run, where there is no adjustment on price and quality of private 
facility using equilibrium price and quality of private facility, having 
higher percentage of insurance coverage makes the total welfare is lower 
compare to total welfare under dual practice regime. 
 
The Figure 2.D.11 in the Appendix 2D provides the comparison of total welfare with the 
increasing price in public 𝑝1̃,  there is no insurance in the system, and the NI
∗ will be 
equal to NN. We put a small amount of insurance rate, (1 − s = 0.2) and keep other 
variables being constant. The s is the percentage of treatment fee paid by patients, and 
(1 − s) is the percentage of treatment fee paid by insurance company. The figure also 
shows that increasing insurance makes total welfare goes up higher than the base state 
of no dual practice-no insurance (NN) but still bellow of total welfare of DN∗. The more 
we put the insurance rate in the system, the total welfare of NI∗ is getting higher than 
NN, as shown in Figure 2.D.12 and Figure 2.D.13 of Appendix 2D, when the insurance 
rate are (1 − s = 0.2) and (1 − s = 0.8).  Patients benefit more from having insurance 
coverage, while private facility gains more profit from higher price, hence these two 
welfare components will be higher than government subsidy.  The total welfare under 
dual practice is still the highest because patients benefit from lower price in private 
facility is still dominance although patients have to pay the full price. Dual practice 
regime also eliminates the government subsidy that will subtract total welfare in our 
welfare composition.   In general we can conclude that the additional insurance and dual 
practice increase the total welfare in short term compare to the null state of no dual 




We produce a simulation using random values for the variables and constraint based on 
the previous result of price and welfare function in sub Chapter 2.5.5. The cost of 
quality in the public and private facilities are greater than zero, 𝜑1 > 0, 𝜑2 > 0. The 
cost of treatment in public and private facilities is equal or greater than zero, 𝑐1 >
0, 𝑐2 > 0. The government decision on quality and price in the public facility are set to 
be greater than zero, 𝑞1̃ ≥ 0, 𝑝1̃ > 0.  The other components such as travel cost and 
income also should be larger than zero, 𝑡 > 0, 𝑦 > 0. We choose value of variables that 
guarantee the result on private price, private quality and welfare under some 
requirements. The price and quality should be larger than zero. The demand function 
appears in the interval [0,1] as the basic assumption. The welfare components are also 
larger than zero, for example the welfare of private facility and the welfare of public 
facility.  The latter requirement will ensure that the health care facility balance their 
revenue over the cost. The private facility can have profit to keep providing services, 
while the public facility keeps the positive margin to run the facility.  To get a clearer 
picture on the pattern of the total welfare in these three comparisons, we set only one 
variable to change, which is a variable of price in the public facility, and keep other 
variables in constant. In this particular figure, the values of each variable are: 𝜑1 =
𝜑2 = 2; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1;  𝑡 = 25; 𝑐1 = 2; 𝑐2 = 5; 0 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 100; 𝑦 = 100;  0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1.  
 
Remark 11: For any insurance coverage between 0 and 1, short run welfare of patient 
in the morning and in the afternoon under insurance shows higher value 




The welfare of patient in the morning between three comparisons appears of base state 
of no dual practice-no insurance, short run insurance effect, and short run dual practice 
effect in Figure 2.D.14 of the Appendix 2D. The welfare of patient in the morning in 
NN is equal in dual practice because the dual practice uses fixed price in NN.  Figure 
2.D.15 of Appendix 2D shows the comparison of welfare for the patient in the afternoon. 
The insurance rate, in this case, is equal 0.5. The welfare of patient in the afternoon with 
insurance is the highest level. The increasing price of the public, the demand of public 
will decrease, and the demand for private is increased. Patient in the morning visit more 
private facility is ignoring the increasing price due to the insurance existence.  
 
The result of patient welfare only shows that in general patients also enjoy the insurance 
coverage in short run effect. They will get more benefit because they do not need to pay 
the whole part of treatment fees. Patients will be less sensitive with the increasing price 
that comes along with the increasing insurance rate.  
 
Remark 12: In the short run, the profit of public and private facility might gain benefit 
or might gain loss in dual practice regime compared to insurance regime.  
  
Figure 2.D.16 of the Appendix 2D  shows the profit in public facility with the price in 
public. The profit of the public at NN is equal to DN∗due to a fixed price in private 
facility. Under dual practice regime, patients might prefer visit public facility, hence the 
demand in public is increasing and welfare in public facility is also increasing. Under 
insurance regime, many patients might be interesting to visit private facility, so the 
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demand in public is decreasing. It brings loss in welfare of public facility under 
insurance regime.  
 
Figure 2.D.17 of the Appendix 2D shows welfare of private facility with the price in 
public facility. Under insurance regime, private facility gets more benefit from the 
increasing price and increasing demand of private facility. Patients might choose private 
facility because they now are covered with insurance that can leave part of the treatment 
fees. While under dual practice, private facility has to decrease the price but it is not 
immediately increasing the demand. In this comparison, private facility might get higher 
welfare under insurance compare to welfare under dual practice.  
 
Remark 13: Total welfare effect in short run between dual practice and insurance 
shows no dominance policy as the welfare of having dual practice might 
be higher or lower than the welfare of having insurance in the system. The 
short run welfare uses non-adjusted price and quality of private facility.. 
 
Depending on parameter values, the total welfare in short run under dual practice 
regime might be lower or higher than insurance regime after meeting the requirements 
condition. We illustrate it in Figure 2.9, and the specific values are in Table 2.5. The 
simulation uses a specific values of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑞1̃ = 0.2;  𝑡 = 25; 𝑐1 = 5; 𝑐2 =
5; 0 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 100; 𝑦 = 100;  𝑠 = 0 . The values that satisfied the conditions are 30 ≤
𝑝1̃ ≤ 78, or along line EF for short run effect of insurance and line of GH for short run 
effect of dual practice. The requirement conditions are the price component, quality 
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component, and welfare values must be higher than zero. The demand based on our 
definition at the beginning must be between zero and one. 
 
The total welfare of dual practice might be smaller than total welfare of insurance 
regime, when a certain price offered by public facility under dual practice regime makes 
most of patients in the morning go to the public facility rather than private facility. The 
demand in public facility reaches its peak point while in contrast the demand in private 
facility is very low. The pattern is similar in the afternoon, where most patients choose 
the dual practice facility over the private facility. The lowered price in private sector 
combines with the low demand of private facility will reduce the total welfare in 
aggregate and the profit from public facility cannot compensate the loss from private 
sector. The total welfare of DN∗  that smaller than NI∗  is shown in the points of B 




Figure 2. 9 Total welfare of dual practice and insurance in short run 
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Table 2. 5 Parameter values on total welfare of dual practice and insurance in short 
 run 
Variables DN*>NI* DN*<NI* 
C (DN) D (NI) B (DN) A (NI) 








𝑝1̃ 45 45 35 35 
Demand of public in the 
morning 
0.85 0.60 0.95 0.63 
Demand of private (morning) 0.15 0.40 0.05 0.37 
Demand of dual practice 0.83 - 0.78 - 
Demand of private (afternoon) 0.17 - 0.22 - 
Patient welfare in the morning 143.65 178.23 152.77 180.63 
Patient welfare in the afternoon 142.65 169.27 145.60 170.73 
Welfare of private facility 52.50 80.51 44.26 71.90 
Welfare of public facility 33.81 23.90 28.36 18.84 
Transfer - 80.35 - 70.74 
Total welfare 372.61>371.56 370.99<371.36 
 
The total welfare of dual practice might be lower than total welfare of insurance in short 
run. Under dual practice regime, the demand of public is very high while the demand of 
private facility is low in the morning. In the afternoon, the demand of dual practice is 
high and it is combining with the low level of demand in the private. The similar 
situation happens under insurance regime when the demand of public is high while 
demand of private is low in the morning. However, the private facility still gains 
significant profit because in the afternoon under insurance regime all patients will visit 
private facility. The low level of demand in private sector under dual practice regime 
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has made significant loss in the short run facility welfare. Hence the total welfare of 
dual practice will be lower than insurance regime. 
 
The more common situation is when total welfare under dual practice is more 
significant than insurance as pointed in point C compare to point D in Figure 2.9 and 
Table 2.5. Under dual practice, the demand of health care in the morning starts shifting 
from public to private facility again, the demand of public facility is still high but not 
too high, and the demand of private facility is low but not too low. In the afternoon, the 
demand of dual practice is high, and the demand of private is also high. Under insurance 
regime, the demand between public is still high, and the demand of private is still low. 
Government pays the insurance subsidy that will reduce the total welfare under 
insurance regime. The profit loss from the low level of demand of private sector is not 
severely harmed the total welfare under dual practice. The shifting demand still benefits 
compare to welfare loss from government transfer in insurance regime hence the total 
welfare of dual practice is still higher than total welfare under insurance regime. 
 
Remark 14: The difference of welfare effect between dual practice and insurance 
coverage in the long run is more significant than the difference between 
two policies in the short run.  
 
In order to get better description on the comparison between long run and short run effect 
of dual practice and insurance, we apply different set of variables,  𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2;  𝑡 =
40; 𝑐1 = 5; 𝑐2 = 5; 1 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 100; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1;  𝑦 = 200;  𝑠 = 0.6, that appears in Figure 
2.10A for long run effect, where conditions are met at 71 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 100 and Figure 2.10B 
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for the short run effect where the conditions are met at 45 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 100. Both short and 




(A)                                                                         (B) 
Figure 2. 10 The total welfare of long run effect and short run effect 
 
Under insurance regime, patients might benefit from insurance coverage while private 
facility gets more profit from higher price and demand of private facility. Our example 
shows that those benefits are smaller than the loss from government paying the transfer 
for the insurance subsidy.  The patient’s benefit from paying lower price in dual practice 
regime shows more significant effect on the total welfare. This profit is added with the 
benefit from the fact that government transfer zero amount because no insurance in the 
system. The large difference between total welfare under dual practice regime and 
insurance regime in the long run comes from the equilibrium price and equilibrium 
quality in the construction. Our short run welfare is based on the difference between two 
policies with the base state of no dual practice-no insurance which have lower price and 
quality than the equilibrium price and quality. The result describes the real situation where 
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the effect of two policies of dual practice and insurance give significant difference in long 
run. The two policies will need more time to be applied in the system. In the short run, the 
introduction of two policies shows light impact as the policies need adaptions from the 
initial situation of no dual practice-no insurance situation. For example, dual practice 
policy needs time for preparing the dual practice facility and insurance subsidy needs 
patient’s identification and budget allocation to implement the regulation. 
 
2.7 The policy implication 
 
In the previous sub sections of 2.3 and 2.4, we explained the construction of price and 
quality in health care system in different situations which are combination between dual 
practice regulation and insurance scheme in the model. The critical motivation behind the 
study of dual practice is the access of health care. The main reason of dual practice 
regulation, in the beginning, is to enlarge the patient access to health care. The insurance, 
however, is also a valuable tool to access health care from financial perspective. The 
insurance can relieve the patient’s financial burden caused by treatment fee. The previous 
result shows that the additional insurance scheme in the model has made the price in 
private sector is higher compare to the situation without insurance.  
 
This sub section will analyze the changes in insurance coverage as a policy 
recommendation to enlarge the health care access in comparison of dual practice 
regulation. We measure the insurance coverage in a different definition. Before, the 
insurance is the percentage of treatment fee that will be paid by the insurance company. In 
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this section we modified the insurance as a percentage of population who has insurance. 
This means that some people have benefit from insurance scheme by lifting the treatment 
fee in any percentage. It is necessary to adjust the model to show the insurance definition 
change will affect to the price of private facility.  
 
We start with simple modification on the price determination, where we add a β, which 
represents to the proportion of insured people in the system. The β equal to zero means 
that no one in the population has insurance scheme, while the β equal to one means that 
all individuals in the population has insurance scheme. The proportion of uninsured 
people is (1 − β). From the previous equation in 2.3, we have 𝑠  as a percentage of 
treatment fee paid by patient. The s equal to zero means that patient is fully insured, no 
need to pay any treatment fee in health care facility. The s lies between zero and one. We 
form the profit of private facility with private physician as the additional function of:  
 
 𝜋𝑝𝑣 = β(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑠 = 0) + (1 − β)(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 0 < 𝑠 < 1) (2. 116) 
 
In the profit function of private facility, we include all the demand in the morning and in 
the afternoon for population with fully insured and the rest of population that still has to 






𝑎𝑚 (𝑝2, 𝑝1̃, 𝑞2, 𝑞1̃)(𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ [𝐷𝑠=0
𝑝𝑚(𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑞2, 𝑞1)(𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ (1 − β)[𝐷𝑠=1
𝑎𝑚 (𝑝2, 𝑝1̃, 𝑞2, 𝑞1̃)(𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ (1 − β)[𝐷𝑠=1














The profit function on the dual practice facility now consists of population with full 
insurance and the rest of the population.  
 
 𝜋𝐷𝑃 = β(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑠 = 0) + (1 − β)(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 0 < 𝑠 < 1) (2. 118) 
 
The profit function in dual practice facility consists of demand in the afternoon as this 




𝑝𝑚 (𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑞2, 𝑞1)(𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ (1 − β)[𝐷𝑠=1








The next step is to find price and quality equilibrium in the private facility by solving the 
first order condition for each profit function in private facility and dual practice facility. 
The process is the same as before but now using the additional component of β. We find 













0. The detailed works appear in the Appendix 2C.1 and here we only provide the final 
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Remark 15: Private facility will set higher price when more people are covered in 
insurance scheme.    
 
To support our claim on the effect of percentage of insured population to the price in 
private facility, we investigate the effects of β on the price on 𝑝2by solving the second 
order condition and find that 
𝜕𝑝2
𝜕β
> 0. The checking on second order condition and the 
complete result of 
𝜕𝑝2
𝜕β
 are provided in Appendix 2C2. The higher portion of insured 
population has made private facility to react by increasing the price. The Figure 2.11 
depicts the change of insurance coverage in the population from 0.4 to 0.8 for example. 
The price of private facility goes up from 𝑝2(0.4) to 𝑝2(0.8).  The result emphasizes our 
result before that the policy to increase access by putting insurance in the system makes 
the price in private higher than without insurance in the system. The situation relates with 
the condition when private facility charges higher price of treatment without losing the 






Figure 2. 11 Price in private and percentage of insurance coverage 
 
Based on our findings, we can generalize the result for the quality level when more 
population are covered with insurance. The quality is going to the same line with the 
price, as facilities charge higher price, they are providing treatment with higher quality of 
treatment. Providers will try to maintain the demand level particularly for the population 
without insurance coverage by offering treatment with high quality so patients might see 
this offer as the compensation from the higher price level in return. The total welfare 
might be increasing along with the more population coverage if the patient’s benefit and 
provider’s profit are larger than the government transfer to subsidize the insurance. On the 
other hand, the total welfare might be lower along with the increasing percentage 
population with insurance if the government transfer to subsidize the insurance exceeds 








Our research has a purpose in analyzing the effect of dual practice and insurance to price 
and quality of health care treatment. We analyze these effects by evaluating the long run 
welfare and short run welfare. The dual practice and insurance are common approach to 
enhance health care access in developing country. The initial argument on allowing dual 
practice in health care system is to provide more services available under limited human 
resource. The insurance existence is a mechanism to ease health access in term of 
financial capability. This research analyzes the price, quality, and welfare in four 
situations based on the dual practice regulation and insurance regime: without dual 
practice-no insurance, without dual practice but with insurance, with dual practice but 
without insurance, and the last one is with dual practice and insurance in the system.  
 
We provide a table that contains summary of the result regarding price in private sector 
under four regimes. The Table 2.6 is a comparative statics of variables in the model to the 
price in private facility,  𝑝2. All variables show consistence sign in four regimes. For 
example the effect of price in public facility to price of private facility is a positive, as 
well as the effect of transport cost to price of private facility, and treatment cost to price 
of private facility. The insurance coverage gives similar direction to the price in private, 
the higher proportion of treatment fee will be paid by the insurance company then the 
higher private facility sets its price. The two other components are the cost component 
of dual practice facility, cost of treatment and cost of quality. They have the same 
direction as other cost components from private facility. The increasing cost of 
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treatment will increase the price. This is a common reaction for provider in order to 
maintain the profit level. 
 
Table 2. 6 Summary of sign effect for variables in each situation 
Variables No dual practice  
No insurance 






𝑝1̃ + + + + 
𝑞1̃ - - - - 
𝑡 + + + + 
𝑐2 + + + + 
𝜑2 +/- +/- +/- +/- 
𝑠  -  - 
𝑐1   + + 
𝜑1   +/- +/- 
 
Price of private facility under insurance regime in general is higher than under non-
insurance regime. While price under dual practice regime will be lower among others. 
The dual practice regime gives as a consequence that the dual practice facility is a 
competitor for private facility. Without dual practice, patient in the afternoon working 
hours can only visit private facility, but after the introduction of dual practice, he can 
choose between private facility and dual practice facility. In our model the private facility 
is a private facility with a private physician and dual practice is a private facility with dual 
practice physician. The patient has more choices of health provider under dual practice 
existence. The additional competitor splits the demand in the afternoon and price 
equilibrium in private facility is set to a lower price in order for private facility to 
maximize its profit level given the presence of an “afternoon” competitor when dual 




In contrast, our model shows that the insurance scheme makes the price in private facility 
is higher compare to the situation without insurance. We measure the insurance as a 
percentage of treatment fee that will be covered by insurance company. The insurance 
component attached on price and cost in the private price equilibrium process. The more 
insurance covers the treatment fee, the price in private sector will be higher. From demand 
side, under no dual practice-with insurance regime, all patients visit private facility in the 
afternoon. Patients with insurance pay less of treatment fee to the health care facility.  We 
describe the relationship between insurance and patient’s utility that the treatment fee will 
reduce the patient’s income. Meanwhile from price of private equilibrium mechanism, the 
insurance component will increase the price in private. The situation describes that under 
no dual practice with insurance regime, private market is fully a monopolist market with 
only one player, the private health care provider. The lack of competition and risk sharing 
by patients make private can sets the price to the higher point. The insurance has the 
expected effect on the price as appeared in the previous literature. The risk sharing 
mechanism between the patient and third party where patient gets financial protection and 
might pay small amount out of pocket makes the private provider responses with the 
increasing price. 
 
In the afternoon under dual practice regulation, the price competition between dual 
practice facility and private facility is determined by the price of the public facility set by 
the government. The price in dual practice facility can be higher or lower than a price in 
private facility. Both facilities have the same reaction with the increasing of price in 
public sector. The private sector will increase the price and increase the quality to keep 
patients coming to the facility. The government has an essential role in the price 
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determination of private sector. Our model proved that the higher the price in the public 
provider, the private provider positively responses with the increasing price. The public 
provider usually associated with lower price and lower quality compared to the private 
provider. The private provider stays in the market by offering treatment with higher 
quality of treatment. We should note that the increasing quality provided in the facility is 
followed by the increasing price. The private sector can maintain the marginal profit by 
balancing number of patients who still interest to the quality offered and patient that 
decide to leave because of higher price in private facility. Brekke, Nuscheler, and Straume 
(2006) have shown in their study that the price is necessary to induce quality provision to 
differentiate between two providers. We should note that their research is in competition 
framework and use a different approach as ours, such as their model do not use price as 
competition tools, but quality and treatment specification instead.  
 
The quality of public provider set up by the government also links with the price 
determination by a private provider. The private provider responds by lowering the price 
when the government has increased the level of quality in public provider. The private 
provider tries to attract more patients by lowering the price. The increasing quality in 
public might attract some patients to divert into public provider rather than choosing the 
private one. The private provider lowering the price although, in compensation, the lower 
price means a lower quality of treatment offered by private provider.  In this point, the 
private provider reaction by lowering price is the reasonable way to keep the competition 
with the public provider.  The result on quality has a different direction with the finding in 
(Kuchinke, Zerth, & Wiese, 2009) when one provider sets a standard quality, another 
provider should adjust the quality into at least equal to the standard, or they have to leave 
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the market. Our specific finding on quality of private sector shows that quality in public 
has a negative relationship with the quality in private facility. Our result is based on the 
construction of the model that the quality depends on the price. The quality in public has 
an adverse effect on price of private facility; hence it also has a negative relationship with 
the quality of private.   
 
The increasing of travel cost that faced by the patient will be responded with the 
increasing price in the private facility. The travel cost in our definition refers to the 
distance of the patient from the health care provider. The higher travel cost means that the 
farther the distance of patient from the private facility. This can be translated into the 
scarcity level of facility and the lack of physician in the system. The private providers 
then have stronger bargaining power over the price. They can increase the price while 
people still come to the private facility to get treatment anyway. 
 
The measurement of total welfare consists of welfare of patient in the morning, patient in 
the afternoon, welfare of private facility, welfare of public facility, insurance company 
and government transfer. The latter comes from the assumption that the government will 
pay the insurance part to insurance company, and it will become the reduction factor of 
total welfare. Welfare of the patient comes from the patient’s utility from visiting health 
care facility to get treatment. Patients have income and pay a treatment price and get the 
benefit from the treatment quality. The welfare of facility comes from the profit function, 
where facilities get revenue from price of treatment paid by the patients minus the cost of 
treatment and cost of quality. The insurance company is set to null because we set the 
company in break-even condition and we do not involve the insurance company in our 
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timeline decision. The insurance company plays as third party that will receive a transfer 
from the government and pays the exact amount to health care provider under insurance 
regime 
.  
The dual practice effect and insurance effect to welfare provide similar indication that 
both factors might give positive and negative effect depends on parameter values. When it 
is break down into effect of dual practice per total welfare component, it shows that 
consumer always get positive impact due to the lower price of private facility under dual 
practice regime. The private facility gets negative impact, because it is suffered from 
lowering down the price. The public facility might get benefit or loss under dual practice 
regime. When less patients come to facility because they are more attracted to low price in 
private facility, hence the public facility faces loss. But when lesser patients can be 
covered from the marginal profit, the public facility still gets benefit. The effect of 
insurance to total welfare by components show that most of them might get positive and 
negative impact from insurance. Only public facility always gets benefit from insurance 
regime. More patients might come to public facility, because the price of private facility is 
getting higher. Public facility will gets higher profit margin from shifting demand of 
patients to the facility.  
 
Price of the treatment is a primary factor of patient welfare, as patient has to pay the price 
treatment and it will reduce the income. The increasing of price in public and private will 
reduce the patient welfare. In contrast, the private facility and public facility, in general, 
will gain more in term of welfare when the price is increasing. This will directly connect 
to the demand of treatment in each facility. When the demand of public facility is high, 
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and suppose the cost of treatment is quite low compares to price, the welfare of public 
provider is high. The demand of private facility or dual practice facility also depends on 
the demand side. In a particular situation where demand of private facility is low compare 
to demand of public facility or demand of dual practice facility, the welfare of private 
facility will be less.  
 
The government transfer measures the money transfer from government to insurance 
company related to the treatment fee covered by insurance. In our case, we assume that 
under insurance regime the government has ability to pay the insurance payment for all 
patients. The insurance company will pay a part of treatment fee to the health care facility. 
This scenario is also typical in a health care system where government has a significant 
role in providing health care. In a particular case, the government uses the scenario to 
subsidize the lowest income population in order to ease people accessing health care. The 
increasing percentage of insurance part makes the government transfer get bigger and 
increases the reduction factor of our welfare function, and it makes the loss of total 
welfare.  
 
Our analysis of welfare for each regime indicates the claim that depending on parameter 
values, the total welfare under dual practice regime might be higher or lower than the total 
welfare under insurance regime in the short run and in the long run. One important 
component of welfare in the long run is the patient’s welfare especially patient’s welfare 
in the afternoon. Under dual practice regime, patient pay less in the private sector as the 
price in private sector is lower compare in the regime without dual practice. From the 
facility welfare point of view, the lower price in private facility is compensated with, the 
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higher demand of private facility and dual practice facility. When most people will visit 
private facility, only some of patients still visit public facility and the demand of public 
facility is low, hence the public facility is having low welfare. The reduction of total 
welfare from the loss of public facility will be covered from the higher level of welfare in 
private and dual practice facility. On the other hand, under insurance regime, the demand 
of public facility is very high, and public facility gets high profit, while the demand of 
private facility is low in the morning, but in the afternoon all patient will visit private 
facility. Hence the private facility still gains revenue. Comparing the two total welfares 
between two regimes will result that dual practice has higher benefit in term of welfare 
than the insurance regime. The insurance might have better impact to the system in term 
of welfare in the condition where the demand of public is high and demand of private 
facility in the morning is low while in the afternoon all patients can only visit the private 
facility. The total welfare under insurance regime will be still high. In contrast, under dual 
practice, the demand of public is low, and the public facility is having great loss that 
affected the total welfare. The loss is so high that cannot be covered with the welfare from 
private facility. Comparing the total welfare of dual practice or insurance will result that 
having insurance is a better option compare to having dual practice.  
 
In the short run, the dual practice effect is higher than insurance effect in a condition when 
under dual practice regime, the demand of public is very high and dual practice is also 
high while the demand of private is low. The welfare of public facility is high enough to 
cover the low level of private facility welfare due to the low demand in private facility. 
Meanwhile, under insurance regime, the demand of public is high and the demand of 
private is low but the loss in private is so severe that cannot be covered by the welfare 
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from public facility. We also note that having insurance in the system must be supported 
with the government obligation to pay transfers that reduce the total welfare. The higher 
the price and demand will cause the larger reduction factor. Hence the total welfare in 
insurance is lower than total welfare under dual practice. The opposite comparison is 
when having insurance is a better option compare to having dual practice in term of 
welfare when under dual practice regime, the demand of public in the morning is really 
high while the demand of private is very low. The loss in private sector is harming 
significantly the total welfare under dual practice and cannot be covered from the high 
welfare of public facility. Meanwhile the demand of public facility under insurance is also 
high compare to the demand of private facility. The loss in private sector under insurance 
is still bearable compare to the loss of private sector in dual practice due to the low level 
of demand in private facility. These benefits still exceeds the government transfer due to 
insurance. Thus total welfare under insurance is still higher than total welfare of dual 
practice. 
  
The next chapter of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will provide the empirical studies related 
with dual practice from the demand and supply point of view. In Chapter 3 we discuss on 
how people choose health care facility with the dual practice existence and we include the 
variables from our theoretical framework such as price of treatment, quality of treatment, 
travel cost, and insurance. Chapter 4 specifically discusses the physician as representative 
of supply side and we include the related variables such as quality and the cost of 






We conclude this chapter by stating our main contribution once again. We construct the 
patient decision on choosing facility by differentiating the time to seek care for two 
periods of time: morning and afternoon. We show how private provider reaction on price 
and quality after knowing the price and quality set by the public provider under the 
different scheme of dual practice and insurance. We build the model that represents the 
dual practice situation combine with the insurance scheme in the most developing country 
setting: the dual practice usually allowed in the system without any strict regulation and 
the lack of insurance involvement in the population.  The paper also provides assessment 
on which policy gives a better impact in term of short run effect and long run effect. 
Using a general model that involves variables related we have been able to characterize 
the equilibrium of price in private facility.  
 
The main conclusion is that, under certain conditions the dual practice existence in the 
system reduces the price in the private facility. The insurance in the system has an 
opposite effect with dual practice, where it makes higher price of private sector. The 
adjusted model on insurance also confirms that more population covered with insurance 
will make higher level of price in private sector. The main intuition is straightforward. 
The dual practice means more competitors for the facility. The private sector in the 
afternoon now consists of the private facility with the different physician, the dual 
practice and the private one. The patients have choices to a more specific private facility 
characterized by its physician. In the condition without dual practice, the private facility 
has higher bargaining power over the patient, especially in the afternoon, because all 
patient must go to the private therefore private facility can set high price. The insurance 
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effect on the price setting mechanism behaves the same direction as the previous paper 
has predicted. The private sector sets higher price when there is more certainty that patient 
can pay the treatment fee. The relation between price and quality shows that the quality of 
treatment is highly related to the price in a positive way. 
 
The access to health care can be related with two different policy instruments. The first 
one is through the dual practice, and the other one is through insurance coverage. The 
dual practice regime creates more competitors in private market and makes private facility 
lowering its price. Patients will have choices to visit private provider or dual practice 
provider and not always end up in public facility.  The existence of dual practice can be 
further interpreted that there will be more health care available in the system and more 
private facilities. The patient will have shorter distance to travel to get health care 
treatment. The insurance guaranties the patient to pay treatment fee. It creates financial 
stability, and the patient has more independent choice over the price as he can get 
treatment without hesitance.  
 
The analysis on welfare effect shows that depending on parameter values, the effect of 
dual practice and insurance to total welfare might be positive or negative. The total 
welfare in dual practice might be higher or lower than insurance regime. Our model 
shows that the main factor that differentiates the welfare level comes from the demand 
shift between public and private facility in the morning, and between dual practice and 
private facility in the afternoon if dual practice allowed in the system. In general, the 
system benefits the most when government is allowing dual practice. The additional 
competitor keeps the price in private sector lower than the initial case or without 
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insurance. In contrast, adding insurance component in the system is lowered the total 
welfare due to price effect and government transfer. The insurance causes the price in 
private to go higher than the initial case although the demand of private facility is still 
maintained as insured patient will pay less due to insurance coverage.  
 
There are some issues that we have not addressed in this paper. We limit our study on the 
relation between patient and health care facilities only. The dual practice regulation and 
insurance coverage is determined at the beginning so public facility has the same price 
and quality level for each possible regime. Related with the insurance where we left the 
decision of an individual to involve in the insurance scheme as taken as given and we 
limited the insurance mechanism as the government is able to pay the percentage of 
treatment fee as insurance subsidy.   
 
Our analysis is a necessary to link between the health care access policies of dual practice 
and insurance from theoretical point of view. Ones should note that in this chapter we 
discuss the theoretical approach on effect of dual practice by using the total welfare to 
provide appropriate judgment on the ideal case of having or not having dual practice or 
insurance in the system. The model has adjusted price in equilibrium which represents 
long term situation and a constant price to represent short term effect. In the next chapter, 
we will calibrate the theoretical finding with the empirical analysis of the price effect, the 
patient decision to describe the demand side and the physician decision to represent the 






Table 2A.1 Comparison of previous studies in dual practice 
 




 How do health care 
providers decide on 
price and quality in 
the different market 
allocations 
according to the type 
of insurance contract 
offered by insurer 
and different?  
 How providers 
decision on different 
timing: simultaneous 
decision between 
prices and qualities 
for primary care 
sector, sequential 
decision (first 




 Enforcing the fixed-co-
payment rule on the 
primary health care 
sector is enough to 
make providers choose 
the optimal (welfare 
maximizing) price and 
quality levels.  
 In the specialized 
health care sector, a 
regulated (public) 
provider to reach the 
first-best solution in 
prices and qualities and 






model that combines 









 What are the costs 
and benefits from 
dual practice in 
health care system ? 
 Dual practice may 
increase or decrease 
public service quality 
depends on whether 
benefit of dual practice 
attracts highly skilled 
physicians and other 
social cost. 
Develops model of dual 
practice incentives. 
Government explicitly 
seeks to maintain a 
given quality of care and 
minimizing total cost of 
salaries and total cost of 
dual practice. The model 
is specifically 
mentioning the primary 




 How do physicians 
in the public sector 
affected by their 
activities in the 
private sector? 
 Analysis in two 
different regulation 
of dual practice : 
exclusive contract 
 Physicians have 
incentives to over 
provide treatments in 
public in order to gain 
reputation in private 
sector. 
 In the mechanism 
where a proper 
incentive was included 
Using principal agent 
model between 
physicians, health 
authority, and patients.  
The study focused on 
physicians who build 
reputation by avoiding 
under-treatment in 
public sector in order to 
158 
 
AUTHORS QUESTIONS ANSWERS APPROACH 
for physicians work 
only in public and 
limiting private 
earning 
in the contract, it is 
never optimal for 
health authority to offer 
exclusive contract. 
 In the flat salary 
mechanism, the 
exclusive contract for 
physician may works. 
 The regulation of 
limiting physician’s 
earning can use to 
decrease physician‘s 
tendency to over 
provide treatments. 
gain more profit in 
private practice. The 
model analyses the 
relationship between 
patient, physician, and 
regulator, hence not 
differentiate the scope of 
treatment between 





 What is physician’s 
strategic behaviour 
as dual practitioner 
concerning waiting 
list and cream 
skimming? 
 Do physicians cream 
skim the mildest 
case from the public 
sector waiting list ? 
 Full cream skimming 
where all mildest 
patients go to private 
sector only compatible 
with intermediate 
rationing policy. 
 Partial cream skimming 
where there are also 
intermediate cases be 
treated in private sector 
happen in the very lax 
or stringent rationing 
policy. 
Supply side waiting list 
model concerning 
patient selection. 
Positive model as it does 
not account the effect of 
patient selection on 
welfare. Rationing 
policy is an exogenous 
variable and the model 
involves two players: 
physicians and patients. 
The study analyse 
specifically for the 
hospital care.  
Gonzalez 
(2005) 
 How do physician’s 
incentives to 
influence and 
manage waiting list 
to their own private 
benefit ? 
 In the situation where 
there is agreement to 
treat some patients on 
public waiting list in 
private hospitals, the 
‘cream skimming’ 
appears. 
 Physicians select the 
less severe patients to 
be treated in private 
hospitals, thus make 
the policy maker’s 
main goal to reduce 
waiting list in public 
sector cannot achieved.  
Model involved three 
players: health authority, 
physicians, and patients. 
The two main 
assumptions: capacity in 
public sector is 
constrained, waiting list 
exist in public sector but 
not in private. The 
framework analyse 
particularly for the 









 The result showed that 
under full commitment, 
there is overinvestment 
on quality because of 
Using the extended of 
Hotelling model, firms 
choose their location and 
quality.   
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 The interaction is 
analysed in two 
versions: full 
commitment where 
regulator sets the 
price prior to 
location and quality 
decision, partial 
commitment where 
price is set after 
regulator decides the 
location and quality. 
the optimal (second-
best) price.  
 The horizontal 
differentiation is 
insufficient if the 
transportation cost is 
high.  The optimal 
price is the first best 
under partial 
commitment, but again 
the horizontal 




 How does job 
incentives in 
moonlighting? 
 How does the effect 
of moonlighting on 
service quality, 
price, and consumer 
welfare in public and 
private sector? 






 Allowing moonlighting 
will enhance the 
aggregate consumer 
welfare, the 
equilibrium of public 
care quality can be 
increase or decrease. 
 If the public care 
quality is increasing, 
then it will improve 
each consumer’s 
expected utility. 
 The price regulation in 
the private market is 
suggested to mitigate 
the negative effect of 
moonlighting. 
Model with three groups 
of players: a set of 
consumers and two sets 
of doctors, dedicated 
doctors and profit 
maximizer. In regulated 
private sector. The 
model is a general 
model that can be 
applied in any field 
outside health sector. 
The framework used in 
this research is applied 
for the general 
environment as long as 
involves mixed 
economy between public 




 How does private 
option for public 
physicians affect 
their public sector 
labor supply and 
public provision of 
health care ? 
 What role does 
competition among 
physicians play for 
public and private 
health care 
 Allowing dual 
physician practice 
‘crowds out’ public 
provision (reducing 
effort in public sector) 
and lower overall 
health care provision. 
 In order to decrease the 
negative effect, the 
health authority can 




approach. Modelling the 
physician’s labor supply 
that involves three 
agents: health authority, 
physicians, and patients. 
Considering physician 
as oligopolistic since it 
competes in Cournot 
fashion. The research 
does not mention 
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provision ? 
 Is mixed health care 
system always 
desirable or should 
health authority ban 
dual physician 
practice? 
 Banning dual practice 
can be optimal in the 
case where physician’s 
competition is weak or 
treatment between 
public and private is 
closely substituted. 
 When physician’s 
competition is hard, the 
mixed health care 
system with dual 
physician practice 
should be considered as 
an optimal system. 
specifically on primary 
care or secondary care 
but emphasize more on 
the differentiation 




 How does the 
system of health care 
provision affect the 
allocation of patients 
to physicians when 
physicians differ in 
altruism?  
 All patients will get 
benefit from the system 
where private care is 
provided along with 
free treatment in public 
sector. 
 Rich patients get high 
quality treatment from 
the private care while 
the poor ones will get it 
from dedicated 
physicians in public 
sector. 
 Altruistic physicians 
will tend to work in 
public sector because it 
gives greater impact on 
patient’s welfare. 
 Transferring patients 
from public to private 
practice will reduce the 
beneficial effect of 
private provision for 
the poorest patient. 
Model involves patients 
who differ in income, 
physicians who differ in 
altruism and treatment 
which differ in quality. 
Compare between 
purely public health care 
system and mixed health 
care system where 
private sector exist 
together with public. 
The model does not 
empirically say the use 
for primary or secondary 
care, but more focuses 
on the organization 
affiliated with physician 









vertical quality in a 
regional health care 
market? The 
horizontal quality 
refers to the location 
 In the reference case 
(no provider acts as a 
leader standard 
quality), two providers 
will differentiate each 
other using vertical 
quality. 
 In the standardization 
case (one provider acts 
The reference case 
employs the typical 
Hoteling framework and 
the extension of 
Hoteling framework for 
the standardization case. 
The expanded model 
involves two steps. In 
the first step, providers 
161 
 
AUTHORS QUESTIONS ANSWERS APPROACH 
of the provider and 
the scope of the 
medical treatment 
offered in the facility 
while the vertical 
quality is the level of 
quality treatment.  
as a leader), the results 
are homogeneous 
supply but the follower 
might be out from the 
market because cannot 
offer standard quality 
due to higher price. The 
follower can be stay in 
the market by offering 
the equal standard 
quality with the leader 
and taking a sub 
optimal profit. 
can choose location, 
scope of treatment, and 
quality. In the second 
step, the model 
introduces 
standardization; one 
provider has already 
select the level of 
vertical quality as a 
standard quality in the 
market. The model can 
be applied for the 
outpatient case and 
inpatient care for the 
simplicity shake. 
Grassi and 
Ma (2012)  
 How do public 
supplier react to 
consumer selection 
by private firm ? 
 How does consumer 
get different surplus 
from public and 
private effect the 
public supply and 
price in private ? 
 How do equilibrium 
change as the 
information structure 
change ?  
 When rationing based 
on wealth, there is 
continuum equilibrium. 
The public supplier 
uses the budget on poor 
consumers while rich 
consumers get rationed. 
Price set by private 
sectors will rise as 
budget increase because 
only rich consumers 
with higher willingness 
to pay stay in the 
private market.  
 When rationing based 
on wealth and cost 
information are used as 
rationing policy, it 
gives unique 
equilibrium. The public 
supplier uses budget for 
the patients with low 
cost and ignores 
consumer’s wealth 
information. There is 
cost effectiveness 
criterion in equilibrium. 
The public will serve 
low cost benefit 
patients and private 
firms will serve the 
high ones.   
Principal agent model, 
where public supplier 
and private are the 
principals and consumer 
is the agent. They apply 
two regime of rationing 
policy, the first is using 
wealth and the second is 
using wealth and cost 
information. 
The model is applied for 
the case where there are 
public provider and 
private firm. It does not 
necessarily the case of 
health care provider. 
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 How do the three 
interventions deal 
with physicians dual 
practice? 
 Which regulation 
does suit with 
developing 
countries? 
 In case of limiting 
policy, limiting 
physician’s earning is 
worse than limiting 
physician’s 
involvement in dual 
practice. 
 In developed countries, 
policy on dual practice 
depends on cost of dual 
practice. In low cost of 
dual practice, there is 
no intervention needed, 
while in larger cost, the 
best intervention is 
limiting physician’s 
involvement in dual 
practice. Banning 
policy is never be the 
optimal choice. 
 In developing 
countries, the 
attractiveness of private 
sector play important 
rule. In the high level 
of private 
attractiveness, it is 
never worth to 
intervene dual practice. 
In the low 
attractiveness, the 
optimal policy is 
limitation. The 
exclusive contract is 
never optimal in 
developing countries. 
A two stages model with 
health authority and a 
set of physician. The 
health authority will 
choose the regulation 
and physicians differ by 
ability. There are two 
health production factors 
to reflect variations 
among countries. For 
developed countries, the 
production of health 
depends on the entire 
physicians and not by 
individual characters. In 
developing countries, 
the production health 
depends heavily on the 
physician’s 
characteristics. The 
research considers the 
heterogeneity resources, 
such as different 
characteristics of health 








 How does dual 
practice work in the 
setting where basic 
treatment provided 
for free in public 
facilities while the 
intensive treatment 
provided out of 
pocket in private? 
 Does dual practice 
will generate an 
 The Physicians shift 
waiting cost to public 
patients in order to 
increase the willingness 
to pay for private 
treatment. 
 Waiting time turns to 
be socially optimal, the 
over provision of 
private care happens if 
and only if the waiting 
Performing first and 
second best allocation. 
The setting involves 
monopolistic physician 
and patient who differ in 
benefit from the 
treatment as a way to 
explore patient’s 
heterogeneity. Waiting 
time plays role in the 
model. The oversupply 
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excessive or 
sufficient supply of 
private care? 
 Is Dual practice 
sociallly valuable or 
whether it should be 
disallowed? 
cost is sufficiently 
high. 




reimbursement in the 
public segment without 
any control to private 
provision. Banning 
dual practice may 
improve in the second 
best allocation, but it 
depends on the welfare 
weight the health 
authority attaches to 
physician profit. 
and under supply will 
depend on the financial 
aspect and time cost. 
Physician can self-refer 
the patients from public 
sector to private.  
The background of the 





2A The Solution for Price and Quality of private in each regime (𝒑𝟐, 𝒒𝟐) 
2A. 1 The Solution for price of private provider in regime of no dual practice-no 
insurance in the system (𝑝2
NN) 
 


















































































+ 1 = 0 
 
(A. 4) 






𝑁𝑁 + 𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ + 𝑞2
𝑁𝑁 − 𝑝2











NN is equal to, 
 2𝑝2
𝑁𝑁 = 3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ + 𝑞2
𝑁𝑁 + 𝑐2 
 
(A. 5) 















































































































 (A. 10) 
 
2A.2 The solution for quality of private provider in the case of no dual practice-no 
insurance in the system (𝑞2
𝑁𝑁)  
 





































The solution for 𝑞2




3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ − 𝑐2
4𝜑2𝑡 − 1
 (A. 12) 
 
2A.3 Solution of price in private provider in the regime of no dual practice-with insurance 
in the system (𝑝2
NI) 
 















































































+ 1 = 0 (A. 16) 
 





−𝑠𝑝2 + 𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑠𝑝1̃ + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 − 𝑠𝑝2
NI + 𝑠𝑐2 + 2𝑡
2𝑡
=








NI to the left side: 
 2𝑠𝑝2
NI = 3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ + 𝑞2
𝑁𝐼 + 𝑐2  
 


























𝑁𝐼 = 0 (A. 18) 
 
Bringing the 𝑞2
















 (A. 19) 



































































 (A. 21) 
 
2A.4  The Solution of quality in private provider in the case of no dual practice - with 
insurance in the system (𝑞2
𝑁𝐼) 
  
We replace the final solution of 𝑝2







































3𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑠𝑝1̃ − 𝑠𝑐2
4𝑠𝜑2𝑡 − 1
 (A. 23) 
 
2A.5 The solution for price in private provider in the case of with dual practice - without 
insurance in the system (𝑝2
𝐷𝑁) 
 

























































































































= 0 (A. 27) 
 








 (A. 28) 
 






















= 0 (A. 29) 







 (A. 30) 




























































































𝐷𝑁 + 𝑐1 + 𝑝2
𝐷𝑁
2
 (A. 34) 
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𝐷𝑁𝜑1 = 0 (A. 35) 
 



























































































𝐷𝑁 solution still contain unsolved component of 𝑝1, which represent the price in 
dual practice facility. We put the abbreviation of DN to differentiate the regime (dual 
practice-with insurance), so we will solve the 𝑝1
𝐷𝑁. We replace 𝑞1
𝐷𝑁 and 𝑞2


































































































































































































































) 2 (2 −
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𝜑2𝑡











The final solution of equilibrium price in private facility with dual practice physician,  
𝑝1
𝐷𝑁 is obtained by substituting 𝑝2
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2A.6 The Solution of quality in private provider in the case of with dual practice but 




We replace the 𝑝2





 with the final solution of 𝑝2
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2A.7 The solution of price in private provider in the case of with dual practice and with 
insurance in the system (𝑝2
𝐷𝐼) 
 








































































































2𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑠𝑝1̃ + 2𝑞2




 (A. 50) 
 























= 0 (A. 51) 







 (A. 52) 
 




























































































𝐷𝐼 + 𝑠𝑐1 + 𝑠𝑝2
𝐷𝐼
2𝑠
 (A. 56) 
 
















𝐷𝐼𝜑1 = 0 (A. 57) 
 









 (A. 58) 
 





























































































































































 (A. 62) 
We substitute the 𝑝1


























































































































The final solution for the price of private facility is: 
𝑝2
𝐷𝐼 =






















) 2 (2𝑠 −
1
𝜑2𝑡







 (A. 64) 
 
The final solution of equilibrium price in dual practice facility,  𝑝1
𝐷𝐼  is obtained by 
substituting 𝑝2
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2A.8 The solution of quality in private provider in the case of with dual practice and with 
insurance in the system (𝑞2
𝐷𝐼) 
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2B Comparative static for each case 
2B.1  The comparative static for the case of no dual practice and no insurance (NN) 
 














































































) > 0 
(B.  6) 
 
The condition is true for 𝜑2 > 0, 𝑡 > 0. 















(B.  7) 















(B.  8) 
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(B.  9) 
 



















(B.  10) 
 









) 2 (1 −
1
4𝜑2𝑡

















(B.  11) 
 
 
2B.2  The case of no dual practice but with insurance (NI) 
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) > 0 
 
(B.  16) 
 
The result must hold the conditions of 𝜑2 > 0, 𝑡 > 0,0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1. 
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2B.3 The case of dual practice but no insurance (DN) 
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(B.  32) 
 













) 2 (2 −
1
𝜑2𝑡























) > 0 












) 2 (2 −
1
𝜑2𝑡










) 2 (2 −
1
𝜑2𝑡














> 0 . 
 













) 2 (2 −
1
𝜑2𝑡












< 0 (B.  34) 
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(B.  35) 
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(B.  36) 
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<> 0 (B.  37) 
 
 






















) 2 (2 −
1
𝜑2𝑡













(B.  38) 
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(B.  39) 
 
 
2B.4 The case of dual practice-insurance (DI) 
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(B.  49) 
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< 0 (B.  51) 
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2C The policy implication 
2C.1 The solution of price in private facility in the adjusted model 
The profit function of private facility  in the adjusted model is 
𝜋𝑝𝑣 = β(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑠 = 0) + (1 − β)(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 1 > 𝑠 > 0)  
𝜋𝑝𝑣 = β[𝐷𝑠=0
𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝2, 𝑝1̃, 𝑞2, 𝑞1̃)(𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ [𝐷𝑠=0
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛(𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑞2, 𝑞1)(𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ (1 − β)[𝐷𝑠=1
𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝2, 𝑝1̃, 𝑞2, 𝑞1̃)(𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ (1 − β)[𝐷𝑠=1






𝜋𝑝𝑣 = β [(
𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑞2
2𝑡
) (𝑝2 − 𝑐2)] + [(
𝑡 − 𝑞1 + 𝑞2
2𝑡
) (𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ (1 − β) [(
𝑡 − 𝑞1̃ + 𝑝1̃ + 𝑞2 − 𝑝2
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The profit function on dual practice facility is  
𝜋𝑝𝑣(𝐷𝑃) = β(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑠 = 0) + (1 − β)(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 1 > 𝑠 > 0)  
𝜋𝑝𝑣(𝐷𝑃)
= β[𝐷𝑠=0
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛(𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑞2, 𝑞1)(𝑝2 − 𝑐2)]
+ (1 − β)[𝐷𝑠=1
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We substitute 𝑝1to 𝑝2 to get: 
𝑝2
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The final solution for 𝑝1 is 
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2C.2 The comparative static in the adjusted model 
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The comparative static of β: 
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2C3. Effect of insurance in long run total welfare 
The total welfare with insurance is a summation of welfare of consumer, private facility, 
public facility, and government transfer. 
 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑇𝑊𝑁𝐼)
= 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦





We assume that in this point, there is no quality choice in public facility and private 
facility and it is assumed equal qualities to make the analysis simpler and more 
intuitive. Hence 𝑞1̃ = 𝑞2
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2C4. Effect of dual practice in long run total welfare 
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= 0, we get  
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𝐷𝑃 =



















 (C. 38) 
The profit function in dual practice facility with dual practice effect, 
 
𝜋𝑑𝑝




















𝐷𝑃 = 𝑑. 𝑥1
𝑝𝑚. (𝑝1

























































































































2 − 𝑞1̃𝜑2𝑡 + 𝑝1̃𝜑2𝑡 − 2𝑐2 + 2𝑐2𝜑2𝑡
4𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑
+
𝑐1𝜑2𝑡
(4𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝜑1𝑡)
+
𝜑2𝑡(2𝜑1𝑡 − 1)

































2 − 𝑞1̃𝜑2𝑡 + 𝑝1̃𝜑2𝑡 − 2𝑐2 + 2𝑐2𝜑2𝑡)(2𝜑1𝑡)(4𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(2𝜑2𝑡) + (𝑐1𝜑2𝑡)(4𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(2𝜑2𝑡)
(4𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝜑1𝑡)(4𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(2𝜑2𝑡) − (2𝜑2𝑡)(2𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(4𝜑1𝑡𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)
+
(𝜑2𝑡)(2𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(2𝜑1𝑡
2 − 𝑐1 + 2𝑐1𝜑1𝑡)(2𝜑2𝑡) + (𝜑2𝑡)(2𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(2𝑐2)









2 − 𝑐1 + 2𝑐1𝑥1𝑡)(2𝑥1𝑡)(4𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝜑2𝑡) + (2𝑐2)(2𝑥1𝑡)(4𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)
(4𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝜑1𝑡)(4𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(2𝜑2𝑡) − (2𝜑2𝑡)(2𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(4𝜑1𝑡𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)
+
(4𝜑1𝑡𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝑥1𝑡)(2𝜑2𝑡
2 − 𝑞1̃𝜑2𝑡 + 𝑝1̃𝜑2𝑡 − 2𝑐2 + 2𝑐2𝜑2𝑡) + (4𝜑1𝑡𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(𝑐1𝑥2𝑡)




Composing total welfare (TW):  








+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑃 − 𝑝2










+ ∫ (𝑦 + 𝑞2
𝐷𝑃 − 𝑝2








𝑇𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (∫ (𝑝2




































 𝑇𝑊𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = ∫ (𝑝2
𝐷𝑃, 𝑝1̃, 𝑞2







 (C. 51) 
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𝑇𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1. (𝑝2
𝐷𝑃 − 𝑐2) −


















𝐷𝑃 − 𝑐1) (C. 53) 
 
 𝑇𝑊𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 =
𝑡 − 𝑝1̃ + 𝑝2
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 , first we rearrange the total welfare of 
consumer, total welfare of private facility, and total welfare of public facility that 
contain of  𝑝1
𝐷𝑃 and 𝑝2
























































































































































































[(4𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)(2𝜑1𝑡)(4𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(2𝜑2𝑡) − (2𝜑2𝑡)(2𝜑1𝑡 − 1)(4𝜑1𝑡𝜑2𝑡 − 3 + 𝑑)]2
×
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×
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2






























































Figure 2.D.1: Patient welfare in the morning and in the afternoon under NN regime uses 
variables of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑡 = 40; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1; 𝑐1 = 5; 𝑐2 = 5; 𝑦 = 200, (1 − 𝑠) =





Figure 2.D.2: Welfare of public facility and welfare of private facility under NN regime 
using variables of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑡 = 40; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1; 𝑐1 = 5; 𝑐2 = 5; 𝑦 =





Figure 2.D.3: Welfare of public facility and welfare of private facility under DN regime 
using variables of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑡 = 40; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1; 𝑐1 = 5; 𝑐2 = 5; 𝑦 =





Figure 2.D.4: Welfare of patient in the morning and welfare of patient in the afternoon 
under NN and NI regimes using variables of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑡 = 40; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1; 𝑐1 =





Figure 2.D.5: Welfare of public facility and welfare of private facility under NN and NI 
regimes using variables of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑡 = 40; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1; 𝑐1 = 5; 𝑐2 = 5; 𝑦 =





Figure 2.D.6: Total welfare of NN and NI regimes using variables of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 =







Figure 2.D.7: Welfare of patient in the morning under NN and DN regimes using 






Figure 2.D.8: Welfare of patient in the afternoon under DN and NI regimes using 







Figure 2.D.9: Welfare of public facility under NN and DN regimes using variables of 






Figure 2.D.10: Welfare of private facility under NN and DN regimes using variables of 






Figure 2.D.11:Total welfare of insurance short run effect using variables of 𝜑1 =






Figure 2.D.12:Total welfare of insurance short run effect using variables of 𝜑1 =






Figure 2.D.13:Total welfare of insurance short run effect using variables of 𝜑1 =





Figure 2.D.14, patient welfare in the morning in the  short run effect using variables of 






Figure 2.D.15: patient welfare in the afternoon in the  short run effect using variables 
of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1;  𝑡 = 25; 𝑐1 = 2; 𝑐2 = 5; 0 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤ 100; 𝑦 = 100;  0 <







Figure 2.D.16: Welfare of public facility in the morning and afternoon in the  short run 
effect using variables of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1;  𝑡 = 25; 𝑐1 = 2; 𝑐2 = 5; 0 ≤ 𝑝1̃ ≤






Figure 2.D.17: Welfare of private facility in the morning and afternoon in the  short 
run effect using variables of 𝜑1 = 2; 𝜑2 = 2; 𝑞1̃ = 0.1;  𝑡 = 25; 𝑐1 = 2; 𝑐2 = 5; 0 ≤







Dual Physician Practice and Health Care 
Demand in Developing Country  



















This research analyses the role of dual practice to demand of health care, and relationship 
with other factors such as monetary factors, non-monetary factors, and individual 
characteristics. The quality aspects of health care facility are included in the study to 
investigate whether people consider about quality when deciding health care services. We 
utilize data of Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 2014. We use multinomial logit to 
analyse the dual practice and insurance relation to health care demand and employ logit 
model to explain quality factors effect on health care demand. Evaluating policy 
simulations to show whether dual practice or insurance have more significant direct 
impact on health care demand. The results show that dual practice physician has indirect 
effect on health care demand, while insurance has direct significant effect on influencing 
individual health care demand. Dual practice policy might work differently as it has larger 
effect in community level. The complicacy to observe quality for individual and the 
priority to get treatment make quality factor getting less attention.  
 










3.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this research is to analyse how health care access instruments which here 
refer to dual practice physician and insurance coverage, influence individual decision to 
seek treatment. The study focuses on the outpatient care and non-emergency case using 
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) wave 5 in 2014. This study analyses the demand of 
health care in a developing country, using Indonesia as a case of study. The focus is 
emphasizing on how dual practice existence which is measured in percentage of dual 
practice physician in the area influences patient’s decision on selecting health care 
facilities. We describe the role of two policy instruments to improve health care access 
which are dual practice physician and insurance coverage. We make an assessment on 
how strong each policy influences individual health care demand. The study is conditional 
on individuals who decide to get outpatient care during the period of illness. We further 
investigate whether the individuals are considering the quality aspects when deciding a 
health care facility to visit. We control monetary factors such as income and treatment 
price, non-monetary factors such as travel cost and waiting time, and individual 
characteristics as factors that affecting demand of health care and have essential role in 
individual’s decision of health care facility. The main contribution of this research is that 
our research highlights the dual practice physician role in the demand of healthcare. We 
compare between dual practice and insurance coverage in order to evaluate how these 
policies affect the health care system. We will show that the size of effects between two 
policies might be different because health insurance is targeting to individual while the 
dual practice is influencing more to community level. This study provides empirical 
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evidence of dual practice from developing country to support decision making regarding 
the future challenge of dual practice policy.  
 
Access to health services has been an important agenda to improve people’s quality of life 
and obtain the best health outcomes. Many countries have committed to agree on realizing 
the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, a commitment program to improve health 
care access and quality life. World Health Organization puts access to health service as a 
fundamental step to guarantee health for all where everyone can access health services 
without facing financial hardship. Based on WHO recommendation, health care access 
should be achieved by following the three steps: gaining into the health care system, 
accessing a location where the services are provided, and finding a health care provider 
where patients put their trust. Our research translates the first two aspects as financial 
capability by measuring insurance coverage and supply side access policy by dual 
practice physician. The last aspect becomes our main purpose in this chapter by analysing 
how people select health care provider when they need health care treatment. 
 
Dual practice among health workers is a dual job holding to work in both sectors, public 
and private.  The presence of dual practice physicians is a tool for health care access 
enhancement in many developing countries. The characteristics of developing countries 
usually are described as a system with limited resources such as lack of facilities or 
shortage on medical personnel. These are some of common obstacles in providing public 
health care for entire residents, moreover densely and unevenly distribution population 
creates complication accessing health care in particular areas such as remote location or 
rural areas. Along with the development in health care sector, the government is required 
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to provide health care services and people are encouraged to utilize formal health care 
provided by physician rather than visit non-physician facility (nurse, midwife) or use non-
formal treatment such as self-treatment or traditional healer. In the case of limited number 
of physicians, the dual practice usually takes place and public physicians provide 
additional health care service after their public office hour so that people in need can get 
health care treatments. Dual practice physicians purposely serve people who cannot reach 
public health care facility by opening private practice in different location or different 
opening time from public practice. Therefore, health care access enhancement as one of 
the primary objectives of dual practice can be achieved. From different point of view, 
health care access can be interpreted as the financial capability from a patient to get 
services in adequate time. Patients should be able to get health care treatment regardless 
their financial ability. The attempt to increase access can be done through government 
doing price intervention or providing insurance scheme. The latter refers to increase the 
number of insurance beneficiaries by volunteer participation or subsidized enrolment.  
 
Dual physician practice appears in most developing countries to compensate low salary 
among public physician. Among many limitations, health care systems in developing 
countries have usually characterized by a limited budget, scarcity of health care 
personnel, and loose regulations of dual practice physician. The principal argument of 
dual practice existence is that it provides more access to health care, especially in rural 
and remote areas. The growing of private sector and the implementing of recent program 
called universal coverage where each person will have the assurance to access health care 
when needed brings health situation changes in the most dynamic way. Therefore more 
aspects are required to be adapted to recent situations. The question on maintaining dual 
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practice physicians in health care system then appears, but first, we should analyse the 
advantage and disadvantage of dual physician practice in the system. 
 
One of the advantages from having dual practice in the system is to cut long waiting time 
that usually appears in public facility. It also means better health care access for 
population. Hipgrave & Hort (2013) in their paper mention some disadvantages of dual 
practice. This practice is believed to responsible for high rate of physician absenteeism on 
public working hours, patient diversion to private clinics that creates financial motive of 
dual practice, low effort to maintain efficiency and quality of treatment in public health 
care facility, and indication to neglect the poor. Although dual practice physician is 
accepted as usual practice in health care system, the net effect is not yet to be defined. As 
a response, different health care system provides different regulation to manage dual 
practice physician. 
 
Most of the recent literature of dual practice usually analyzes the motives of physician 
working in dual jobs, while the empirical proof of whether dual practice improves welfare 
is still scant (Barros & Siciliani, 2009). Dual practice studies appear more often in the 
theoretical discussion that relies on modelling. This approach is useful regarding the 
limitation of dual practice evidence in a specific condition. Dual practice physician offers 
treatment in his private facility outside his regular working hours. It is often the case in 
developing country that physician also serves in rural and remote areas where public 
services is limited hence creating demand for private providers (Gruen, Anwar, Begum, 
Killingsworth, & Normand, 2002). Dual practice affects the treatment quality trough 
referral channel, whether it is direct referral when physician explicitly suggests patient to 
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his private office or indirect one by inducing referral demand. The referral procedure 
diverts patient from public to private is by reducing quality of public service and 
lengthening waiting times or waiting lists in public sector (Jan, Bian, Jumpa, Meng, 
Nyazema, Prakongsai, et al., 2005; Biglaiser & Ma, 2006). Quality of health care is more 
difficult to assess by the patients, while patients easily observe variable such as public 
waiting time. In the case of rationed waiting list admission, waiting time in public 
increases when physician has a private practice (Iversen, 1997). The empirical evidences 
mostly appear for the case of developed country such as in France (France, Taroni, & 
Donatini, 2005), UK and Canada (Garcia-Prado & Gonzalez, 2011). Allowing physician 
to work in the private sector benefits all patients, as it is explained by Delfgaauw (2007). 
The rich patient self-selects to private sector so that public sector can be more efficiently 
dedicated to poor ones without hampering the quality because the altruism physician still 
provides optimal treatment in public. In term of quality, dual practice benefits the public 
facility when physician performs optimal treatment to gain reputation for his private 
facility (Gonzalez, 2004). The theoretical part uses assumptions that sometimes ignore 
details in the existence of dual practice of the real world, especially the case of dual 
practice in developing countries where the practice is common but the study related this 
issue is still scarce. Therefore empirical research related dual physician practice is still 
needed.  
 
The health care systems in developing countries are mostly mixed health care systems, 
where both public and private sectors stand side by side to provide health care services for 
the population. The differentiation between public and private sectors can be classified 
based on the ownership, where public sector is owned by government and private sector is 
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a facility owned by private person or private company. Based on data availability, this 
research identifies the public sector as a community health center and the private sector 
consists of private clinics and private physician practice. We emphasize the important fact 
that in our research, treatment fee in public health care facility is not free. The fee in 
public sector has the same mechanism in private sector that it will be determined based on 
diagnosis group.  Related with insurance mechanism, patients will pay less for the 
treatment fee as a form of copayment or get reimbursement after paying in full fee if 
patients are covered in an insurance scheme. In this research, the insurance scheme 
applies for the services in public or private sector but not applies to nurse practice, 
midwife practice, or traditional healer.  
 
The connection between dual physician practice and access to health care can be 
translated into two different kinds of health care demand. The first is when dual practice 
physician creates demand expansion. Patients who live far away from public health care 
facility or unable to come to public facility because limited working hours, without 
private facility nearby they might rely more on self-treatment or traditional healer. Dual 
practice physicians present a solution to formal health care while they provide services 
that are more affordable in distance and with more flexible opening hours. Secondly, a 
demand diversion as dual practice physician provides alternative choices. With a presence 
of dual practice physician, patients who queuing to get service from a particular physician 
in public sector now can receive service from the same physician in his private practice.  
This kind of demand means that dual practice physician affect patient’s choice of 
provider. The demand for health care relates to the individual’s seeking behavior of 
medical treatment for example people will decide to get treatment from public provider, 
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private facility or non-formal option such as traditional healer. The decision is triggered 
by individual’s need of health care. The perceived need leads to the demand for health 
care so that individual decides to visit or not visit a medical facility. After an Individual 
decides to visit a medical facility, he will decide in which facility to come based on 
several considerations, such as available price, income available, and quality.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In sub chapter 3.2, we provide literature review 
regarding empirical studies on health care demand and our testable hypothesis. In Sub 
chapter 3.3, we present the health care demand in Indonesia that will describe health 
situation in Indonesia and data source for this research. In sub chapter 3.4, we discuss the 
strategy of identification and estimators. Sub chapter 3.5 describes the result from 
descriptive statistics while the main results are in Chapter 3.6. The next sub chapter of 3.7 
provides policy implications. The last sections are discussion and conclusion. 
 
3.2  Literature Review and Testable Hypothesis 
 
Literature on choice of health care provider is available with variety of motivations. 
Goddard and Smith (1998) model the demand of health care where public and private 
cares can be found at the same time. Individual can choose between no care, public care 
and private care by considering the illness severity, the cost and quality of public care as 
well as the cost and quality of private quality care. Goddard and Smith (2001) describe 
the treatment decision as the usual economic choices that benefit perceived by the patient 
exceeds the perceived cost to the individual. Their theoretical discussion mentioned that 
the probability of receiving treatment depends on benefit of treatment individual cost to 
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facility such as travel cost, quality preference such as treatment delay, relative quality 
such as waiting time, and individual cost to alternative facility. Propper (2000) analyses 
the model of health care services in UK among the choice of public, private or no care. 
She investigates the demand for a hospital, physician, dental and other services. It shows 
that private care is related with individual income, demographic characteristics, and 
political affiliation. Hanson et al. (2004) emphasizes the role of quality and waiting time 
that affect the choice between public and private sectors. They compose individual 
perceived quality instrument to assess public and private provider. The result shows that 
quality and waiting time affect individual’s preference to private facility over public. 
Atella & Debb (2008) and Fabbri & Monfardini (2009) use Italy as a case study to 
analyze the relation between public and private provider. They highlight different aspect, 
as the previous paper analyze whether the relation between public and private care is 
substitute or complementary while the later assesses user charges and waiting time as 
rationing tools for public provision of health care.  
 
The empirical literature on healthcare demand in developing countries provides several 
pieces of evidence on effect of price, income, and individual characteristics but none of 
them directly measured the effect of dual practice existence in the health care system. The 
theoretical prediction shows that price has a significant role in demand, and the effect is 
higher in the developing countries because of a higher percentage of low income and 
limited insurance coverage. Sarma (2009) argues that the demand for health care in 
developing country has several conflicting evidence. His study finds that price and 
income are significant determinants of health care demand. The difference results come 
from the various price mechanisms in the previous studies. Akin, Griffin, Guilkey, & 
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Popkin (1986) use standard fee schedule while Gertler and Van der Gaag (1989) and Jack 
(1999) use medical expenditure per visit by the patient. The first approach has been 
criticized because the price for health care service also depends on type of treatment, 
quality, and individual health condition. The second measurement suffers as in the data 
collection process; it might be mixed up with other cost paid by patient such as 
transportation cost and medicine.  
 
The pattern of health care demand in rural Tanzania by Sahn (2003) shows that the 
increasing of user fees affect individual to do self-treatment rather than visit public or 
private health care provider. The quality and availability of doctors or nurses, drugs and 
clinic environment have considerable effect on health care demand. Study of health care 
demand during a period of economic depression in Nigeria by Ichoku and Leibbrandt 
(2003) shows that the severity of illness is the principal reason for people to seek care. It 
is worth to be noted that none of the papers explicitly mention the implication of dual 
practice physician in the study.  
 
Dual practice in Indonesia was allowed legally by law in the early 1970s in which one of 
its goals is to address low salaries among public physician and other health workers 
(midwife and nurse). Apart from supplementary income for the physician, dual practice is 
also expected to increase health care supply as health provider has more extended service 
hours. The improved access to health service in Indonesia is believed to result as a part of 
dual practice role (Rokx, 2009). Physician ratio in Indonesia is 37 per 100.000 
populations although it still has issues on distribution, mainly based on geographical area, 
between Java-Bali-Sumatera Island and outside Java-Bali-Sumatera Island, or rural and 
237 
 
urban areas.  Based on Indonesian Family Life Survey wave 5 (IFLS wave 5) in 2014-
2015, almost half of general practitioners in public community health center have a 
private practice.  Compare to nearly 70 percent physician in public community health 
center in the previous IFLS wave (IFLS 4 in 2007); this percentage shows decreasing 
trend. Results among IFLS wave provides a similar pattern on dual practice: it mostly 
takes place in urban areas. This description supports the fact that dual practice reacts to 
demand of health care, where urban area characterizes as more populated area than rural 
ones.  
 
A limited budget in health care that characterizes most developing countries needs an 
appropriate policy that will maximize public sector financing and its targeted user (Ensor 
& Cooper, 2004). Thus, we need a deep understanding of health care seeking behavior 
regarding the different source of utilization and expenses.  Public sector usually has a 
limitation in facing the growing needs of the population, cost containment subsidizing or 
levying a retribution for particular treatments, and put priority in some areas regarding 
geographical obstacles. Knowledge how people behave to seek care can be useful for 
assessing the feasibility of such efforts: how to deal with the change in health care 
provider and impact on access to services. 
 
The demand for treatment when an individual has an illness can be translated into 
provider choice among several different kinds of care, public, private, traditional healer, 
or no care. This choice is usually related to curative care. The model usually follows 
empirical specification starting with the behavioral model where an individual maximizes 
his utility from health and other goods beside medical care. Among several kinds of 
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treatment from a different provider, individual will choose a provider that gives the 
highest utility under a budget constraint. The utility from health improvement is a 
function of the available providers to individual and his characteristics. The implication of 
the model can be focused on how different factors are determining the efficacy of medical 
care by different providers. These factors can be monetary and non-monetary cost. The 
price of treatment is typical monetary cost, while travel time and waiting time are some of 
the non-monetary costs.  
 
Previous studies have explained some explanatory variables in the health care demand 
function. However, our study is one of the first studies that using a dual practice 
framework. We treat dual practice indicator, which is percentage of dual practice 
physician in the area as explanatory variable as a part of facility characterisation to 
analyse whether this will impact health care demand directly. Demographical 
characteristics such as age, sex, and education appear mostly as an individual item that 
can explain demand of health care (Propper, 2000). These features are standard empirical 
link in health care demand although it is merely vital in health care seeking behaviour 
between providers. Age and sex are insignificant factors of choice between public and 
private in Malaria treatment in Brazil (Bartolome & Vosti, 1995). Education level 
describes how people give a different value for their health and evidence of middle class 
capture wealth state (Propper, 2000). The reasonable explanation is that utility gained 
from health care provider might differ according to individual characteristics.  
 
The geographical factors such as rural or urban identification are usually used to 
accommodate the presumption that different location will have a different kind of health 
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care demand and to refer the health care facilities discrepancy issues between a location 
that usually happen in developing countries. Income together and price are relevant 
variables to determine elasticity and to analyse health care demand among income level. 
These variables usually appear to measure willingness to pay for health care treatment, 
also to evaluate policy regarding regular treatment fee in the system as one level of 
income might react differently to others (Jack, 1999).   
 
We construct several testable hypotheses as follows
1
. 1. The percentage of dual practice 
physician might positively influence patient’s choice of health facility. The more dual 
practice physician is associated with the additional private facility in the area, hence 
patient prefer to come to private facility rather than to visit public facility or other 
practice. 2. The insurance ownership affects patients to visit formal health care provider 
such as public facility and private facility than non-formal provider such as nurse practice, 
midwife practice, and traditional healer. 3. Income is one of monetary factors that will 
differentiate the patient’s facility choice. Patients with high income will likely to choose 
private facility and public facility than traditional healer. 4. The price of treatment that 
also a monetary factor will negatively influence the patient choice to visit any health care 
facility. 5. The same also goes to non-monetary factors, travel cost and waiting time. The 
more expensive travel cost to visit particular health care facility will be followed with the 
decreases in the probability for patients to visit the facility. The longer the waiting time 
will decrease the patient’s interest to visit particular health care facility. 6. The quality 
aspect will attract patients to visit health care facility. 7. The choice of health care facility 
                                               
1
 The summary of previous studies that become the foundations of our testable hypotheses is 
available in Table 3A.1of Appendix 3A  
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is affected with the geographical identification and individual characteristics such as age, 
sex, education, and severity illness.  
 
3.3  Health care demand in Indonesia 
 
3.3.1 Indonesia at a Glance 
 
Indonesia is an archipelago country in South East Asia, with almost 13,000 islands and 
the total area of 1.905 million kilometers squared. Indonesia has around 257 Million 
populations in 2015; it makes Indonesia the most fourth populous country in the world 
after China, India, and the United States of America. The Indonesian GDP per capita is 
3,834 USD (2015), which is still below the neighborhood countries such as Malaysia and 
Thailand; however, Indonesia has a promising future of economic power in the region 
with vast human and natural resources availability. The country has a diversity of more 
than 1,300 ethnic groups which speaks 2,500 local languages. There are five main islands 
sorted from the biggest one: Papua, Kalimantan, Sumatera, Sulawesi, and Java. Like 
many other developing countries, Indonesia faces uneven population distribution where 
more than half of the population lives in Java Island, and the majority of Indonesia citizen 
lives in rural areas. The Indonesian economic growth is from 5.02 percent in 2014 to 5.60 
percent in 2017 with the five main sectors contributing in Indonesian economy are 
processing industry, trading, agriculture, construction, and mining.  
 
Indonesia health care system is mostly provided by the public health sector, owned by the 
government through Ministry of Health. Since decentralization law in 1999, the regional 
241 
 
government has controlled and is responsible for the local management including health 
sector. Although the central government still carries out a regular task such as health care 
prevention program, most of the medical management is managed by regional 
government through public health office. There are 6,358 public community health 
centers that provide outpatient care and 3,396 public community health centers with 
outpatient-inpatient facility. In terms of ratio, there is one community health center for 
every 30,000 population. A public hospital provides secondary treatment and constitutes 
of 60 percent from total 2,488 hospitals in Indonesia. The bed ratio per 1,000 individual in 
Indonesia shows slight increase from 0.71 in 2011 into 1.21 in 2015. 
 
The public sector implements a referral system for patients who need intensive care for a 
severe case. In the public health care facility, patients usually visit the public community 
health center as the front gate of the referral system to get outpatient or inpatient care. 
Public community health center provides outpatient health care although there are some 
of them already have inpatient care facility and usually located in the sub-district level. 
There are also called public community sub center which is the smaller facility of public 
community health center usually located in the village level. The levels of regional 
administration in Indonesia from the largest to the smallest are province, regency or city, 
sub-district and village. The public hospital provides inpatient care and handles the 
advance case from the public community health center as the higher provider in the 
referral system. The working hours of public health care facility is limited only during the 
day and work days but the public hospital usually equipped with the emergency unit for 
the emergency case. But other than that, patients have to come the next days or to private 
facility to get immediate treatment. In the private sector, there is no referral system, 
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patient could come and get treatment at any time and any levels. The standard private 
health care facilities are private physician practice, private clinics and private hospital. 
The private sector offers flexibility in term of visiting time because private facility mostly 
opens not only during the day but also in the late afternoon time and night. The private 
sector usually characterizes with shorter waiting time and promises the better service 
quality that commonly will be proportional with the treatment fee.   
 
The structure of the primary medical personnel in Indonesia consists of a physician, 
midwife, and nurse. These three usually provide health care services in public or private 
facility that provide formal treatment based on modern medical principle. Data from 
Ministry of Health shows the available physician is 94,727 physicians in 2013 or 38 
physicians per 100,000. The number of midwives in the same year is 137,110 or 55 
midwives per 100,000 populations. Besides formal treatment, there is a non-formal 
treatment or alternative treatment where people still rely on in the form of self-treatment 
or traditional healer. The self-treatment can be consuming over the modern medicine 
(buying without prescription), consuming traditional herbs, using topical medicine, 
consuming vitamins and massaging. Based on IFLS wave 5, the percentage of individuals 
who choose to self-treatment in the period of illness rather than visiting health care 
facility is relatively high, which is 73 percent. Data from the same resource also shows 
that, from the total number of patients who visit health care facility during illness period, 
there is 16 percent still come to a traditional practitioner (shaman, wiseman, kyai, Chinese 
herbalist, masseur, or acupuncturist). The complete description based on IFLS wave 5 
appears in Figure 3.1. The popularity of self-treatment and traditional healer is prevalent 
not only for low income group but also appear in the highest income group.  From the 
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same Figure, the outpatient visit to non-physician facility has high percentage among 
other facilities, in this case is visit to nurse practice and midwife practice. This indicates 
that non-physician facility still becomes main option for people seeking care. For the 
consistency with our research purpose, we divide health care facility into two categories: 
physician attended facility where physician service is available (public hospital, public 
community health center, private hospital, and private clinics), and non-physician 
attended facility where physician service is not available (private midwife practice, 




Figure 3. 1 Outpatient care based on health care facility 
 
In general as appears in Figure 3.2, the pattern of seeking health from different waves of 
IFLS shows that most people seek care into public community health centre, private 
physician practice, and private midwife or nurse practice. In Indonesian health care 
system, public community health centre is a front gate of public referral system, also it 
usually available in each sub-district. The figure also shows the importance role of private 
sector, not only private practice with the physician but also other midwife and nurse 
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practice. The low level of utilization in public hospital and private hospital is due to 
smaller number of hospital compared to other health care facilities. The patients usually 
visit hospital for more advanced case of illness.  
 
 
Figure 3. 2 Percentage of outpatient utilization based on IFLS 3, IFLS 4, IFLS 5 
 
The private sector in Indonesia has a significant role in providing health care for the 
population. The mix health care system in Indonesia allows the private sector to provide 
service side by side with the public sector. In general, health expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP is 1.8% in 2014, it shows increasing trend back since 2004, with 1.4%. The out-
of-pocket health expenditure (% of private expenditure on health) also shows slightly 
increasing since 2004 with 73.88% to 75.32% in 2014. In the Figure 3.3, when the public 
facility is simplified into three categories based on treatment formalities and ownership: 
public facility, private facility, and traditional healer, midwife, nurse practice, we show the 
pattern of health seeking care among three categories using three sources of IFLS data 
from 2000, 2007, and 2014. Rural areas experienced a change in health care seeking 
pattern from mostly using traditional healer, nurse practice or midwife practice to private 
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clinics or private physician practice. Public facility is the main source in providing health 
care treatment but private facility such as private clinics and private physician practice is 
also growing to have important role in providing health care services too. The traditional 
healer, midwife, nurse practice still becomes a choice for people especially in rural area, 
while for urban area, people relies more on private facility. Indonesian rural area is 
commonly characterized with low performance of public facility as its public medical 
personnel deficiency due to the remoteness and low remuneration among public officer. 
Rural area usually relies on the private health care facility and traditional healer to meet 
the need of health care. Although private sector gains more popularity in both urban and 
rural but in particular, the rural area shows significant increasing in the percentage of 
individual visit for outpatient care.  
 
The change in healthcare seeking behavior might come from the increasing coverage of 
health care facility. Based on the Indonesian potential village survey in 2005 and 2014, 
the number of village having private physician practice is increasing from 11,412 villages 
in 2005 to 13,781 villages in 2014. While the number of villages with private policlinics 
center is slightly increasing from 7,223 villages in 2005 to 7,396 villages in 2014. The 
number of villages with public community health care center and public subsidiary health 
care center also increase around 15.4% from 30,211 villages that is covered with public 






Figure 3. 3 Outpatient care utilization between rural/urban population 
 
Note: The IFLS 2007 has three additional provinces compare to IFLS 2000 while IFLS 
wave 5 has six additional provinces compare to IFLS 2000. In order to keep the 
consistency, we only include the 15 provinces as in IFLS 2000 in Figure 3.3:  North 
Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, South Sumatra, Lampung, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Center 
Java, East Java, DI Yogyakarta, Banten, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, Center Kalimantan, 
South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi. 
 
From processing data od IFLS 5, The individual’s perceived health status from total 
sample of 31,421 individuals, there are 13,069 individuals or 42 % of individuals who 
have at least one day miss their daily activity due to poor health. Among of individuals 
whom their health are disrupted, only 28% of people visit health care facility. Using 
morbidity measure, most of individuals or about 85% have one or more symptoms. 
Among of them who have at least one symptom 20% visit health care facilities. The last 
measurement on individual’s health condition is using chronical condition status. An 
individual who has at least one or more chronical condition based on medical personnel 
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diagnosed is categorical as in need of health care. There is 33% of individuals in chronic 
condition, and around 28% of them visit health care facility. To sum up, using three 
measurements of individual’s health condition, around 25% of individuals who were in 
need of health care treatment visits a health care facility, while the rest of them decide not 
to seek care in any health care facility.  
 
The different pattern of health care utilization appears between the lowest income quintile 
and the highest income quintile. Health care utilization between different quintile income 
shows that the lowest income quintile heavily relies on public community health center 
and private midwife, or nurse practice. The percentage of individual who visit public 
community health center is decreasing along with the higher quintile income. The higher 
is the income quintile, then the higher also the percentage of individual who visit private 
clinics and private physician practice. The similar pattern also applies on the health care 
utilization of private hospital. The highest income quintile uses more of a private hospital. 
It is interesting to be noted that the use of traditional healer is also frequent even in the 
highest quintile group. The traditional healers are: shaman, wise man, kyai, Chinese 
herbalist, masseur, and acupuncturist. 
 
The individual in the rural area mostly visits public community health centre while the 
urban people relies more on private midwife or nurse practice. In comparison, the 
percentage of individual visit public community health centre between urban and rural 
area is not much different. The total percentage of an individual visit to private physician 
practice and private clinics in a rural area is higher than in urban area. This figure 
confirms the role of private provider to serve the population in the rural area. The 
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discrepancy of health care utilization based on geographic location of island between Java 
and outside Java Island shows people in Java utilize private facilities (hospital, physician 
practice, clinics, midwife or nurse) more than individual outside the island. Both areas 
almost equally utilizing the public community health centre, although Java percentage is 
slightly higher than Non-Java Island. 
 
We provide description of dual practice physician in Indonesia based on IFLS wave 5 
data. On average more than half or 73% of public physicians are dual practice physicians. 
The number can be interpreted that among 100 public physicians working in public 
community health centre, 73 physicians are dual practice physicians. Figure 3.4 describe 
the percentage of dual practice physician in each province that included in IFLS wave 5. 
The data shows that being dual practice is a common option for public physician who 
works in public community health centre. They usually have private physician practice 
after their public working hours. When we differentiate the average percentage based on 
the island category, provinces in Java Island ( in Figure 3.4 are provinces of Jawa Barat, 
DKI Jakarta, Jawa Timur, DI Yogyakarta, and Banten) in average has a slightly higher 
percentage of dual practice physician, about 74% compare to provinces of Non-Java 
Island that has 72%. Data available in IFLS wave 5 only covers dual practice physician in 






Figure 3. 4 Percentage of dual practice physician based on province in Indonesia,  
2014 
 
Related with health insurance using the IFLS wave 5 data, in 2014 half of population or 
about 53% of population is not covered by any health insurance scheme. Among 
population with health insurance, there are several insurance schemes in Indonesia. Figure 
3.5 shows that most of population with insurance is covered under health insurance by 
government subsidy from central government or regional government and it is appeared 
in the graph as Community Health Insurance (JAMKESMAS), Regional Health Insurance 
(JAMKESDA), Social Health Insurance (JAMKESSOS), Childbirth Health Insurance 
(JAMPERSAL) and National Health Insurance (JKN). With 63% of coverage, this 
number shows government commitment to provide health insurance for people 
particularly from the poor group of income. The program ensures the beneficiaries to get 
primary and secondary care from public facility using referral system and government 
will pay the insurance premium. The name differentiation indicates different of financial 
sources. For example, JAMKESMAS, JAMKESSOS, and JKN are financed by central 
government, while JAMKESDA is financed by regional government. The JAMKESMAS 
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and JAMKESSOS are the previous subsidized health insurance program for the poor 
people and since 2014 the central government merges both programs into single platform 
of JKN. The JAMPERSAL is particular health insurance subsidy that covers childbirth 
and maternal care. Around 14% of health insurance beneficiaries are covered under health 
insurance scheme for civil servant. They will pay the premium of 2% from monthly 
salary. The health insurance also will cover primary and secondary care in public facility. 
Around 9% of population of insurance beneficiaries are covered under health insurance 
scheme for formal workers (JAMSOSTEK) and around 10% is covered by employer 
provided insurance and clinics.  Private company in Indonesia has to provide health 
insurance for its employees under JAMSOSTEK health insurance scheme. But based on 
the current regulation, they can opt out from JAMSOSTEK and provide their own health 
insurance scheme by using other private insurance company or providing health clinics 
for the employees.  
 
 







The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) is an on-going longitudinal survey in 
Indonesia. This research uses the recent wave of IFLS wave 5. The IFLS wave 1 to 4 was 
held in the years of 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007. The IFLS wave 5 took place in late 2014 
and early 2015.The sample in IFLS wave 5 represents 83% of around 237 million 
Indonesian populations in 33 provinces. The IFLS wave 5 consists of 16,204 households 
and 50,148 individuals being interviewed. The questionnaire for households covers 
questions on behaviours and outcomes: wealth of information collected at the individual 
and household levels, including multiple indicators of economic and non-economic well-
being: consumption, income, assets, education, migration, labor market outcomes, 
marriage, fertility, contraceptive use, health status, use of health care and health insurance, 
relationships among co-resident and non-resident family members, processes underlying 
household decision-making, transfers among family members and participation in 
community activities. The survey also interviewed community facilities in which IFLS 
households are located and from the facilities that serve residents of those communities. 
These data cover aspects of the physical and social environment, infrastructure, 
employment opportunities, food prices, access to health and educational facilities, and the 
quality and prices of services available at those facilities. The facilities included in the 
survey are village administration office, school, and health facilities. The large scale of 





The IFLS wave 5 sampling scheme starts with province and urban or rural location 
stratification. The selected provinces represent population, capture the cultural and 
socioeconomics diversity of Indonesia, and cost-effective to survey due to the size and 
geographical location of the country. For primarily cost-effectiveness reason, there are 
only 13 provinces at the beginning of IFLS1 and increases into 23 provinces in IFLS 
wave 5. The included provinces based on islands are nine out of ten provinces in Sumatra 
(Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, North, West, Riau, Jambi, South, Lampung, Bangka 
Belitung, and Kepulauan Riau), all six provinces in Java (DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central 
Java, DI Yogyakarta, East Java, and Banten), all provinces in Kalimantan (west, center, 
south, and east), two out of six provinces in Sulawesi (south and west), Bali, West Nusa 
Tenggara, and west Papua. Among the sample, there are three provinces with only 1 
percent sample due to cost effectiveness: Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, West Kalimantan, 
and West Papua. Other reason is that IFLS has a specific survey for the eastern area of 
Indonesia, called IFLS East, that has purpose to collect the similar IFLS information from 
the eastern Indonesia. The next step is to choose 321 enumeration areas randomly within 
13 provinces using sample frame of 1993 socioeconomic survey (SUSENAS). The 
selection process of enumerating area considers the proportion of urban-rural category 
and Java Island-non Java Island comparison. The listing of each selected enumerating 
area uses listing from regional BPS Statistics Indonesia (Indonesia National Statistics) 
office. From each of enumerating areas, the IFLS selects 20 households from urban 
enumerating area and 30 households from rural areas. The difference number manages 
expensive travel cost in the rural areas and maintains the correlation cost among 
households. The survey defines household as a group of people who live together in the 
same dwelling and share food from the same kitchen (based on Indonesia National 
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Statistics definition). Several household members are then randomly selected to do the 
interview. IFLS interviews following: the household head and his or her spouse; two 
randomly selected children of the head and spouse age 0 to 14; an individual age 50 or 
older and his or her spouse, randomly selected from remaining members; for a randomly 
selected 25% of the households, an individual age 15 to 49 and his or her spouse are 
randomly selected from remaining members.  
 
The total sample individual in IFLS wave 5 is the total household sample that can be 
tracked back in IFLS 1minus household member who died between the IFLS waves.  
Some of the sample might be split from the first household, because of marriage or move 
to different location, the IFLS will re-contact and track their new location as a part of the 
sample. The completion rate of the IFLS waves in general is always high; it is around 90 
percent and categorized as a successful survey compare to other similar survey in 
different countries.  
 
Our research uses particular section of IFLS questionnaire in BOOK 1 to calculate the 
individual income information. The individual income uses household expenditure as 
income approach. It is a usual agreement among economist that household expenditure is 
a better estimator than household income to capture household standard of living. This 
approach is commonly used in developing countries as a good proxy for income (Gertler 
& Gaag, 1989). Theoretical work by Narayan and Pritchett (1996) shows that in the 
presence of properly functioning capital markets, expenditure is a better measure of 
permanent income. The expenditure data sometimes is difficult to assign because being 
subject to large seasonal swings (Ainsworth & Van der Gaag, 1988; Hentschel & 
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Lanjouw, 1996; Deaton, 1997) . The estimation process of consumption expenditure is 
easier because households might consume only certain commodities of goods and 
services (Hentschel & Lanjouw, 1996).  From the field works, households are likely to 
understate their incomes and overstate their consumption (Deaton, 1997). In our research, 
the household expenses include all consumption of food and non-food, and cover 
expenditure for all household members. Expenditure per capita is obtained by dividing 
total household expenditure with a total household member. The further adjustment is by 
multiplying the expenditure per capita with the Consumer Price Index for December 2014 
from the Indonesia National Statistics office.  
 
The survey of IFLS wave 5 uses the community-facility survey to collect information 
about communities of household respondents. The official village or township leader and 
a group of his or her staff were interviewed about community life. The other sources come 
from health and education facilities. To draw sample of facilities, the survey first defines 
six strata: Government health centers and subcenters (puskesmas, puskesmas pembantu); 
Private clinics and practitioners including doctors, midwives, nurses, and paramedics 
(klinik, praktek umum, perawat, bidan, paramedis, mantri); Community health posts 
(posyandu); Community health posts for the elderly (posyandu lansia); Traditional health 
practitioners; Elementary schools (SD); Junior high schools (SMP); Senior high schools 
(SMU) / Senior vocational high schools (SMK). The survey wants the detailed interview 
to reflect facilities available in community from household perspective rather than village 
leader or on proximity to the community center. The IFLS samples the health facilities 
based on household information. It is unnecessary for household to use the facilities but 
more on the household knowledge whether they know those facilities in their 
255 
 
neighborhood. For school frame, the survey lists all the schools attended by household 
members under age 25. The school and health care facilities are excluded from the list if 
they located more than 45 minutes away by motorcycle from the household residence. 
The IFLS wave 5 also sets the quota for each facility strata in the enumerating area. 
Different number facility interviewed is applied, for example private clinics and 
practitioners has larger sample compare to government health centers and sub centers 
because Indonesia communities tend to have more private practitioners than government 
facility.   
 
Our research mainly uses IFLS community questionnaire in health sector: the public 
community health center and private facility. We measure the quality characteristics and 
dual practice physician identification from these questionnaires. The dual practice 
identification using IFLS wave 5 is quite satisfactory because the questionnaire can be 
used to differentiate which physicians involving in dual practice. Although IFLS data does 
not have physician information working in hospital but the sample is already represented 
physicians because most physicians in Indonesia works in primary care facilities such as 
public community health center and private facilities, which are larger than the number of 
secondary care such as hospital. The facility of quality is a composite index measured by 
calculating the score that indicated the cleanness level of the facility, the completeness of 
the health instruments, and basic medicine storage. The cleanness indicator covers the 
completeness of cleaning equipment and the result of direct observation on the facility. 
The quality of physician is measured by the indication whether physician in the facility 
has got the training related to the expertise such as on the pre-natal care, children care or 
diabetes care. The quality of treatment is based on the vignette score on the particular case 
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of the treatment. The vignette is a list of questions relates to the example of patient 
condition. The physicians are being interviewed using questionnaire to get their response 
on how to manage care based on the symptoms. The result describes the completeness 
level of care management that ideally should be done to treat the case.  
 
3.4  Empirical Strategy and Estimator 
 
3.4.1 Dual practice and factors affected demand of health care 
 
The general framework of how dual practice physician activity affected individual 
decision on health care facility choice starts from a health care demand function. 
Individuals make decision on medical care when the illness period occurs. The decision is 
a complicated process as this decision might be influenced by other individuals or 
professional advice, individual considers risk and benefit when choosing a particular 
medical care, and the potential opportunity that will be sacrificed because using financial 
resource on medical care instead of other goods.  The economic model of determining 
health care demand in this research follows a conventional utility theory that considers 
health as one of the several commodities where individuals have knowledge on individual 
preference. The demand of health care service can be described using an orthodox static-
utility maximizing framework (Phelps,1992). Individuals have preference on health. They 
use health care services as input to produce a health. The level of health care services 
adjusts with the individual level on preference of health. This preference is independent of 
health status and health care demands change based on the illness period where the 
medical services could improve health. 
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Different econometric techniques are needed when dealing the different nature of 
dependent variables characterize health care demand. The discrete choice model is 
preferred in this research as an individual will decide which facility he wishes. We 
estimate the probabilities of choosing health care facility conditional on patients have 
already opted to get treatment from health care facility and not preferred on self-
treatment. The dual practice physician means the availability of health care services in the 
system. It describes the supply situation that will affect individual’s decision. We expect 
that the more dual practice physicians in the areas, the individuals will show different 
reactions. Our empirical strategy will provide evidence on the relationship between dual 
practice physicians and demand of health care and also define the magnitude of the 
relationship. 
 
Our research frames the patient’s decision that after patient decides to seek care, he will 
choose a particular health care. The available options for the patient are going to public 
facility, private facility, or other. The latter refers to health care facilities without attended 
by physicians which in our case are nurse practice, midwife practice, and traditional 
healer. Consider our model has three outcomes equal to {1, 2, 3} that describe dependent 
variable y as individual choice to private facility(𝑦 = 1), public facility (𝑦 = 2) , or 
others (𝑦 = 3). We provide the summary of the code and the resources from the IFLS 
questionnaire to describe clearly the link between the model and the available data. The 






Table 3. 1 Code for the dependent variables in individual choice of health café  
facility model 
Facility Code Original code from IFLS Questionnaire* Physician/Dual 
practice physician 
attendance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Private 
facility 
1 E. Private hospital*** 
F. Polyclinic, Private Clinic, Medical Center 
G.Private Physician (General Practitioner, 




2 A. Public hospital*** 
B.Public Health Center 





3 H. Nurse, Paramedic, Midwife practitioner 
I.Traditional practitioner (shaman, wiseman, 
kyai, Chinese herbalist, masseur, 
acupuncturist, etc.) 
No 
*The bold letter indicates the original code for the alternatives answer in IFLS 
Questionnaire. 
**We also refers this category as non-physician category, as there is no physician 
attendance in the facility 
***Although we include the hospital option, we should note that the limit of the study is 
the outpatient care only. The facilities refer to the outpatient clinics that are managed by 
hospital. 
 
Patient’s decision will depend on several factors. The explanatory variables, including the 
dual practice existence that we want to measure its effect on health care demand are 
represented in X. The definitions of dependent variables are summarized in Table 3.1. The 
structure of the outcomes are not in ordered, as selecting private facility does not imply 
that private facility has larger or smaller outcomes than selecting public or other facility. 
We estimate a set of coefficients 𝛽(1), 𝛽(2), 𝛽(3) based on the outcomes2: 
 
 








(3) , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2,3. (3. 1)) 
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To identify the model, we set 𝛽(2) = 0 and the outcome y=2, (visit to public facility) is 
the reference group. The 𝛽(1) and 𝛽(3) measure the change relative to the y=2 group. The 
different coefficients will be used to identify how explanatory variables affected the health 
care demand. Setting  𝛽(2) = 0, the equation becomes:  
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The relative probability of y=1,3 to the reference category of  y = 2 is then: 
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 (3. 4) 
 
Using multinomial logistic model for our model is a straightforward process in depicting 
factors affected demand of health care; moreover our point of interest is mainly in the 
dual practice existence that influences individual decision on health care facility. Besides 
providing more straightforward interpretation on the result, multinomial logit has a 
standard feature that becomes primary concern in the research. The model should satisfy 
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption. Domencich and McFadden 
(1975) mentioned that the error terms should be independently distributed and the 
addition of a new alternative while decreasing the probability that an alternative is chosen 
does not alter the relative odds of the existing ones. It means that the addition of facilities 
in the outcomes should not change the current relative odds.  The assumption usually 
entails that the outcomes should be distinctive so that the use of multinomial logit is 
appropriate. In most of studies, Amemiya (1981) mentioned that the IIA assumption 
should be carefully justified. The outcomes of this study in practice can be differentiated 
based on the type of provider. Each facility has its own characteristics. The private facility 
is owned by private individuals and usually is characterized by better quality and higher 
price compared to public facility. In other hand, the public facility is facility owned by 
government that usually provide standard health care services in term of quality and 
treatment fee. The last category provides the non-physician facility (midwife practice, 
nurse practice, and traditional healer). The first two facilities might have the similarity in 
the kind of services available and that those facilities are attended by physicians while the 
last outcome category; we can say it is reasonably different. The estimation process will 
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be completed with the testing of IIA assumption in the first place, so that result from the 
multinomial logit approach can be accounted for.   
 
The model is summarized as a system of demand equations: 
 𝑄𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓𝑖𝑗(𝐷𝑗 , 𝑌𝑗, 𝑃𝑗 , 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑍𝑗) (3. 5) 
 
Where 
𝑄𝑖𝑗= whether outpatient medical service i is used by the j th individual, where 
 i = private facility, public facility, or traditional healer/midwife/nurse practice  
 j = all individual age 15 or above who decides to seek care during the period of  
illness in the last 4 weeks prior the survey. 
𝐷𝑗= percentage of dual practice physician in the public facility where individual lives. 
𝑌𝑗= monthly income for the j th individual. 
𝑃𝑗= price of service paid by j th individual. 
𝑇𝑗= vector of non-monetary factors associated with distance and waiting time by each j th 
individual. 
𝑍𝑗= a vector of social and demographic control variables for the j th individual. 
 
The 𝐷𝑗 , 𝑌𝑗 , 𝑃𝑗 , 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑍𝑗 are the independent variables that appears as X in the beginning when 
we define the model. 
 
In our model of individual choice of health care facility, we have insurance as one of the 
explanatory variable. Dor & Umapathi (2014) mentioned three causes related with 
methodological challenge when the study involves insurance and health outcomes: 
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selection, reverse causality and omitted variables. The selection problem arise when there 
is asymetric information between insures and insured. The estimate relationship between 
insurance and health will bias downward. The adverse selection appears when insurance 
company attracts sick people who more likely to use insurance benefit and health people 
will choose cheaper insurance plan. The reverse causality appears when health affect 
health insurance status and the direction of bias is still unknown. Lastly, the ommited 
variable bias is resulted when individual’s choice of insurance are affected by some 
factors that also affects the health outcomes but these factors are not observed by 
researcher. For example, risk-averse people avoids the risk of income loss from buying 
the insurance but on the other hand they show risk-avoid health behaviours. Risk aversion 
variable is rarely available in the data set. As a consequence the explanatory variables 
included in the regression might be correlated with the error term. Our study might 
suffered the endogeneity from the last cause. Most of the observations are not engage in 
any of the insurance schemes while most of people who are using the insurance are 
holding the insurance susidized from the government.   
 
We address the endogeneity problem in individual choice of health care facility model by 
carefully examining an instrumental variable based approach to correct the endogeneity 
bias. The focus here is to use proper tool to analyze our case where the model is 
generalized linear model with binary endogenous variable. The method has been referred 
as two-stage residuals inclusion (2SRI) (Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008). It is an extension 
to non-linear model of usual two-stage least square estimator (2SLS). On the first stage, 
the reduced form regression is estimated and the results are used to generate predicted 
values for the endogenous variable. The second stage regression is conducted for the 
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outcome equation of interest but instead of replacing the endogenous variable with its 
predicted value like in the two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS), the 2SRI uses the 
residual and the actual observed value of the endogenous regressors are still maintained.   
 
In our empirical model, the individual choice is conditional on the insurance ownership 
because the individual wants to go to a certain health care facility then he chooses the 
insurance contract that allows it. Therefore we allow for the possible endogeneity of 
individual’s having insurance in the choice of health facility. The conditional mean of 




 𝐸(𝑦|𝑥𝑒 , 𝑥𝑜 , 𝑥𝑢) = 𝑀(𝑥𝑒𝛽𝑒 + 𝑥𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝑥𝑢𝛽𝑢) (3. 6) 
 
Where 𝑦 is the choice of health facility outcome, 𝑀(. ) is a known function, and there are 
three types of explanatory variables in our model: 𝑥𝑒  is a 1 ∗ 𝐽  vector of binary 
endogenous insurance variable, 𝑥𝑜 is a 1 ∗ 𝐾 vector of observable exogenous explanatory 
variables; 𝑥𝑢 is a 1 ∗ 𝐽 vector of unobservable explanatory variables that have an impact 
on the choice of health facility and are also correlated with the endogenous variable of 
insurance. The regression model for the choice of health care facility is: 
 
 𝑦 = 𝑀(𝑥𝑒𝛽𝑒 + 𝑥𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝑥𝑢𝛽𝑢) + 𝑒 (3. 7) 
 
The 𝑒 is the random error and it is assumed that 𝐸(𝑒|𝑥𝑒 , 𝑥𝑜 , 𝑥𝑢) = 0. The estimates of 
above equation will be biased and inconsistent if the insurance ownership is endogenous. 
                                               
3
 We follow the work of (Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008) and (Nguyen & Connelly, 2014) 
with adaptation of our particular case. 
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We resolve this issue using an instrumental variables approach by introducing reduced 
regression for the insurance ownership. 
 
 𝑥𝑒 = 𝑟(𝑤𝛾𝑗) + 𝑥𝑢𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, 𝐽̅̅ ̅̅  (3. 8) 
 
Where 𝑤 = [𝑥𝑜 + 𝑧], 𝑧 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 1 ≥ 𝐻 vector of instruments(𝐻 ≥ 𝐽), and 𝛾𝑗  is a (𝐾 + 𝐻) ∗
1  vector of parameters. The instrument variables of 𝑧  must fulfill the following 
conditions: (1) they cannot be correlated with𝑥𝑢; (2) they must sufficiently correlated 
with 𝑥𝑒 ; (3) they cannot be correlated with the variable of y, unless through 𝑥𝑒  only. 
Insurance ownership is a binary choice which indicates individual using insurance or not 
using insurance. We use the Probit model to model insurance variable. The individual 
choice outcome in our case is whether respondent visited one of the health care facilities: 
dual practice facility, public facility, or private facility in his last visit in a month prior to 
survey. Individual chooses one of three mutually exclusive states therefore we estimate 
the individual choice via Multinomial Logit model. The correlation between error terms in 
insurance and individual choice of health care facility will be addressed using 2SRI 
approach. It gives consisten estimates for the individual choice of health care facility with 
endogenous explanatory variable where both outcome and endogenous variables are 
modelled via non-linear regression (Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008). The result of SRI 
approach is available in the Appendix. 
 
The 2SRI approach is first proposed by Hausman (1978) to test the endogeneity in the 
model (equation 3.7 and equation 3.7). The 2SRI is identical to 2SLS, so that 𝛽𝑒 and 𝛽𝑜 
are consistent. The 2SRI provides a consistent estimate for 𝛽𝑢 in linear case. Previous 
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literatures show that 2SRI is consistent for specific non-linear models for example 
Nguyen & Connelly (2014) emphasize the endogeneity of unpaid caregiving intensity 
when analyzing its impact on the labor force participation of caregivers. Study by Shea, 
Terza, Stuart, & Briesacher (2007) identify the impact of insurance coverage to 
prescription utilization by Medicare beneficiaries. Some other studies that employed 2SRI 
in health economics field are: Shin & Moon(2009) , Stuart, Doshi, & Terza (2009), 
Lindrooth & Weisbrod(2007). 
 
The challenge in using instrument variabel approach is finding a good instrumental 
variable for endogenous variable, in this case is variable of insurance. We use self-
employment to explain insurance usage in our model. The self-employment is indicated 
as a good instrument in (Meer & Rosen, 2004). There is a strong negative relationship 
between insurance and self-employed (Perry & Rosen, 2001). We use the self 
employment as the instrumental variable for insurance, and also use the marital status for 
the comparison. 
 
Dependent variable: visit private facility, public facility, or other facility 
 
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that identifies individual visits to one 
among health care facilities of private practice, public facility or other facility. The latter 
refers to traditional healers, nurse, and midwife practices. The provider choice in this 
variable is specific for the last visit in the last four weeks prior survey. We simplify 
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individual’s choice on health care facility in IFLS data for our research purpose
4
. The 
result of options classification appears in Table 3.1 above. We reclassify from seven 
categories of health care facility choices into three categories: private facility, public 
facility, and other. The public facility consists of public hospital and public community 
health centre. The private facility covers polyclinic, private clinic, medical centre; private 
physician (general practitioner, specialist, and dentist) and the private hospital. The study 
focuses on the outpatient care by considering the data availability and more frequent case 
in order to ease the capturing information. The outpatient care can describe more precisely 
on the choice of health facility made by the patient rather than inpatient care that usually 
related with the medical decision. The third category is the other category or non-
physician facility; here we categorized practice by nurse, paramedic, and midwife 
together with traditional healer. As our primary concern of the study is on physician, the 
third category covers all kind of practice other than physician or medical doctor. We only 
consider first visit patient-initiated to exclude bias from previous visits that might be 
influenced by physicians and other previous experience in the specific provider.  
 
Percentage of dual practice physician (DP) 
This variable identifies the percentage of dual practice physician available in the area 
where patient live. The identification of dual practice activity can be tracked down in the 
public community health centre questionnaire. The physicians will be listed and declare 
the activities outside the public practice. We calculate the percentage of the dual practice 
                                               
4
 The information in the questionnaire contains seven facility categories: public hospital; 
public health centre; private hospital; polyclinic, private clinic, medical centre; private 
physician (general practitioner, specialist, and dentist), nurse, paramedic, midwife 




physician by dividing the number of physician who involve in dual practice with the total 
physicians in the facility. The dual practice identification is not available from the private 
facility questionnaire because the survey has a slightly different approach to get data from 
the private facility. The interview process is only for facility representative that might be a 
physician or not (receptionist, nurse or midwife). If facility representative is a physician, 
then we can detect whether he is a dual practitioner or not. Otherwise, this facility cannot 
be identified to have dual practice physician. This limitation forces us to concentrate on 
the dual practice physician identified from the public facility with the consideration that 
the response rate for the public community health centre is high, almost 100 percent while 
the response rate of private facility for this particular dual practice identification is low. 
The dual practice variable in this research refers to the average ratio of dual practice 
physician in province level. Thus it is measured an average effect of existence of dual 
practice, not whether a patient goes to a dual practice facility or not. Patient’s visit to 
health care facility might be affected by different situation of treatment capacity in the 
system. Patients may not consider the existence of dual practice physician directly from 
this measurement, the same argument may apply when we use the variable indicating 
whether patient visits dual practice facility or not. But the important thing is that patients 
will observe the change of treatment capacity caused by this practice. So that our data 
definition will be sufficient to measure the effect of dual practice physician on the 
patient’s decision of health care facility. 
 
Income 
Income is measured using personal consumption expenditure. The expenditures cover 
expenditure on food consumption from the food staple to prepared food and tobacco. The 
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expenditure also counts the non-food expenditure that consists of electricity bills, water, 
clothing, schooling, medical costs and non-food items given to other parties outside the 
households. The calculation considers all items being consumed not only from purchasing 
activity but also from items given by other parties. Some expenditure captured in different 
time frame, such as the clothing expenditure and schooling expenditure are measured in 
yearly, the electricity bill is counted in monthly and the food consumption is calculated in 
weekly. We equalize all time frames into monthly by dividing twelve of yearly 
information and multiplied by four for the weekly information. The summation of food 
and non-food expenditures then will be divided with total number of household. The 
result also adjusted with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The final figure is the 
individual monthly income approximated from the personal monthly expenditure using 
currency of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR).  
 
Price  
We use the treatment fee when individuals visiting health care facility as proxy to the 
price of treatment in each facility. This is due to the lack of information of price 
information from facility that categorized as other facility (nurse practice, midwife 
practice, and traditional healers). The public facility and private facility have the same 
information of the price based on the kind of health care services but the other facility 
(nurse practice, midwife practice, and traditional healer) has different kind of services 
hence it does not provide the same information as the other two facilities. Therefore we 
use treatment fee paid by patients when visiting health care facility as a source of price 
information. As a comparison, we will use the treatment fee as a proxy of treatment price 
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without estimation process in the Appendix. The difference is that the price cannot 
appeared as price per sector but it will reflect the price of treatment in general term. 
 
The approach to retrieve price information is using the amount of money in Indonesian 
Rupiah (IDR) from individual’s out of pocket to pay the outpatient treatment in health 
care facility. The amount of money paid to health facility varies usually based on kind of 
treatments and providers. The imputation process is needed to complete the price 
information per sector for each individual. We use the average treatment fee based on 
providers and administration areas (village, sub-district, regency, and province) 
characteristics. We use this information as a proxy for the price of treatment in health care 
facility although it contains the heterogeneity not only from different provider but also 
from a different kind of treatment. From the point of view of individuals they see a price 
is not differentiated based on the facility to visit but what matter is the price paid by the 
patient.  
 
The process starts with checking all entries of the treatment fee for each individual in the 
sample from missing values code. We calculate the average of treatment fee for 
individuals visiting the same kind of facility in the same area. Each individual will have 
complete set of price information for price in public, private or other facility. For 
example, Individual A visits private facility in the area X and pays treatment fee as a price 
in the private facility. From the data, we only get the information of the treatment fee of 
visiting private facility but no information about the alternative price if this Individual A 
visits public facility or other facility. We fill the information of public price and other 
facility price from other individuals live in the same area (area X) with individual A but 
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choose to visit public or other facility. The area identification is stratified from the lowest 
identification level of sub-district, region, and province. At the end of the process, we will 
have a complete set of price information for individual A that is approximate from the 
treatment fee of health care facility.  
 
Demographic variables 
Age is a continuous variable that determines the demand for health care in general. This 
variable is one of the individual characteristics to explain individual choice among 
provider. The IFLS wave 5 data in health section provides only for adult 15 years or more. 
The rationale behind age restriction is that children have a different demand of health care 
compare to adult. Their decision of seeking care also is determined by their parents or 
household head.  
 
The male variable is coded one if the individual is male and zero for the female 
individual. In general, the sex difference also believed to have a different demand of 
health care. In our model of provider’s choice, we put this variable as one of the 
demographic characteristics that might show a different pattern of a provider seeking 
behaviour based on gender.  
 
Education level is also an essential determinant of determining health care provider. The 
more educated person might have a healthier lifestyle and get more informed on health 
care facilities available. Health care knowledge leads to the likelihood of people visit to 
more modern facility in this case is public or private rather than traditional healer. 
Education variable in this research is a level of education that was coded into five 
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categories: never attend school, primary, secondary, high school, and higher education 
levels. The never attend school is the base category. We expect a positive relation between 
education level and public or private health care utilization.  
 
Insurance 
The insurance variable is coded one if the individual use any insurance in his last visit to 
health care facility and zero otherwise. There are several insurance scheme in Indonesia, 
such as public insurance that usually for civil servant and the poor: ASKES, SKTM, 
JAMKESMAS, JAMKESDA, JKN, JAMPERSAL; and private insurance: 
JAMSOSTEK, employer provided health benefits, private health insurance, and savings 
related insurance. Insurance ownership in Indonesia is quite low and increased drastically 
into more than half of total population since the program of health insurance for the poor 
has launched in 2007.  
 
Severity 
Health condition is an individual characteristic that important influence individual to seek 
care. Several variables can be used to describe health status among individuals, such as a 
number of illness, chronic condition, or symptoms. After trying and analysing the use of 
three approaches, we decide to use the number of days with any illness. The variable of 
severity was measured as days when a person is experiencing health problems and 
activities disrupted because of illness in 4 weeks before the survey. There is no further 
explanation from the questionnaire that relates one episode of sickness with the provider 





In order to distinguish health care demand geographicaly, we use a binary variable to 
identify whether the individual lives in urban areas (1) or zero otherwise. The other 
category is the island classification. The variable is coded one if an individual lives in 




Travel cost is used to approximate distance to health care facility. This variable is using a 
money unit in Indonesia Rupiahs (IDR) that individual spends in the last visit to a health 
facility, including fuel cost in one way trip. We differentiate the travel cost based on 
facility category: travel cost to private facility, travel cost to public facility and travel cost 
to health care facility categorized in other. We calculate the median of travel cost from the 
same administrative area for the particular provider. This variable also describes personal 
knowledge of other providers available in the neighbourhood. We assume that individuals 
will visit providers around their neighbourhood for most of the cases.  
 
The waiting time indicates how long individual expected to be examined in health care 
facility upon arrival. The measurement unit is in minutes. The waiting time also applies 
for each facility category, private facility, public facility, and facility in other category. 
The value of waiting time in public is individual waiting time who visits a public health 
facility. We calculate the median value of waiting time in a public facility in the same 
administration area under assumption that individual in the same area will experience the 
same amount of waiting time for a particular category. The same calculation applies for 
273 
 
the waiting time of private facility and other facility. We summarize all variables that 
involve in the model in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3. 2 List of variables names and definition for individual choice of health care  
facility model 
Variable name Definition 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable Individual visit to health care facility prior 4 weeks of 
the survey: 
1. Private facility 
2. Public facility 
3. Other facility  
Based category: public facility (3) 
Dual practice The average of dual practice physician ratio in public 
facility at a province level.  
Age The squared age of individual. 
Male 1. Male; 0. Female 
Education Education level: no education, elementary school, 
junior high school, high school, higher education. 
Insurance Using insurance during the visit: 1. Yes 0.No 
Income The average monthly income per person (IDR) 
Severity The severity level (Score) 
Urban Living in 1. Urban, 0. Rural 
Java Living in 1.Java island,0. Non-Java island 
Travel cost to private 
facility* 
The total transportation cost to the private facility 
(including fuel cost, one way trip in IDR) 
Travel cost to public 
facility* 
The total transportation cost to the public facility 
(including fuel cost, one way trip in IDR) 
Travel cost to other* facility The total transportation cost to the other facility 
(including fuel cost, one way trip in IDR) 
Waiting time in private 
facility 
How long to wait to be examined upon arrival in the 
private health care facility (minutes).  
Waiting time in public 
facility 
How long to wait to be examined upon arrival in the 
public health care facility (minutes). 
Waiting time in other facility How long to wait to be examined upon arrival in the 
other health care facility (minutes). 
Price in the private facility* The average price of a particular treatment in private 
health care facility at village level. 
Price in the public facility* The average price of a particular treatment in public 
health care facility at village level. 
Price in the other facility* The average price of a particular treatment in other 
health care facility at village level. 
*Use the unit currency of 10,000 IDR 
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Self-employment is binary variable where one indicates that individual is self-employed, 
and 0 for others. This variable is extracted from variable item number TK24 in IFLS 2014 
questionnaire indicates whether individual status in his primary job (job that consumes 
most time) is self-employed, self-employed with unpaid family worker/temporary worker, 
or self-employed with permanent worker, government worker, private worker, casual 
worker in agriculture, casual worker not in agriculture, or unpaid family worker. We re-
categorize the variable by grouping the first three options into code 1 which is individual 
is self-employed, while the rest is categorized as 0 (other). In the last category also 
includes people who are not working in the present time of the survey.  
 
3.4.2 Quality and demand of health care 
 
In this sub section, we will provide an analysis on how quality aspect influences health 
care demand. This is an additional benefit from using the same data source of IFLS wave 
5 as the data is completed with the information on quality. We measure specifically the 
role of facility quality on the demand of health care after controlling other variables and 
conditional on individual decide to seek care in the formal health care facility. The formal 
care refers to the facility which is attended by physician. The demand for health care is 
stated as whether individual visits public or private health care facilities during one period 
of illness prior four weeks of the survey. The model also simplified only in one level of 
decision making by individual based on the first visit to health care provider.  
 
In this research, the demand for health care of individual chooses public or private 
provider is a dichotomous variable. It takes the value of one (𝑦𝑑 = 1) with probability 𝜋 
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if the patient has demand of health care in private practice and zero (𝑦𝑑 = 0)  with 
probability 1 − 𝜋 if individual has no demand in private. The binary outcome is related 
with the available data on quality aspect that will be our focal point for the model. The 
quality data is collected from the public community health centre questionnaire and 
private practice facility questionnaire. These two questionnaire have equal quality 
structure hence it is possible to compare individual’s choice between public or private 
facility. We excluded the non-physician practice (midwife, nurse, and traditional healer) 
as the facility has different quality information structure hence incomparable with the 
other two choices.  
 
The quality aspect in this research represents the quality aspects mentioned in (Phelps, 
1992) that quality is defined into two components; the first is quality related with the 
production of health such as physician training or technology. The second component is 
quality related with the amenities aspect of health care such as convenience of opening 
hours and friendliness of service. Adopting the quality framework, we have three aspects 
of quality: quality of physician, quality of treatment, and quality of facility.  The other 
explanatory variables that determine health care demand is the same structure as previous 
model: dual practice, monetary, non-monetary, and individual characteristics.  
 
The demand of health care can be described as individuals visit into private facility or 




1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦




Table 3. 3 Code for the dependent variable in individual choice of health care facility  
with quality factor 
Facility Code Original code from IFLS Questionnaire* 
(1) (2) (3) 
Private 
facility 
0 E. Private hospital 
F. Polyclinic, Private Clinic, Medical Center 
G.Private Physician (General Practitioner, Specialist, 
Dentist, Family Doctor) 
Public 
facility 
1 A. Public hospital 
B.Public Health Center (puskesmas)/Auxiliary Center 
(puskesmas pembantu)  
*The bold letter indicates the original code for the alternatives answer in IFLS 
Questionnaire. 
**Although we include the hospital option, we should note that the limit of the study is 
the outpatient care only. The facilities refer to the outpatient clinics that are managed by 
hospital. 
 
The 𝑦𝑖  is a realization of random variable 𝑌𝑖  which take value of one and zero with 
probabilities 𝜋𝑖  and 1 − 𝜋𝑖. Suppose we have k independent observations 𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑘 and 
𝑦𝑖 has a binomial distribution, 
 
𝑌𝑖~𝐵(𝑛𝑖 , 𝜋𝑖) 
 
The 𝑛𝑖 = 1 for all i that shows the stochastic structure of the model. The linear function 
of predictors with logit of the probability 𝜋𝑖is  
 




 the 𝑥𝑖   a vector of covariates and 𝛽  is a vector of regression coefficient. The model 
structure is generalized linear model with binomial response and link logit function. 






The multiplicative form above is useful to calculate the odds ratio when we are interested 
in one unit change of the j-th predictors while holding other things constant, we multiply 
the odds 𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛽}. The interpretation in term of odds ratio will be easier as it presented in 
more familiar scale. The model is summarized below in reduced form, as a system of 
demand equations. Here we decompose the explanatory variable of 𝑥  into several 
definitions to make vivid interpretations of the results. 
 
𝑄𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓𝑖𝑗 (𝐷𝑗 , 𝑌𝑗, 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑗 , 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑗 , 𝑡𝑝𝑣𝑗 , 𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑗 , 𝑍𝑗 , 𝑞𝑝𝑣𝑗 , 𝑞𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑗) 
 
Where 
𝑄𝑖𝑗= whether outpatient medical service i is used by the j th individual, where 
 i = private facility or public facility  
 j = all individual age 14 or above who decides to seek care during the period of  
illness in the last 4 weeks prior the survey. 
𝐷𝑗= percentage of dual practice physician in the public facility where individual lives. 
𝑌𝑗= monthly income for the j th individual. 
𝑃𝑗= Price of service paid by j th individual. 
278 
 
𝒕 = vector of non-monetary factors associated with distance and waiting time by each j th 
individual. 
𝒁𝑗= a vector of social and demographic control variables for the j th individual. 
q = vector of facility-level quality including quality of facility, physician’s quality and 
treatment 
quality 
𝒒𝑝𝑣𝑗= quality of private facility serving the j th individual’s area. 
𝒒𝑝𝑣𝑗= quality of public facility serving the j th individual’s area.  
 
The estimation process in health care demand function is using logistic regression 
technique as it uses a dichotomous variable. This regression cannot be estimated using 
ordinary least squares because it suffers from heteroscedasticity and non-normality 
problem in the error term. We use Maximum Likelihood Method to estimate parameters 
of logistic regression. 
 
Dependent variable: visit private facility, public facility, or other facility 
 
The dependent variable in the quality regression will only consist of two options: 
individual visits private practice or individual choose to public facility. We exclude the 
traditional healer, nurse, and a midwife practice out of the sample because the facility 
information corresponds to the patient visit is limited only to the public community health 
centre and private facility. The latter consists only the polyclinic, private clinic, medical 





Different information sources are used to get the information price for public and private 
facility. We get the price information by matching the individual information with the 
health facility being visited. The information comes from public community health centre 
questionnaire and private health cfacility questionnaire. The price of particular treatment 
measured in Indonesian Rupiahs (IDR). This information is a part of provider’s 
characteristics and suffered from considerable missing values because some of the health 
care facilities were not filling in their price of treatment questionnaire. The imputation 
process applies by replacing with a median of price based on providers and administration 
areas. We assumed that price for treatment in the same kind of providers and areas would 
be similar. We use two kinds of prices that mostly available in the facilities: the price of 
treating wound and price for examination and medicine as a proxy of price in public and 
private facilities. The use of particular treatment price as a proxy for the price suffers from 
the assumption that not all individuals visit health facility to get that treatment. However, 
we can argue that the variation in the price hence based only because of provider 
differentiation. 
 
Quality of facility 
The quality of the facility is a dummy variable relates to the cleanness of facility in the 
examination room and the availability of cleanness tools such as trash bin and wash basin. 
Interviewer observes the cleanness facility during an interview session in the facility. This 
variable can be used as a proxy for provider quality from user’s perspective. The detailed 
composition of quality facility index is available in Appendix 3C. The quality of facility 
also covers completeness of necessary equipment and medical supply in the facility. 
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These questions are filled by the provider’s staff. We calculate the average of facility 
quality by sum up the score of quality and divided by number of facilities in province 
level for public and private category. 
 
Quality of physician 
The quality of physician has measured whether a physician in the facility gets additional 
training after graduating from medical school. There are trainings related to specific 
ability captured by IFLS wave 5 questionnaire, but in this research, we do not specify any 
particular ability and take general definition whether physician get any additional 
treatment. The quality of physician is a ratio between a number of physicians with 
additional training and total physician in a facility at province level. First, we identify the 
total number of physician and number of physician who received training in one facility. 
Then we take the average for public and private category at province level. 
 
Quality of treatment  
The quality of treatment is a score of physician vignette in curative care for an adult. The 
vignette contains a list of questions in how the physician is diagnosing patient’s case. The 
full set of the vignette questions are available in Appendix 3C. The valuation is not based 
on true or false but how physician will react spontaneously to provide general procedures 
in diagnosing patient’s symptoms using dummy case.  The ideal expected score should be 
a low score because a spontaneous respond is coded 1 while prompted responds are coded 
2 and 3. The small score indicates that physician has already applied appropriate 
procedure. There are four kinds of vignette in the questionnaire: curative care for adult, 
curative care for an adult with diabetes, curative care for children, and prenatal care. We 
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use only the curative care for an adult as this treatment mostly available in public and 
private facilities. The vignette questionnaire can be filled by other medical staff such as 
midwives or nurses, but in this study, we consider the only vignette that is occupied by a 
physician. We take the average vignette score for each category: public and private at 
province level. All variables for the quality effect are summarized in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3. 4 List of variables names and definition for the individual choice of health  
care facility with quality effect 
Variable name Definition 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable Individual visit to health care facility prior 4 weeks of the 
survey: 
0. Private  
1. Public  
Reference category: public facility(1) 
Dual practice The average of dual practice physician ratio in public facility 
at a province level.  
Age2 The squared age of individual. 
Male 1.Male; 0. Female 
Education Education level: no education, elementary school, junior high 
school, high school, higher education. 
Insurance Using insurance during the visit: 1. Yes 0.No 
Income The average monthly income per person (IDR) 
Severity The severity level (Score) 
Urban Living in 1. Urban, 0. Rural 
Java Living in 1.Java island,0. Non-Java island 
Travel cost The total transportation cost to the facility (including fuel cost, 
one way trip in currency unit of Indonesian Rupiahs, IDR) 
Waiting How long to wait to be examined upon arrival in the health 
care facility (minutes).  
Price The average price of a particular treatment (treating a wound) 
in private health care facility at province level. 
Quality facility The average score of public facility at province level. 
Quality physician The average of ratio between a number of physicians with 
additional training and total physician in public facility at 
province level. 





3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.5.1 Sample definition 
 
Our analysis focused on estimating health care demand conditional on the individual has 
made the decision to seek care in the existence of the dual practice. The limitation of data 
makes dual practice identification not appeared directly from an individual perspective 
but more from provider’s side. Data in this analysis combines individual data and health 
facility data (public community health centre and private practice).  
 
The sample selection process is described in Figure 3A.1 of Appendix 3A. For each step 
we also report the descriptive statistics for variables included in Table 3A.1A of Appendix 
3A. The descriptive statistics shows that our selected sample show consistency with the 
original sample of IFLS data. The first step of sample selecting process is identifying 
individuals based on the age as we will exclude children or population within age 14 years 
old or bellow. The health care decision is made by the adult age 15 years old or above. 
The total individuals being interviewed in the IFLS sample is 50,148. We take 31,421 
individuals age 15 years old or above. Out of 31,421 individuals’ age 15 years old or more 
being interviewed, around 18% or 5,695 individuals visited health care facilities in 4 
weeks duration prior survey. We limit the study only for individuals whom visit health 
care facility for outpatient care. The facilities are public facility such as public hospital 
and public community health centre. The private facilities are private hospital, private 
clinics, and private physician practice. There are also facilities which are not attended by 
physician such as midwifes practice, nurse practice and traditional healer. Physician 
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usually provides services in formal treatment, in public or private health care facility. It 
should be noted that although we include the public hospital and private hospital, both 
also still refer to outpatient care. The next selection characteristic is whether the visit is 
categorized as the first visit. The selection on the first visit only is isolating the decision of 
visiting health care facility made by the patient from the physician involvement. The 
criteria cut the sample into 2,686 individuals.  
 
In the next step there are two different matching processes taken to get a sample for the 
regression processes. The first sample will be matched with the dual practice 
identification. The information of dual practice activity comes from the community health 
centre in the area. The questionnaire lists the physician activity outside the public 
community health centre that can be used to identify a dual practice physician. We use 
three different administration areas to identify the percentage of dual practice physician: 
sub district, region, and province. Ideally the percentage represents the sub-district level 
because public community health centre is available in the sub-district level, but some 
cases shows that not all individuals in the survey reside in the same sub-district as the 
community health centre being interviewed. In that case, we use the upper level which is 
the region level, and in the rare case the province level. Other obstacle appears in the 
information completeness of health care facilities particularly on the price information. 
The interview process asked the treatment price based on the basic treatment and 
diagnose. We also use patient’s information on treatment cost to approximate the price for 
each treatment in each facility. The data available could only identify the price 
information in which individual actually visits to get the treatment. The price information 
of two alternatives health care facilities are gathered using information from different 
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individuals who use the two alternative facilities but reside at the same area. The problem 
appears if there is no information of two facility prices in the same area with the 
individual. The unmatched cases will reduce the number of observations. The sample 
matched with dual practice identification is reduced into 1,326 individuals.  
 
A different matching process is taken to get sample for the regression on quality. We 
identified the sample matched with provider’s data. In the regression to analyze the 
quality effect on individual choice, we only use individual data who visit public and 
private facility. The detailed questionnaire on quality is only available for the public 
community health, private clinics and private physician practice. This research addresses 
the physician quality explicitly as one of the quality component while the traditional 
healer, midwife practice and nurse practice are not facilities that affiliated with physician 
practice. We use the two sources to approximate the quality in the public and private 
facility. The health care facility is not necessarily the one which is visited by the 
individual but we use the area identification using the sub district as the smallest 
identification area. The difficulty appears from the low respond rate of private health care 
facility. While the respond rate of public community health centre is almost 100 percent 
the respond rate of private facility is quite low, only around 40 percent of the private 
facility which completely filled the questionnaire mainly on the quality sections. The 
other consideration is related with the price information. In our previous regression 
model, we use the individual information on treatment cost to approach the price 
information of health care facility. By excluding the traditional healer, midwife practice, 
and nurse practice we can collect information on treatment fee from the special treatment 
price in the public and private facility. We take the price of treating wounds from both 
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facilities to approximate the price for the public facility and private facility. The selection 
consideration of this particular treatment is more due to the data completeness reason as 
the treatment has the highest percentage of completeness rate compare to other price 
information. After clearing out the missing values commonly from the facility 
information, the final sample for the dual practice purpose in sub Chapter 3.6.1 are 1,116 
individuals and 998 individuals for quality purpose in sub Chapter 3.6.2. 
 
The final sample each process represents all the provinces included in the IFLS main 
sample but for some provinces, the number of individuals is too small. The sample 
description is available in the Appendix. Our selected sample consists of individuals from 
15 provinces out 23 provinces in the original IFLS sample. The selection criteria notably 
because we only include individuals which visit health care facility contributes large 
portion of sample decreasing in this research. 
 
3.5.2 Individual characteristics 
 
To provide a deep understanding of individual characteristics, we explain the descriptive 
result on the primary sample that will be used in the first model. The administration area 
identification is simplified between individual reside in Java island and non-Java island. 
The proportion between individual of Java and Non-Java Island is almost the same with 
the percentage of Java Island is still higher than non-Java. Most of the individuals in the 
sample are female, with the 62 percent of female and 38 percent of male. The complete 
tables can be found in Table 3A.2 to Table 3A.9 Appendix 3A. The proportion between 
individual visiting public and private facility is almost the same which is around 30 
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percent, and the last category, the traditional healer, midwife and nurse practice has the 
highest percentage of around 36 percent.  
 
The average monthly income is 978,777 IDR. The minimum and maximum values of 
incomes are 20,009 IDR and 14,800,000 IDR. The cross tabulation between monthly 
income quintile and health care facility chosen by patient shows that the lowest quintile 
rely on public facility while the highest quintile visit more the private sector. The midwife 
practice, nurse practice, and traditional healer appear in all level of income quintile, about 
30 percent in average. It indicates that people still rely on non-physician facility outside 
public or private facility. The pattern also appears when we compare the case between 
rural and urban area utilization. People in rural area still rely much on midwife practice, 
nurse practice, and traditional healer rather than visit public or private health care facility. 
Individuals living outside Java Island visit in almost the same proportion between public 
facility and traditional healer.  
 
In term of transportation cost, the average of transportation cost to the private facility is 
the highest among others, it is 15,208 IDR while the transportation cost to other facility 
outside public or private facility has the lowest average, 4,562 IDR. The complete figure 
appears in the Appendix 3 A Table 3A.9. We also calculate the waiting time to get the 
treatment, started from registration process in the facility until getting serve by health care 
personnel. The lowest waiting time is 7 minutes to get treatment in midwife practice, 
nurse practice and traditional healer. The highest waiting time is to get treatment in public 
facility, around 30 minutes, while it takes around 25 minutes to get treatment in private 
facility. The highest price of treatment is in private sector, it is 104,243 IDR while the 
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public and other facility are quite lower than the price in private facility are 44,716 IDR 
and 30,748 IDR.  
 
3.5.3 Facility characteristics 
 
The facility information comes from 969 public community health centre and 1,597 
private health care facilities. The detailed figures are available in Table 3A.11of Appendix 
3A. The facility sample represents the public and private facilities available in the same 
area with the patients. The matching process is using area identification with individual 
data. The facility quality measured by the facility cleanness shows that most of the facility 
has high score of the facility quality index. The score indicates the medical instrument 
completeness, essential medicine completeness, and facility cleanness.  We classify the 
score into two categories: high and low. The private facility has higher average percentage 
of facility with high score, around 93 percent, while in public is around 78 percent. The 
health care facility mostly concern on the completeness of the medical instrument, 
medicine, and cleanness because these three indicators are necessary things that should be 
available in the facility.  
 
The quality of physician is measured by the percentage of physician in the facility who 
gets general training. In public health care facility, most of the physician have already 
involved in additional trainings that support the medical skill after being graduated from 
medical school. The average percentage of physician with additional training in public 
facility is 86 percent from total physician in the facility which is much higher compare to 
the percentage of physician with additional training in the private facility with only 67 
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percent. The quality physician indicator shows the provider role in providing the 
additional treatment for their physician. It is a common knowledge that public providers 
usually give more opportunity for their physicians to get additional treatment as a part of 
additional benefit of being public physician beside the usual income.   
 
The quality of treatment is described using vignette score that indicates the physician 
response in managing a particular case. The score shows the completeness of steps in 
diagnosing patient symptom that should be considered by the physician rather than right 
or wrong indications in treating the patient. The average total vignette score is 77. When 
decompose based on public and private facility, the vignette score in public facility has 
higher average than vignette score in private facility with 85 index unit in public facility 
compare to 72 index unit in private facility. The score shows the number of physicians’ 
attempt in diagnosing symptoms.  Low level of vignette score can be translated that 




3.6.1 Dual Practice and health care access  
 
The estimated result for individual choice of health care facility using multinomial logit 
regression is reported in Table 3. 5. The corresponding result associated with nested 





Table 3.5 Parameter estimation of individual choice of health care facility before  
correcting for potential bias 
Variables MNL Coefficient  
Private VS Public Traditional healer/nurse/ 
midwife VS Public 
Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dual practice -3.623** 1.230 -0.508 1.200 
Age squared 0.0001* 0.00006 -0.00005 0.00006 


























Insurance -1.325*** 0.177 -5.071*** 0.719 
Ln Income 0.270** 0.098 0.170* 0.102 
Severity 0.015 0.012 -0.003 0.013 
Urban 0.302* 0.174 -0.310* 0.170 
Java 0.237 0.165 -0.088 0.168 
Travel cost (private) 0.002540 0.000002 0.018800 0.000002 
Travel cost (public) 0.044700 0.000004 0.081100* 0.000004 
Travel cost (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 0.016600 0.000001 0.026700 0.000014 
Waiting time (private) 0.001 0.002 0.00028 0.001 
Waiting time (public) 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Waiting time (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 
-0.014* 0.007 -0.003 0.008 
Price (private) -0.022700** 0.000001 0.00396* 0.0000002 
Price (public) 0.0035400 0.0000008 -0.0024600 0.0000008 
Price (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) -0.0505000 0.0000069 -0.0978000 0.0000074 
Const -0.961 1.684 -0.484 1.744 
n 1326 
Log likelihood -1237.9956 
p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001. 
Using multinomial logit model, Visits: 0. Private, 1. Public, 2.Traditional/ midwife/nurse). 
Base category is public facility. 
 
A likelihood ratio test suggests that the nested multinomial logit model is not better than 
multinomial logit model as it is usually the case in the previous literature of health care 
demand model. We also test for the best model among these three regression result and 
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see whether the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives is adequate. The 
complete report of the test is available in the Appendix 3B, Table 3B. 1. For the 
comparison, another multinomial regression using simplified variables of price, waiting 
time, and travel cost but with larger sample size is available in Appendix 3B, Table 3B.4. 
The coefficients have similar signs with the Table 3.5. Our primary focus is the 
interpretation of dual practice physician and insurance effect, therefore the following 
discussion is based on the multinomial logit model in Table 3.5.  
 
The coefficient for dual practice variable is statistically significant at 1 percent level in the 
comparison between choosing private facility or public facility. This implies that the 
existence of dual practice physician in the facility is importantly affecting the choice of 
outpatient health care. The dual practice variable gives expected but insignificant effect in 
the comparison between traditional healer, nurse or midwife facility and public facility. 
The dual practice physician does not necessarily shifts individuals to change from non-
formal facility such as traditional healers, nurse, and midwife to public facility. The 
percentage of dual practice physician is important in the shifting choice of provider 
between private and public health care facility. The increasing percentage of dual practice 
physician in the area associates with the increase of relative log odds of individual visiting 
public facility compare to visiting private facility. The magnitude of the effect however is 
small since the relative risk ratio of dual practice is less than one, only 0.027 (Relative 
risk ratio is presented in Table 3B.2A of Appendix 3B). One percent increase in dual 
practice percentage can be associated in very small change in number of dual practice 
physician in the area. Hence people might not realize the difference unless the increasing 
percentage is quite large number. From the descriptive statistics, it is showed that 
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traditional healer, nurse or midwife still becomes individual first choice to seek health 
care. The traditional healers, nurse or midwife mostly provide health care treatment from 
children care, maternity and adult treatment. In order to make an assessment of the impact 
of dual practice on the choice of provider, the effect of changing the percentage of dual 
practice ratio is presented in sub Chapter 3.7 together with discussion on the effect of 
insurance to propose new policy for dual practice regulation in Indonesia. 
 
As expected, the effect of insurance is significance at 1 percent level in the choice of 
provider. The insurance information is related with whether people use insurance in their 
last visit health care. This approach is more convincing than using the information 
whether people is registered in any insurance scheme because people may not using the 
insurance for several reasons such as visiting facility not affiliated to insurance scheme 
etc. People with insurance are more likely visiting public health care facility rather than 
visiting traditional healer, nurse or midwife. The comparison between private and public 
shows those individuals with insurance are more likely visiting public facility rather than 
private facility. It should be noted that in general, the treatment in public facility is not 
free but applied a treatment fee. The magnitude of the effect of insurance to individual 
choice of healthcare facility is clearly seen in the relative risk value of insurance which is 
2.30.  For people with insurance relative to people without insurance, the relative risk for 
visiting private facility relative to public facility would be expected to decrease by a factor 
of 2.263 given the other variables in the model are held constant. If an individual was 
having insurance, the relative risk for choose traditional healer, nurse, or midwife  relative 
to choose public facility would be expected to decrease by a factor of 1.023 given the 
other variables in the model are held constant. The IFLS data shows that around 76 
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percent of the sample is not having insurance. Among individuals who have insurance, 
most of them are having public insurance which is insurance for civil servants and 
subsidized insurance of the poor from the government of Indonesia. These kinds of 
insurance usually can be applied in public facility. Insurance provides financial protection 
and directly impacts on public demand health care. In this case, there is an indication of 
moral hazard as having insurance means greater access to public facility. Providing 
insurance gives more significant effect to health care demand through access 
enhancement channel compare to provide more dual practice physician in the system. 
 
Individual characteristics provide evidence that those variables in general are 
insignificantly affecting the choice of health care provider. The individual characteristics 
might significantly affect the demand for health care as shown in previous literature but in 
this research only age is significantly explains the choice of health care between private 
and public health care facility, while the urban location is significant in the choice 
between traditional healer and public facility. The significance sign in urban variable 
implies that individual living in urban area is less likely choose traditional healer over 
public facility. The result is in line with a previous study in UK (Propper, 2000). The 
explanation on why many individual characteristics give insignificant sign is that our 
model directly address the choice of health care while the individual characteristics might 
provide significant evidence on to visit or not to visit health care facilities. 
 
The coefficient of log income variable is positive and significant at 1 percent level, 
implying that wealthier individual, the more likely the individual choose private facility 
over public facility. This result is consistent with the theoretical consideration because 
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higher income group have more financial power to choose between private and public. In 
this case the public facility is characterized as lower and almost free treatment, but has a 
longer queue.  
 
Non-treatment cost variables such as travel cost and waiting time are all relevant but in 
fact provide a small evidence on the factors that involve in individual decision of health 
care provider. Access to health care facility represented by amount of travel cost to the 
nearest health care facility shows that the more expensive the costs to public facility, 
individuals are more likely to choose the traditional healer/nurse/ midwife.  
   
The price of treatment in private facility shows significant coefficient in the decision 
between private and public facility but not between traditional healer and public facility. 
Although people are willing to pay for a better treatment in private facility, but the result 
points out that the increasing price of private treatment will be followed with the 
decreasing people visit private facility and more people choose the public one. However, 
the relative risk ratio in Table 3B.2A of Appendix 3B shows that the magnitude is not 
convincing because the relative risk ratio is close to one.  
 
The result after correction for endogeneity is presented in Table 3.6. We focus on the 
variables that are our main concern: variable of insurance and dual practice physician. The 





Table 3. 6. Parameter estimation of individual choice of health care facility after  
correction for potential bias  
Variables MNL Coefficient (standard error) 
Private VS Public Traditional healer/nurse/ 
midwife VS Public 
Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dual practice -3.869* 1.256 -0.355 1.223 
Age squared 0.00006 0.00007 -0.00001 0.00007 
Male 0.238 0.160 0.083 0.164 
Education 
     Primary school 
     Secondary school 
     High school 





















Insurance 0.052 1.395 -6.419*** 1.573 
Ln Income 0.289** 0.101 0.155 0.104 
Severity 0.012 0.012 -0.001 0.013 
Urban 0.105 0.259 -0.135 0.250 
Java 0.241 0.165 -0.096 0.168 
Travel cost (private) 0.0000008 0.000002 0.000001 0.000001 
Travel cost (public) 0.000005 0.000004 0.000007* 0.000004 
Travel cost (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 
0.000007 0.00001 0.000002 0.00001 
Waiting time (private) 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 




-0.014* 0.007 -0.003 0.008 
Price (private) -0.000002** 0.000001 -0.0000003* 0.0000002 
Price (public) 0.0000003 0.0000008 -0.0000002 0.0000008 
Price (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 
-0.000004 0.000007 -0.00001 0.000007 
Residual -1.406 1.415 1.389 1.430 
Const -0.929 1.683 -0.463 1.748 
n    1326 
Log likelihood    -1235.83 
p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001. 
Using multinomial logit model, Visits: 0. Private, 1. Public, 2.Traditional/ midwife/nurse). 
Base category is public facility. 
 
The coefficient of dual practice physician variable in corrected model has similar negative 
sign with the non-corrected model in Table 3.5 but has lesser coefficient values. The dual 
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practice is significant in affecting individual choice of health care facility between private 
and public but insignificant in traditional healer/nurse/midwife and public. People who 
live in the area with more dual practice physician will be more likely to visit public health 
facility rather than private facility. The insurance variable in corrected model shows 
insignificant positive sign for the comparison between private and public, but significant 
and positive effect on comparison of traditional healer/nurse/midwife and public. The 
previous result shows that in both comparisons, the coefficient of insurance variable is 
significant and positive. The coefficient value of insurance in corrected model is smaller 
than in the non-corrected model. After correcting the endogeneity problem, people with 
insurance less preferred of visiting traditional healers/nurse/midwife compare to visiting 
public facility under everything being constant. 
 
The robustness check for both models, before and after the correction bias is available in 
Table 3A.1A to Table 3A.1F of Appendix 3A. Both models are qualified as good model to 
represent individual choice of health care facility.  
 
3.6.2 Dual Practice, quality, and the choice between private or public 
 
The estimated results for the quality model are reported in Table 3.7 with the different 
measurement in price component. The complete result of odds ratio and robustness check 
of the model is available in Table 3B.6 and Table 3B.7 Appendix 3B. Dual practice 
variable shows positive and significant coefficient in both models. The increasing 
percentage of dual practice physician in public facility leads to increasing probability 
people visit public facility rather than private facility. 
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Table 3. 7 Parameter estimates of individual choice of health care facility with  
quality factor  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std.error 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dual practice 3.248* 1.1882 3.964** 1.755 
Age -0.0001** 0.00005 -0.0001** 0.00006 
Male -0.100 0.137 -0.144 0.143 
Education 
     Primary school 
     Secondary school 
     High school 





















Insurance 1.412*** 0.151 1.312*** 0.162 
lnIncome -0.339*** 0.085 -0.202** 0.090 
Severity -0.013 0.012 -0.009 0.012 
Urban -0.035 0.162 -0.149 0.166 
Java -0.501 0.367 -0.383 0.382 
Travel cost (private) -0.0000007  0.000002 -0.000002  0.0000003 
Travel cost (public) -0.0000001  0.0000005 -0.00000004  0.0000008.5 
Waiting time(private) 0.002 0.001 0.0008 0.0008 
Waiting time (public) -0.005** 0.002 -0.000001** 0.002 
Price (private) -
0.0000000002* 
0.0000000001 0.000001  0.0000010 
Price (public) -0.0000000001 0.0000000004 -0.0000001  0.0000007 
Quality facility (private) -0.429 0.446 0.275 0.367 
Quality facility (public) 0.064 0.263 0.135 0.230 
Quality physician (private) -3.244 2.346 -0.166 1.584 
Quality physician (public) 2.210 2.260 -0.790 1.127 
Quality treatment (private) 0.048 0.042 -0.003 0.022 
Quality treatment (public) -0.174* 0.091 -0.078* 0.044 
Cons 13.843** 4.990 7.705 3.628 
n 1116  998  
Log likelihood - 671.041*  -615.25102  
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* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001 
Use logit model, logit model with dependent variable of visiting public or private 
provider. The reference category is private facility.  
The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 is on the price variable approach where 
Model 1 uses price data taken from a certain treatment fee in the facility. Model 2 uses 
price variable from patient’s expenditure when visiting health care facility.  
 
In this model, we emphasize the role of quality component in patient’s decision to visit 
private or public health care facility. Among the three quality measurement: facility, 
physician, and treatment, only the quality treatment in public is significant. We use the 
score of vignette questionnaire for adult treatment to approximate the level of quality 
treatment in the facility. The significant component gives the expected sign and it can be 
interpreted that when the quality of treatment in public facility is increasing, people will 
be more likely to visit to public facility. The negatives sign is due to the use of the 
vignette score which indicates that the higher vignette score means the physicians are less 
spontaneous in diagnosing patient to find the best medical solution. This is an approach to 
quantify quality treatment provided in health care quality in the IFLS 5 questionnaire. The 
smaller vignette score means that physicians are more thorough full in diagnosing a 
patient’s symptom. From the patient view, this score can be represented the physician-
patient interaction during the medical consultation by providing physical check-up or 
asking prompted questions.  
 
Only quality of treatment in public facility among three quality variables shows the 
significant and negative sign in both model 1 and model 2. The measurement uses 
vignette score of how physician in each facility provides treatment. The low score means 
that physician is spontaneously answering the questions in order to diagnose the 
symptoms during interview. It describe that physician performance in providing health 
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care treatment is excellent. While the higher score means that physicians need more 
approach in diagnosing patient’s symptoms. The interpretation of the regression in Table 
3.7 shows the expected sign that the more physician can perform well in public facility, 
the more patients will come to public facility. Results on both models show the 
insignificant coefficient for the rest of quality components which are quality of facility 
and quality of physician. It confirms the argument that individual or patient is also less 
informs about quality aspect. In our result, the facility quality is a mixed measurement 
between facility cleanness, the completeness of instrument, and the stock of medicine in 
the facility. The insignificant sign might come from the merging of these three indicators 
into single variable. We have already tried to separate the three indicators of facility 
quality, for example we include only the facility cleanness score into the regression as this 
indicator might be the easiest indicator to observe by patients compare to the 
completeness of instrument and medicine in the facility. The result again provides the 
insignificant sign. The reasonable explanation is that most facility has already met the 
minimum standard of cleanness, instrument, and medicine completeness. From the 
patient’s perspective, the patient might assume that the quality of facility between public 
and private is similar so that the choice is not based on the facility quality but from other 
different aspects. The closer look into descriptive of statistic shows that only a few facility 
that has low score while most of facility has average score or higher. We should mention 
that our study is limited for outpatient care only that mostly provide primary care hence 
most of the instrument and medicine can be well provided in both facilities. 
 
The physician quality is indicated by the ratio of physician who receive or attend 
additional training after finishing medical school shows consistent sign although still 
299 
 
insignificant. Among several trainings provided in the questionnaire, we use the particular 
training for adult treatment. The additional training seems to be a necessary as most 
physicians have it, but patients do not observe this information. Physician’s training 
together with physician’s original university might be necessary for the facility reputation, 
but in our result, the patient cannot identify the physician quality directly. The 
insignificant sign can be also interpreted as the information gap between patient and 
physician during the medical treatment.  The patients might have not enough information 
on the expected treatment based on their treatments.  
 
The quality of facility and quality of physician are two quality aspects that insignificant 
on the patient’s decision to visit public or private facility. Both quality aspects have the 
expected signs although not significant but the result might support our claim that the 
higher quality level in public facility and public physician, patients will be more likely to 
visit public facility. While the higher level of private facility and private physicians lead to 
the decreasing odds for patient to go to public facility. There is a difference between 
quality treatment in public and private, the mean difference test shows significant 
difference between the two score means of quality treatment in public and private facility. 
The result of the quality aspects in affecting health care facility choice shows that people 
might experience difficulties to observe the quality and to quantify the expected quality of 
treatment. But on the other side, people still value the quality interaction between 
physician and patient during the process. Hence the quality treatment is one of the 




The price variable indicates that individual is less sensitive to it. Both approach in price 
measurements shows only one variable price is significant in the model, the price in 
private facility, but gives the unexpected sign. The increase price of private treatment 
leads to the less likely people chooses public facility. The price of public treatment gives 
the expected sign but insignificant and so do the other prices using out of pocket payment 
approach.   
 
3.7 Policy implication 
 
We will bring the result into policy discussion mainly related with dual practice and 
insurance provision. As a reference, we collect information of insurance premium from 
Social Security Administrator for Health (BPJS, a government agency that provides health 
insurance in Indonesia), Table 3.8.  
 




Outpatient benefits Inpatient benefit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
First 80,000  There are no 
differences between 
classes in outpatient 
treatment. 
The difference 
between classes is 
different claim tariff 
from hospital to BPJS 
based on disease’s 
grouped (INA-
CBGs). 
Get facility in first class bed in hospital, around 
2-4 beds per room. Able to upgrade to VIP class 
by paying the room price differently.  
Second 51,000  Get facility in second class bed in hospital, 3-5 
beds per room. Able to upgrade to higher class 
by paying the room price different. 
Third 30,000 Get facility in third class bed in hospital, 4-6 
beds per room. Unable to upgrade to higher class 






Get facility in third class bed in hospital, 4-6 
beds per room. Unable to upgrade to higher class 




To approach the information of providing dual practice in the system, we use the 
information on salary of physician with temporary employee status (Table 3.9). This is a 
particular program from government of Indonesia to increase the physician post in remote 
areas. Physician will work in public facility, usually fresh graduate physician, with 
temporary contract for one to three years contract based on replacement area category.  
 
Table 3. 9 Salary and incentives for public physician under temporary contract 
Placement area Salary* Incentive* Total 
(salary+incentive)* 
Contract 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Normal area 2,800,000 None 2,800,000 3 years 
Remote area 2,800,000 10,300,000 13,100,000 2 years 
Very remote area 2,800,000 13,000,000 15,800,000 1 years 
*Currency in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 
 
We will use the case of aid recipient premium (23,000 IDR) and total salary plus incentive 
for physician in normal area (2,800,000 IDR) for the policy simulation as the insurance 
premium is paid by the government and we take the lowest possible salary for physician. 




We will use the health insurance scheme for aid recipient (PBI) to describe policy 
scenario. Suppose health authority has 100 Million IDR additional budget per a year. The 
health authority decides to finance health insurance for PBI. This is a specific health 
insurance scheme for the poor. We simulate the poor group using the lowest quintile of 
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individual monthly income. The health insurance for PBI a year costs 12 x 23,000 IDR = 
276,000 IDR. The yearly budget can provide additional 100,000,000 IDR: 276,000 IDR = 
362 insurance packages per year.  
 
The policy implication uses the estimation of the multinomial logit before correcting 
endogeneity (Table 3.5). However we concern the endogeneity problem in our model as 
appears previously in Sub Chapter 3.6.1 Table 3.6. We categorize individuals based on 
income quintile and insurance status as appears in Table 3. 10. We use this table to 
randomize the change of given insurance in the simulation process. In the simulation 
process, we will change 363 individuals with no insurance in the lowest quintile to have 
insurance. We calculate the average predicted probability for all outcomes (private, 
public, and traditional healer, midwife or nurse). 
 
Table 3. 10 Number of observations based on income quintile and insurance status 
Quintile Having insurance? After simulation, 
Having insurance? 
No Yes No Yes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1
st















442 103 442 103 
5
th
 quintile (the highest)
 
459 143 459 143 
TOTAL 2,078 551 1,716 913 
 
The result in Table 3. 11 shows the predicted probability after the simulation in additional 
health insurance beneficiaries, the average predicted probability of choosing public 
facility is increasing, while the average predicted probability choosing private facility 
only slightly increasing. The large difference occurs in the average predicted probability 
of choosing traditional healer, midwife or nurse, which is smaller after the simulation. The 
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closer looks into the particular income quintile which receives treatment in health 
insurance shows large gaps, with increasing figure is more than double in the average 
predicted probability of choosing public facility, and huge decreasing in the average 
predicted probability of traditional healer, midwife or nurse. 
 
Table 3. 11 Mean predicted probability outcomes 




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Private 1613 0.37 0.38 293 0.31 0.37 
Public 1613 0.22 0.29 293 0.23 0.58 
Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
1613 0.41 0.33 293 0.46 0.05 
*Based on the result in Table 3.5 
 
Table 3.12 provides comparison between outcomes and correctly predicted outcomes 
using multinomial logit model. In general, model can modestly predict the outcomes, 
about 60 percent. The rule of thumb usually sets the percentage of 50 percent as the 
lowest percentage of sufficient correctly predicted outcomes. The model can predict most 
correctly especially in the private and traditional healer, midwife or nurse outcomes. The 
correct prediction percentages for both outcomes are 64 percent and 81 percent. The 
model is less powerful predicts the public outcome, as the percentage of correct prediction 







Table 3. 12 The outcomes and correctly predicted outcomes  
Outcomes Correctly predicted outcomes (based on the highest prob) 
 Private Public Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private 380 31 182 593 
public 118 57 185 360 
Traditional healer/midwife/nurse 115 8 537 660 
Total 613 96 904 1,613 
*Based on the result in Table 3.5 
 
Table 3. 13 shows the highest predicted probability between three outcomes (private, 
public, and traditional healer, midwife or nurse) for all observations in the first visit 
sample. It shows the highest percentage is the traditional healer, midwife or nurse 
outcome, about 56 percent and the lowest percentage is the public outcome, only 6 
percent. The simulation of additional health insurance beneficiaries changes the 
composition percentage of predicted probability. After the simulation, about 19 percent of 
observation in traditional healer, midwife or nurse changes to public.  
 




Highest predicted probability outcomes after simulation 
 Private Public Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private 578 35 0 613 
public 0 96 0 96 
Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
21 170 713 904 
Total 599 301 713 1,613 





Table 3. 14  Highest predicted probability outcomes before and after health 
insurance simulation in the lowest income quintile 
Highest predicted 
probability Outcomes 
Highest predicted probability outcomes after simulation only in the 
first income quintile 
 Private Public Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private 41 35 - 76 
public 0 26 - 26 
Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
21 170 - 191 
Total 62 231 - 293 
*Based on the result in Table 3.5 
 
The partial looks into the composition of predicted probability in the lowest income 
quintile is in Table 3. 14. Before the simulation, the highest percentage predicted 
probability is traditional healer, about 65 percent but after the simulation the highest 
percentage predicted probability is public, about 79 percent. After the simulation, there is 
89 percent of observation who change from traditional healer, midwife or nurse to public, 
and 11 percent observations change to private. There is no observations stay in traditional 
healer, midwife or nurse after the simulation. Compare to the complete sample for the 
data distribution of each income quintile to health care facility in Table 3.15, we can 
conclude that visit to traditional healer, midwife, or nurse seems to have bigger impact 









Table 3. 15 The visit to health facility based on income quintile 
Quintile Visit to health facility Total 
private public traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1
st















327 347 492 1166 
5
th
 quintile (the highest)
 
503 277 475 1255 




The second scenario works using the similar process, but in this case, we simulate the 
ratio of dual practice physician in a public facility. Using the same amount of budget, 100 
Million IDR per a year, the government can add about three physicians in a standard 
category replacement area. The choice of using the criteria is considering the minimum 
level of physician salary that will make the interpretation easier for the policy implication. 
In the simulation we add these three physicians in one of the province outside Java Island. 
The result of predicted probability as follows: 
 
The result in Table 3.16 shows that in general the mean predicted probability after 
simulation is unchanged. Putting more dual practice physician in the system has 
insignificant change on the mean predicted probability. The detailed look on province 
level data shows that the mean predicted probability of visiting private facility is 
decreasing while the mean predicted probability of visiting public is increasing, and the 
mean predicted probability visiting traditional healer, nurse or midwife is constant. The 
change in mean predicted probability between public and private health care facility 
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shows that patients more convenience to come to public facility after additional numbers 
of dual practice physician in the area.  
 



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private 0.37 0.37 150 0.38 0.36 




0.41 0.41 150 0.46 0.46 
Note: Number of observations is 1613.  
Based on the result in Table 3.5 
 
The change in predicted probability after the simulation in particular province outside 
Java Island shows the slightly increasing in the average predicted probability of public 
outcome comes from the change in private outcome, while the average of traditional 
healer, midwife or nurse remain unchanged. The highest predicted probability outcomes 
in table 3.17 and table 3.18 support the conclusion that the change mainly comes from 
private outcome to public, while the traditional outcome is constant.   
 




Highest predicted probability outcomes after simulation 
 Private Public Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private 610 3 0 613 
public 0 96 0 96 
Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
0 0 904 904 








Highest predicted probability outcomes after simulation 
 Private Public Traditional healer/midwife/nurse Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private 50 3 0 53 
public - - - - 
Traditional 
healer/midwife/nurse 
0  97 97 
Total 50 3 97 150 
 
The first scenario with insurance coverage, it shows that the policy might affect only for 
those individuals who receive the extra insurance. While dual practice policy potentially 
reaches much larger population. In both policy scenarios using annual budget of 100 
Million IDR, government can add around 365 insurance packages per year. It means that 
there are 365 individuals that directly affected with the insurance policy. The same budget 
can provide three more dual practice physicians. We place these physicians into a certain 
province so the percentage of dual practice physician in public community health center 
will change from 0.68 to 0.71. Based on the number of population in the province, each 
public community health center serves around 23,733 people. Before the policy scenario, 
about 16,138 people were served by dual practice physician. After policy implementation, 
there are 16,850 people are served by dual practice physicians. The difference between 
16,138 and 16,850 is 712 people. So we can say that the dual practice policy in our 
example affect to 712 people, almost double the size of people affected with insurance 
policy. Having more people served by dual practice physician means that the chance for 
people getting treatment from physician is increasing because the dual practice physician 
will provide extra services at his private practice. So people who cannot get treatment in 
309 
 
public (because of opening hours or distance) they can visit his private facility. Thus the 





Drawing from the experience of Indonesia, this article contributes to the literature on dual 
practice physician and health care demand in the following ways. First, the use of dual 
practice physician ratio in the public facility to measure the role of dual practice physician 
in the health care system directly was not found in the previous literature before especially 
in the developing country setting. The monitoring of dual practice physician usually is not 
done regularly; hence the usual source of dual practice physician data comes from 
particular survey. Second, this research provides policy implication regarding the rules of 
dual practice regulation and health care insurance scheme in providing access to health 
care particularly the use of formal health care provided by physicians. We analyse what 
policy gives better outcome in term of health care access to formal health care facility. 
The formal care sector refers to health care facility attended by physician and it is owned 
by government or managed by private company, for the outpatient care in Indonesia refers 
to public community health centre and private clinics. The non-physician practice is a 
facility attended by health care personnel other than physician such as nurse or midwife, 
in this research we include the traditional healer into the same category as non-physician 
practice. Finally, we use data from IFLS wave 5 which allows us to identify treatment and 
non-treatment cost variables such as travel cost and waiting time. The expected treatment 
cost for unchosen alternative in the choice set for an individual was imputed by taking 
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into account the provider type and geographical location to address individual 
heterogeneity of the expected price of care faced by an individual. We provides alternative 
model to address the recent method of health care demand analysis using nested 
multinomial logit regression. This method allows us to model health care demand as steps 
of decisions made by patients. Our focus of study is precisely on analysing the role of 
dual practice and we argue that there are different aspects between providers in the study. 
We complete the discussion that is supported by statistical test to determine proper 
method. We decide to use the multinomial logit as it provides more natural interpretation 
needed for our cases.  
 
Our study also considers the endogeneity issue in the model related with insurance 
ownership to individual choice of health care facility. After correcting the model for this 
potential bias, the result confirms the dual practice and insurance effect to individual 
choice of health care. The magnitude of related variables is lower than the non-corrected 
model, but it provides significant and similar sign. Dual practice physician in the area is 
important influencing factor to choose between private and public facility. The insurance 
ownership has meaningful effect in individual choice between traditional 
healer/nurse/midwife and public facility. 
 
The dual practice physician existence is statistically significant in determining individual 
choice of health care provider between private and public but not between non-physicians 
facility to public or private facility. The significant sign in dual practice variable confirms 
the fact that the available supply of health care services indirectly influences individual’s 
decision on health care choice. The increasing percentage of dual practice physician is 
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associated with more private practice available in the system but the result shows that the 
increasing percentage of dual practice physician affect individual to visit public facility 
rather than private facility. The result might come from the fact that there are many public 
facilities that were not attended by physician, so the increasing of dual practice physician 
also means that public facilities are attended by physician or have more physicians than 
before. The physician capacity in public is more recognizable by patients rather than 
additional private practice offered in the system. The insignificant coefficient of dual 
practice in the decision between non-physician facility and public facility can be 
explained from the mixed effect of several facilities in the category of non-physician 
facility. In this category we have traditional healer, nurse practice, and midwife practice. 
Based on our data description on health care utilization, people still rely on nurse practice 
and midwife practice. Public facility in this case is public community health centre, is 
dominated by nurses and midwives as the main health care personnel. The number of 
physician in each public community health centre is limited, usually one physician per 
facility for the minimum requirement but in some cases the facilities have no physician. 
So people could come to public community health centre but still received treatment from 
nurse or midwife. People could also come to nurse practice or midwife practice because 
these facilities offers flexible opening hours and cheaper treatment fees compare to 
private physician practice. Hence the increasing percentage of dual practice physician 
provides insignificant effect of the individual decision on health care facility.  
 
On the other hand, the insurance coverage has significant impact on the individual choice 
of health care providers. The insurance beneficiaries will be more likely to use formal 
health care rather than traditional healer, nurse practice, midwife practice. Between 
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private facility and public facility, individual insurance scheme will choose public facility. 
The financial barrier has more substantial effect rather than supply barrier although only 
price of treatment in private facility is significant affecting the individual choice. From the 
non-monetary factors only the travel cost to public facility significantly affects the 
individual health seeking behaviour between public and traditional healer. This 
information actually supports the claim that dual practice availability might reduce the 
travel distance and makes travel cost lower. Other rationale behind why insurance gives 
more impact on the health seeking behaviour might be on the emergency level that 
enforces individual to seek care. The measurement of severity illness uses number of days 
with health problem. Around 33 percent of the sample has zero days, and around 68 
percent of the sample has 3 or less days with health problem. When people are not 
disturbed enough with the illness they will choose the nearest or most accessible facility 
to get treatment. From the descriptive result, the travel cost and waiting time of traditional 
healer are the lowest compare to others choices. The closer look into the data on health 
insurance shows that almost 40 percent of insurance holders are covered under health 
insurance program from government which can be applied mostly in public health care 
facility and not for the non-physician practice. Hence the provided insurance that can only 
use in the public or private facility will drive individuals to visit private or public facility 
rather than traditional healer. The data support the argument that health care insurance can 
enhance the health care access. Moreover, individuals consider about the price when they 
want to visit health care facility and this is supported by the result that the price in private 
facility significantly affects health seeking behaviour.  The descriptive statistics shows 





The significant result of price variable confirms the reasons why many people still rely on 
non-formal treatment. The price of treatment is one of the obstacles for individuals 
accessing health care services primarily when accessing private facility. The average price 
of treatment in private facility is the highest among the other two facilities.  The negative 
sign shows less attractiveness of private facility when the price of treatment is getting 
higher. Related with the dual practice policy, the public physicians provide more services 
in private facility, hence more services available for individuals but at the same time, 
individuals still struggle to afford the services in private facility. Furthermore, non-
physicians facility still becomes the main option when it comes to health care facility 
decision. 
 
Travel cost variable represents one of non-monetary factors that also relates with patient’s 
decision on visiting health care facility. The result shows that the cost to go to the 
healthcare facility is importantly affecting the decision making process. The higher travel 
cost to a public health facility, the more likely individual chooses an alternative treatment 
other than the public one. Individual generally will choose the lowest travel cost in order 
to minimize total cost of seeking care. In Indonesia health care provision system, the 
public community health centre usually available in every district. But there are still many 
people who have difficulties in visiting public community health centre because of far 
distance, bad road conditions, or lack of public transportation system. Those will make 
cost to get to the facility become expensive. People might prefer to get treatment from 
health care facilities nearby such as nurse practice, midwife practice or traditional healer 
rather than rely on public providers. The government of Indonesia has applied the “Bidan 
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Desa” program in the past. This is a particular program that places midwife in the remote 
village to work in public community health sub centre and she can open private practice. 
It is a public community health centre in village level that attended by midwife or nurse 
only. The government implements the program in the expectation of providing alternative 
options for the people who live far away from the public community health centre. This 
also explains on the popularity of the nurse practice and midwife practice among people. 
Another non–monetary variable is the waiting time that measures how long patients have 
to wait from to get treatment, from the registration process until they meet the physician. 
The result on waiting time variable shows that individuals do not concern much on how 
long they have to queue in the facility to get treatment. It seems that people’s priority is to 
get treatment so as long as they get health services needed; there is no issue on waiting 
time. The general characteristic of public sector has the longest waiting time among three 
categories, while the shortest waiting time is on the category of non-physicians facility. 
Like any other non-formal facility, the traditional healer might has more flexible opening 
hours hence individuals could quickly come and get treatment.  
 
The finding in individual characteristics provides mix results in comparison with the 
previous studies. Age is important variable in the demand of health care, the result is 
consistent with Sarma (2009). The older people are less likely to demand formal care 
from private health care. The education is not mattered is consistent with Gertler and Van 
der Gaag (1990). There is no evidence that we can differentiate health care demand based 
on choice of provider according to individual’s education level. The location identification 
involves whether individual lives in rural-urban areas and Java Island-outside Java Island. 
The result shows that rural and Non-java Island individual relies more on the public 
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facility in seeking care. Indonesia like other developing countries faces development 
discrepancy that marked by concentration population in the specific area. In this case, 
Java Island is inhabited by almost 60% of the population in Indonesia. In contrast with 
population pattern in 1980 where around 78% population lives in rural area, nowadays 
half of population lives in the urban area. The health care personnel distribution still 
becomes the main issue. The average number of physician per public community health 
centre is increasing since 1996, but more public facility lack of physician especially in 
rural area. The physician ratio is 18 physicians per 100,000 in 2006, while it is only 15 
physicians per 100,000 populations in 1996. Based on health statistics data by Ministry of 
Health in 2015, on average 26% from total public community health centre is categorized 
as deficient in term of physician sufficiency ratio which means there are 26% public 
facility is still lack of physician. The average has large different with minimum 
percentage is 0.83% and the maximum percentage is 65.74%. Based on 2012 facility 
survey, there is still 4.2% community health centre without general physician and 16 
percent among of them is located in eastern provinces of Indonesia. The physician ratio in 
the urban area is 36 physicians per 100,000 populations while it is only six physicians per 
100,000 populations in rural areas.   
 
We compare the analysis of proposed policy through the insurance channel and dual 
practice channel. The interpretation from the regression coefficient shows that the effect 
of insurance has almost ten times larger than the effect of increasing the dual practice 
physician. Providing one insurance pack (using the subsidized insurance scheme) only 
costs around one tenth of providing one more dual practice physician in the system (using 
the public salary for the contract physician in normal area). The results indicate that two 
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policies, dual practice physician and insurance coverage affect the demand of health care 
in different ways. The direct comparison between two policies in general shows that the 
insurance gives higher impact on the health care demand compare to increasing the 
number of dual practitioner. This result should be carefully translated that both policies 
have different objectives in realizing health care enhancement in Indonesia. The 
increasing number of health care insurance beneficiaries can shift people from visiting 
traditional healer into formal practice, public health care facilities. The increasing number 
of dual physician practitioner seems only affecting to shift individual between private to 
public facility. As we have already seen in the data description that many people still rely 
on non-formal facility, hence to increase the access to formal facility, the policy should 
give more attention by providing more insurance particularly for indigent people.  
 
Further question that might appear regarding dual practice physician is related with the 
increasing demand of health care. Our results show that dual practice physician 
responsible for the extension demand of health care rather than the increasing demand of 
health care particularly formal treatment that attended by physicians in public or private 
facility. We investigate the relationship of dual practice physician with the increasing 
demand by analysing the decision whether patients decide to seek care or not. The 
analysis can be described as individual decision in the first part of Figure 3.6. The 
complete result is available in Table 3B. 8 of Appendix 3B. The analysis uses a sample 
size of 13,885 individuals age 15 years or above. The dependent variable is binary 
variable of 1 indicates individual decide to seek care and 0 if individual is not seeking 
care during four weeks prior the survey. The dual practice physician shows insignificant 




Extension demand  
seems insensitive with dual practice physician situation. The result emphasizes the fact 
that dual practice role in health care demand is on the demand health care extension not in 
the increasing of health care demand. Hence we concentrate on individual choice of 




Figure 3. 6 Decision steps that represent increasing demand and extension demand  
of health care 
 
3.9 Conclusion  
 
The initial purpose of allowing dual practice for physicians is to increase health care 
access coverage as a government effort in ensuring health care services for all citizens. 
Indonesia health care utilization is still characterized with the use on non-physician 
practice (nurse, midwife and traditional healer). The physician deployment is constrained 
by geographic barriers that make some areas have sufficient access on health care while 
patient 
seek care 









others might have poor condition on accessing health care services. The dual practice 
physician availability in the system is not directly affecting individuals to use more formal 
care compare to non-physician facility. The dual practice enables services more available 
in the area but at the same time the individuals have hardship in term of financial access. 
Therefore dual practice is not directly changing individual health seeking behaviour from 
non-formal to formal treatment. 
 
Insurance ownership is proven to have significant effect on switching individual’s choice 
from non-physicians facility to formal care in private or public health care facility. The 
geographic difference contributes on the difference pattern of health seeking behaviour. 
The urban area in Java Island is preferred utilizing more on private facility rather than 
utilizing non-formal care. The individuals living in rural area still relies more on non-
physicians treatment facility and it confirms the fact that private sector is well developed 
in urban and Java Island category rather than in rural and non-java category.  
 
This research emphasizes two policy instruments to analyse health care access in 
Indonesia by simulating additional dual practice physician in the area and insurance 
ownership in the population. The first is regarding dual practice physician that makes 
health care services more accessible. The second is insurance ownership that lifted 
financial barriers for population. Providing insurance has direct impact into switching 
individuals from non-physician health care facility to more formal care provided in public 
or private facility. While adding dual practice physician is not directly change the 
individual pattern of seeking health care from non-physician facility to public facility but 
more to the community level effect. The area in aggregate will be affected when more 
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dual practice physician available in the system. Providing insurance will have effect 
particularly for those individuals who receive the benefits. While the dual practice policy 
might potentially affect larger size of population as many more people have opportunity 
to get treatment from dual practice physician. 
 
Our research has managed to identify dual practice physician indicator based on IFLS 
survey. We calculate the percentage of dual practice physician from public health 
community centre questionnaire and get the average ratio in the particular area. The more 
adequate information on dual practice physician should regularly be collected in order to 
get clearer picture on how dual practice affected health care demand. The regular data also 
provides monitoring function that will be useful to organize the dual practice activities. 
Our study only analyse the dual practice activity among physician while dual practice 
activity is also common in Indonesia for other medical personnel such as midwife and 
nurse. We limit our study of health care demand on the patient care, while it is also 
essential to have depth understanding on dual practice and insurance  in different level of 
care such as inpatient care because it is usually characterized with more expensive 
treatment and severe illness. 
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Appendix 3A. Sample process and dual practice identification 
 
 















Individuals age 15 
years or more=31,421  
Visit health care 
facility=5,695  
First visit=2,686  
Matching with dual practice 
identification=1326;  
Matching with quality data=1,116  
Matching with facility price=998 
 Book Households 3B IFLS questionnaire 
 Community health center questionnaire 
 Private practice questionnaire 
 Podes Survey data 
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Table 3A.1A Descriptive statistics for each step of sample selection 
 
Variables N=31,421 N=5,695 N=2,686 Selected 
sample 
(N=1,326) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DP 
percentage  
Mean 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 
Std. Dev 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 
Min 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.65 
Max 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.93 
 
Age Mean 37.3 39.7 38.6 39.8 
Std. Dev 14.9 15.3 15.0 15.7 
Min 14 15 15 15 
Max 101 94 90 90 
 













Education Not having 
school 




































































Severity  Mean (Std.Dev) 2.1 (4.5) 4.2 (6.5) 3.9 (5.8) 4.0 (6.0) 
 








Rural 12,878 2,263 1,093 575 
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Variables N=31,421 N=5,695 N=2,686 Selected 
sample 
(N=1,326) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(40.99%) (39.74%) (40.69%) (43.36%) 
 











































0 29.6 (83.5) 27.5 (77.7) 27.2 (73.1) 24.9 (55.1) 
1 30.5 (44.00) 31.8 (44.9) 30.2 (44.2) 30.4 (45.4) 































*) Our previous sample was using insurance as “do you using insurance when visiting 
health care facility in a month prior to survey?” This questions only appears when 
people visit health care facility, while having insurance/not having insurance question 
appears for all individual in the survey (15 years or above) 
 N=5,695  N=2,686  Selected sample 
(N=1,326) 
Using Insurance Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Yes 1,322 23.21 563 20.96 256 19.31 
No  4,373 76.79 2,123 70.04 1,070 80.69 





Table 3A. 2 Number of individuals in the selected sample based on province 
Province        Freq. Percent Cum. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sumatra Utara 96 7.24 7.24 
Sumatra Barat 48 3.62 10.86 
Sumatra Selatan 60 4.52 15.38 
Lampung 35 2.64 18.02 
Bangka Belitung 2 0.15 18.17 
DKI Jakarta 68 5.13 23.30 
Jawa Barat 201 15.16 38.46 
Jawa Tengah 191 14.40 52.87 
DI Yogyakarta 112 8.45 61.31 
Jawa Timur 152 11.46 72.78 
Banten 46 3.47 76.24 
Nusa Tenggara Timur 117 8.82 85.07 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 149 11.24 96.30 
Kalimantan Selatan 21 1.58 97.89 
Sulawesi Selatan 28 2.11 100.00 
    
Total 1,326 100.00  
 
 
Table 3A. 3 Number of individuals in the selected sample based based on Sex 
 
Sex Frequency Percent Cumulative 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 816 61.54 61.54 
Male 510 38.46 100.00 
    
Total 1,326 100.00  
 
 
Table 3A. 4 Number of individuals in the selected sample based on Rural urban 
 
Urban Frequency Percent Cumulative 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rural 575 43.36 43.36 
Urban 751 56.64 100.00 
    
Total 1,326 100.00  
 
 
Table 3A. 5 Number of individuals in the selected sample based on Island 
 
Java Frequency Percent Cumulative 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Non-Java 556 41.93 41.93 
Java 770 58.07 100.00 
    





Table 3A. 6 Number of individuals in the selected sample based on Health facility visit 
 
Individual visit based on facility Frequency Percent Cumulative 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Private 424 31.98 31.98 
Public 427 32.20 64.18 
Other facility 475 35.82 100.00 
    
Total 1,326 100.00  
 
 
Table 3A. 7 Number of individuals in the selected sample based on Education 
 
Education Frequency Percent Cumulative 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Never  attend school 65 4.90 4.90 
Primary school 451 34.01 38.91 
Secondary school 268 20.21 59.13 
High school 390 29.41 88.54 
Higher education 152 11.46 100.00 
    
Total 1,326 100.00  
 
 
Table 3A. 8 Number of individuals in the selected sample based on Insurance 
 
Insurance Frequency Percent Cumulative 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No insurance 1,070 80.69 80.69 
Having insurance 256 19.31 100.00 
    
Total 1,326 100.00  
 
 
Table 3A. 9 The summary statistics of selected variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dual practice physician ratio  1326 .7578327 .0713156 .65 .9286667 
Age 1326 39.79336 15.67349 15 90 
Individual income 1326 978777.5 1097321 20008.55 1.48e+07 
Severity 1326 4.00905 6.000874 0 28 
Travel cost to private facility 1326 15208.16 64847.81 0 1001500 
Travel cost to public facility 1326 11298.08 53206.18 0 445000 
Travel cost to other facility 1326 4562.387 6131.219 0 40000 
Waiting time in private facility 1326 24.97888 55.11892 0 915 
Waiting time in public facility 1326 30.44721 45.45028 0 360 
Waiting time in other facility 1326 6.901961 10.69176 0 90 
Price of treatment in private facility 1326 104243.4 298173.1 100 4025000 
Price of treatment in public facility 1326 44716.44 99114.08 1000 770000 




Table 3A. 10 Health care facility choice based on selected variables 
 
Variables Visit to health care facility TOTAL 
(percentage) Private Public Other 





























































































Table 3A. 11 Quality component of private and public health care facilities 
 
Variable Private facility Public facility 
(1) (2) (3) 
Number of private facility 1,597 969 
   
Quality facility   
High 93% 78% 
Low 7% 22% 
Total 100% 100% 
   
Quality of physician   
Get additional training 67% 86% 
No additional training 33% 14% 
Total 100% 100% 
   
Quality of treatment   
Average of the vignette score 73 85 
Std. deviation 35.32 10.85 
Min 45 56 







Appendix 3B Results 
 
Table 3B. 1A Goodness of fit (before and after bias correction)* 
 
Fit stat                 + before correction After correction 
-------------------------+------------- 
Log-likelihood           |              
                   Model |   -1237.996  
          Intercept-only |   -1454.929  
-------------------------+------------- 
Chi-square               |              
      Deviance (df=1282) |    2475.991  
              LR (df=42) |     433.866  
                 p-value |       0.000  
-------------------------+------------- 
R2                       |              
                McFadden |       0.149  
     McFadden (adjusted) |       0.119  
            Cox-Snell/ML |       0.279  
  Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke |       0.314  
                   Count |       0.523  
        Count (adjusted) |       0.257  
-------------------------+------------- 
IC                       |              
                     AIC |    2563.991  
        AIC divided by N |       1.934  






















































       
Table 3B. 1B The result of VIF for the alternative model 
Variables Before correction After correction 
VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Health care visit 1.11 0.90 1.11 0.90 
Dual practice 1.32 1.15 1.36 0.73 
Age squared 1.28 0.78 1.64 0.61 
Male 1.03 0.97 1.08 0.92 
Education 1.44 0.70 2.68 0.37 
Insurance 1.11 0.90 48.37 0.02 
Ln Income 1.18 0.85 1.23 0.81 
Severity 1.04 0.96 1.07 0.93 
Urban 1.34 0.75 2.73 0.37 
Java 1.20 0.83 1.20 0.83 
Travel cost (private) 1.10 0.91 1.31 0.76 
Travel cost (public) 2.11 0.47 2.27 0.44 
Travel cost (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 
1.16 0.86 1.33 0.74 
Waiting time (private) 1.10 0.91 1.10 0.91 
Waiting time (public) 2.17 0.46 2.28 0.44 
Waiting time (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 
1.27 0.78 1.27 0.79 
Price (private) 1.03 0.96 1.04 0.96 
Price (public) 1.14 0.87 1.15 0.87 
Price (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 
1.23 0.81 1.24 0.81 
Residual   44.77 0.002 
Mean VIF 1.28  6.01  
 


































Travel cost (private) 
Travel cost (public) 
Travel cost (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 
Waiting time (private) 
Waiting time (public) 








chi2    df   P>chi2 
-----------------+---- 
10.472    2    0.005 
6.587     2    0.037 
1.559     2    0.459 
1.764     2    0.414 
0.214     2    0.899 
2.236     2    0.327 
5.145     2    0.076 
261.282   2    0.000 
7.455     2    0.024 
2.820     2    0.244 
14.540    2    0.001 
4.712     2    0.095 
3.327     2    0.189 
7.577     2    0.023 
0.040     2    0.980 
 
0.470     2    0.791 
3.667     2    0.160 
3.927     2    0.140 
 
12.261    2    0.002 
0.665     2    0.717 
1.756     2    0.416 
 
After correction 
chi2    df   P>chi2 
-----------------+-- 
12.019    2    0.002 
1.340     2    0.512 
2.341     2    0.310 
1.542     2    0.463 
1.678     2    0.432 
.023      2    0.988 
.590      2    0.745 
24.551    2    0.000 
8.293     2    0.016 
1.521     2    0.468 
0.998     2    0.607 
5.000     2    0.082 
0.734     2    0.693 
4.968     2    0.083 
0.605     2    0.739 
 
0.636     2    0.728 
2.146     2    0.342 
3.873     2    0.144 
 
12.375    2    0.002 
0.435     2    0.804 
2.011     2    0.366 
 
4.331     2    0.115 
 
*The LR test for the result in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 
















Travel cost (private) 
Travel cost (public) 
Travel cost (Traditional 
healer/nurse/ midwife) 
Waiting time (private) 
Waiting time (public) 








chi2    df   P>chi2 
-----------------+---- 
10.124    2    0.006 
6.592     2    0.037 
1.556     2    0.459 
1.705     2    0.426 
0.212     2    0.899 
2.212     2    0.331 
4.999     2    0.082 
96.176    2    0.000 
7.393     2    0.025 
2.861     2    0.239 
14.415    2    0.001 
4.684     2    0.096 
2.994     2    0.224 
5.883     2    0.053 
0.040     2    0.980 
 
0.502     2    0.778 
3.771     2    0.152 
3.836     2    0.147 
 
7.873     2    0.020 
0.676     2    0.713 
1.756     2    0.416 
 
After correction 
chi2    df   P>chi2 
-----------------+-- 
11.599    2    0.003 
1.343     2    0.511 
2.342     2    0.310 
1.520     2    0.468 
1.696     2    0.428 
0.023     2    0.988 
0.591     2    0.744 
22.163    2    0.000 
8.221     2    0.016 
1.540     2    0.463 
1.000     2    0.607 
4.968     2    0.083 
0.625     2    0.732 
3.585     2    0.167 
0.607     2    0.738 
 
0.684     2    0.710 
2.163     2    0.339 
3.784     2    0.151 
 
7.967     2    0.019 
0.440     2    0.802 
2.003     2    0.367 
 
4.286     2    0.117 
 
 *The Wald test for the result in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 
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Table 3B. 1E LR tests and Wald test of combining alternatives for model before and 
after bias correction 
Before Correction 
Comparison LR test Wald test 
chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df P>chi2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
private &public  141.838 21 0.000 108.055 21 0.000 
private&traditional healer 201.303 21 0.000 106.776 21 0.000 
public  &traditional 
healer 
325.054 21 0.000 76.235 21 0.000 
* for the result in Table 3.5. 
After correction 
Comparison LR test Wald test 
chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df P>chi2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
private &public  142.778 22 0.000 108.782 22 0.000 
private&traditional healer 205.565 22 0.000 110.350 22 0.000 
public  &traditional 
healer 
326.283 22 0.000 77.536 22 0.000 
* for the result in Table 3.6. 
 
 
Table 3B. 1F Tests of IIA assumption for the alternative model 
Before Correction 
Outcome Hausman  Suest-based Hausman Small-Hsiao 
chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df P>chi2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
private 2.320 15 1.00 26.799 22 0.219 68.763 22 0.000 
public -31.107 15 . 34.443 22 0.044 50.753 22 0.000 
Traditional 
healers 
1.315 15 1.00 16.204 22 0.806 20.348 22 0.561 
* for the result in Table 3.5. 
 
Before Correction 
Outcome Hausman  Suest-based Hausman Small-Hsiao 
chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df P>chi2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
private 2.831 16 1.000 27.676 23 0.228 78.277 23 0.000 
public -20.168 16 . 35.141 23 0.050 87.151 23 0.000 
Traditional 
healers 
-7.059 16 . 16.314 23 0.841 38.099 23 0.025 
* for the result in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3B. 2A Relative risk ratio of the individual choice of health care facility 
(before bias correction)* 
 
Variables MNL Coefficient (standard error) 
Private VS Public Traditional healer/nurse/ 
midwife VS Public 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dual practice .0267109 .6018549 
Age squared 1.000107 .9999536 
Male 1.210359 1.129302 
Education 
     Primary school 
     Secondary school 
     High school 











Insurance .2659113 .0062788 
Ln Income 1.306125 1.185133 
Severity 1.015239 .9965619 
Urban 1.352792 .7331741 
Java 1.267836 .9161535 
Travel cost (private) 1.000000 1.000002 
Travel cost (public) 1.000004 1.000008 
Travel cost (Traditional healer/nurse/ 
midwife) 
1.000002 1.000003 
Waiting time (private) 1.001046 1.000277 
Waiting time (public) 1.004395 1.001075 
Waiting time (Traditional healer/nurse/ 
midwife) 
.9862602 .996635 
Price (private) 1.000000 .9999996 
Price (public) .9999977 .9999998 
Price (Traditional healer/nurse/ midwife) .999995 .9999902 
Const .3825609 .6163773 











Table 3B. 2B Relative risk ratio of the individual choice of health care facility (after 
bias correction)* 
Variables MNL Coefficient (standard error) 
Private VS Public Traditional healer/nurse/ 
midwife VS Public 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dual practice .0208843 .7014716 
Age squared 1.000064 .9999853 
Male 1.269007 1.086853 
Education 
     Primary school 
     Secondary school 
     High school 











Insurance 1.053338 .00163 
Ln Income 1.335503 1.167787 
Severity 1.012422 .9989869 
Urban 1.111274 .8738356 
Java 1.272778 .9085735 
Travel cost (private) 1.000001 1.000001 
Travel cost (public) 1.000005 1.000007 
Travel cost (Traditional healer/nurse/ 
midwife) 
1.000008 .9999979 
Waiting time (private) 1.001133 1.000233 
Waiting time (public) 1.003786 1.001566 
Waiting time (Traditional healer/nurse/ 
midwife) 
.9862964 .9965471 
Price (private) .9999977 .9999996 
Price (public) 1 .9999998 
Price (Traditional healer/nurse/ midwife) .9999953 .9999895 
Residual .2450125 4.012515 
Const .3949425 .6291468 










Table 3B. 3  Nested Multinomial Logit Model  
Visits: 0. Private, 1. Public  
2.Traditional/midwives/nurse 
Coefficient (standard error) 
Facility  
Price -3.98e-07(2.43e-07) 
Travel cost -2.35e-06(1.54e-06) 
Waiting time -.002 (0.0010 
Visit equations  













Dissimilarity parameters  
/nonphysician_tau  
/physician_tau 


















Table 3B. 4   Multinomial Logit Model (simple) 
Visits: 0. Private, 1. Public  
2.Traditional/midwives/nurse 
Coefficient (standard error) Relative Risk Ratio 
(standard error) 
0.Private   
DP -5.154***(1.223) 0.006(0.007) 
Age2 1.28e-04*(6.97e-05) 1.000(6.97e-05) 
Male 0.264*(0.160) 1.303(0.208) 
Education   
2 -0.671(0.412) 0.511 (0.211) 
3 0.019(0.451) 1.020(0.460) 
4 -0.113(0.444) 0.893(0.396) 
5 0.125(0.480) 1.1338(0.540) 
Insurance -0.667*(0.374) 0.513(0.192) 
Income 0.037(0.096) 1.040(0.992) 
Severity -0.016(0.013) 0.984(0.013) 
Urban 0.422***(0.165) 1.525(0.252) 
Java 0.540***(0.162) 1.716(0.280) 
Travel cost 5.31e-09(1.41e-08) 1.000(1.41e-08) 
Waiting time -0.002**(9.2e-04) 0.998(9.2e-04) 
lnPrice 1.183***(0.092) 3.265(0.299) 
Const -9.098***(1.886) 1.12-e04(2.11e-04) 
Traditional healer/nurse/midwives  
DP -3.103***(1.040) 0.045(0.047) 
Age2 1.19e-05(6.57-05) 1.000(6.57e-05) 
Male -0.186(0.150) 0.830(0.125) 
Education   
2 -0.634*(0.380) 0.530(0.201) 
3 -0.064(0.416) 0.940(0.390) 
4 -0.547(0.414) 0.579(0.239) 
5 -0.568(0.452) 0.567(0.256) 
Insurance -3.280***(0.742) 0.038(0.028) 
Income 0.104(0.091 1.101(0.100) 
Severity -0.005(0.150) 0.995(0.013) 
Urban -0.445***(0.150) 0.641(0.096) 
Java -0.022(0.150) 0.978(0.150) 
Travel cost 4.10e-09(1.41e-08) 1.000(1.41e-08) 
Waiting time -0.029***(0.003) 0.971(0.003) 
lnPrice 0.322***(0.083) 1.380(0.115) 
Const -0.424(1.745) 1.380(0.115) 
n 1615 0.654(1.141) 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.2060  
Log likelihood  -1369.6966  
∗ 𝑝 ≤ 0.1,∗∗ 𝑝 ≤ 0.05,∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01 
Note: This result is the main model using the simplified variable of travel cost, waiting time, 
and price. These variables uses the observed data from the individuals without classified based 





Table 3B. 4A Post estimation for the simplified model* 


















AIC 2803.393  
BIC 2975.780  























Table 3B. 5A Estimation of Probit model for the first stage of SRI 
---------------------------------------- 
    Variable |    Model A      Model B       
-------------+-------------------------- 
phydppropr~n |  .89368203    .98988412   
             |  .66399834     .6582022   
        age2 |  .00008966    .00010451   
             |  .00003746    .00003581   
             | 
         sex | 
     1:Male  | -.09062152   -.13299161   
             |  .08926682    .08801477   
             | 
        educ | 
          2  |  .54666952    .55594324   
             |  .25809488    .25762998   
          3  |  .88354458    .89833022   
             |  .27331497    .27285889   
          4  |  .93983404    1.0131108   
             |  .27433281    .27206303   
          5  |  .99813633    1.0969986   
             |  .28637738    .28414768   
             | 
     probhat |  2.9558113                
             |  .84579761                
   lnrpcenew | -.08239745   -.07070134   
             |   .0567135    .05613118   
    severity |  .00656586    .00823475   
             |  .00714671    .00704472   
 
      urban  | 
          1  |  .53014369    .54320102   
             |  .10143578    .10031415   




           N |       1326         1326   




 Variable |     Model A      Model B       
-------------+-------------------------- 
        java | 
          1  |  .03892698    .01614104   
             |  .09612662    .09397274   
 
trcostmedd~0 | -.00001592   -.00001653   
             |  4.436e-06    4.375e-06   
trcostmedd~1 | -2.982e-06   -3.136e-06   
             |  1.561e-06    1.567e-06   
trcostmedd~2 | -.00001673   -.00001451   
             |  7.430e-06    7.296e-06   
waitin~afac0 | -.00277659   -.00288731   
             |  .00186566    .00182602   
waitin~afac1 |  .00242211    .00203682   
             |   .0014965    .00146397   
waitin~afac2 | -.00115958   -.00146916   
             |  .00435809    .00429431   
costmeddes~0 |  1.592e-07    2.300e-07   
             |  2.973e-07    2.687e-07   
costmeddes~1 | -5.700e-08    3.339e-08   
             |  5.766e-07    5.623e-07   
costmeddes~2 | -3.866e-06   -1.947e-06   
             |  4.119e-06    4.057e-06   
             | 
  selfemploy | 
          1  |  .00285768                
             |   .1254333                
             | 
  marstatnew | 
          1  |               .08038291   
             |               .09891584   
             | 
       _cons | -1.9803141   -1.7913015   



















Table 3B. 5B Estimation of Probit model for the second stage of 2SRI  
--------------------------- 
    Variable | Model B 
-------------+------------- 
Private      | 
phydppropr~n | -3.6432188   
             |  1.2574164   
        age2 |  .00009935   
             |  .00007831   
             | 
         sex | 
     1:Male  |  .19964335   
             |  .16280169   
             | 
        educ | 
          2  | -.36864364   
             |  .42889441   
          3  | -.23945019   
             |  .54094627   
          4  |  .20538631   
             |  .57559175   
          5  |  .76297785   
             |  .63453419   
             | 
   insurance | 
          1  | -1.1016061   
             |  1.5941125   
             | 
   lnrpcenew |  .27124857   
             |  .10148345   
    severity |   .0145614   
             |  .01255033   
             | 
       urban | 
          1  |  .26873933   
             |  .27920596   
             | 
        java | 
          1  |  .23830672   
             |  .16486484   
             | 
trcostmedd~0 |  2.679e-07   
             |  1.947e-06   
trcostmedd~1 |  4.535e-06   
             |  4.394e-06   
trcostmedd~2 |  2.681e-06   
             |  .00001392   
waitin~afac0 |  .00106485   
             |  .00157846   
waitin~afac1 |  .00430295   
             |  .00281459   
waitin~afac2 | -.01381841   
             |  .00749769   
costmeddes~0 | -2.263e-06   
             |  9.907e-07   
costmeddes~1 |  3.475e-07   
             |  8.051e-07   
costmeddes~2 | -5.014e-06   
             |  6.865e-06   
      resid3 | -.22692507   
             |  1.6146466   
       _cons | -.97094023   
             |  1.6838765   
-------------+------------- 
Statistics   |              
           N |       1326   
          ll | -1237.2925   
--------------------------- 
--------------------------- 
    Variable |     ModelB       
-------------+------------- 
Traditional healer/nurse/midwife             
phydppropr~n |  -.3056883   
             |  1.2277298   
        age2 | -9.669e-06   
             |  .00007825   
             | 
         sex | 
     1:Male  |  .08047534   
             |  .16606278   
             | 
        educ | 
          2  | -.31547813   
             |  .40849293   
          3  |  .12052792   
             |  .50877117   
          4  |  .00973227   
             |  .54809639   
          5  |  .36689398   
             |  .61465423   
             | 
   insurance | 
          1  |  -6.465781   
             |  1.7331845   
             | 
   lnrpcenew |   .1531756   
             |  .10435983   
    severity |  -.0010314   
             |  .01344427   
             | 
       urban | 
          1  | -.12816098   
             |  .26867915   
             | 
        java | 
          1  | -.09627905   
             |  .16843786   
             | 
trcostmedd~0 |  1.241e-06   
             |  1.817e-06   
trcostmedd~1 |  7.467e-06   
             |  4.437e-06   
trcostmedd~2 | -2.279e-06   
             |  .00001477   
waitin~afac0 |  .00022535   
             |  .00141285   
waitin~afac1 |  .00163081   
             |  .00287782   
waitin~afac2 | -.00347479   
             |  .00788286   
costmeddes~0 | -3.931e-07   
             |  2.107e-07   
costmeddes~1 | -1.986e-07   
             |  7.920e-07   
costmeddes~2 | -.00001028   
             |  7.413e-06   
      resid3 |  1.4273629   
             |   1.606329   
       _cons | -.50516827   












Table 3B. 5C Goodness of fit for multinomial logit after bias correction 
Instrumental variabel : marital status self-employment 
-------------------------+------------- 
Log-likelihood           |              
                   Model |   -1237.293  
          Intercept-only |   -1454.929  
-------------------------+------------- 
Chi-square               |              
      Deviance (df=1280) |    2474.585  
              LR (df=44) |     435.272  
                 p-value |       0.000  
-------------------------+------------- 
R2                       |              
                McFadden |       0.150  
     McFadden (adjusted) |       0.118  
            Cox-Snell/ML |       0.280  
  Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke |       0.315  
                   Count |       0.529  
        Count (adjusted) |       0.267  
-------------------------+------------- 
IC                       |              
                     AIC |    2566.585  
        AIC divided by N |       1.936  













































Table 3B. 6 Odds Ratio and Robustness check for the individual choice of health care 
facility with quality factor 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Dual practice 25.733(48.420) 52.643(92.372) 
Age 1.000(5.41e-05) 1.000(0.000) 
Male 0.907(0.125) 0.865(0.124) 
Education 
     Primary school 
     Secondary school 
     High school 















Severity 0.987(0.012) 0.991(0.012) 
Urban 0.966(0.156) 0.861(0.143) 
Java 0.606(0.222) 0.681(0.260) 
Travel cost (private) 1.000(2.19e-06) 1.000(2.63e-06) 
Travel cost (public) 1.000(5.34e-07) 1.000(8.54e-07) 
Waiting time (private) 1.002(0.001) 1.000(0.001) 
Waiting time (public) 1.000(0.002) 1.000(0.002) 
Price (private) 1.000(1.04e-10) 1.000(9.77e-07) 
Price (public) 1.000(4.02e-10) 1.000(6.92e-07) 
Quality facility (private) 0.651(0.290) 1.320(0.509) 













Cons 1028306(5132220) 2220.218(8056.741) 
n 1116 998 





Table 3B. 7 The Link test, Hosmer and Lemeshow test, and AIC/BIC test for the 
individual choice of health care facility with quality factor 
Test Model 1 Model 2 
Link test 0.100(0.064): P>|z = 
0.128 




Prob>chi2 = 0.439 Prob>chi2 = 0.445 
AIC Logit = 1390.082 Logit = 1280.502 
AIC divided by N Logit = 1.246 1.283 
BIC Logit = 1510.502 Logit = 1403.146 
   
Model 1 uses price data taken from a certain treatment fee in the facility. Model 2 uses 





















Table 3B. 8   Logit Model on increasing demand framework 
Seeking health care: 0. No, 1. Yes  Coefficient (standard error) 
  













Travel cost to private -3.40e-07(3.93e-07) 
Travel cost to public 1.79e-06***(6.22e-07) 
Travel cost to nurse, midwife, traditional 
healer 
-.0000138***(3.97e-06) 
Waiting time private -.0007987**(.0003671) 
Waiting time public -.0004836(.0007339) 









Pseudo 𝑅2 0.0658 
Log likelihood  905.53 
∗ 𝑝 ≤ 0.1,∗∗ 𝑝 ≤ 0.05,∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01 
Note: This model tests our cautions on whether dual practice affects the increasing demand 
of health care. This table is a supporting analysis for discussion in sub chapter 3.8. See also 









Appendix 3C Measuring the quality assessment 
 
Our research uses three components of quality that will affect individual’s decision on health 
care facility between public facility or private facility. The first component is quality of facility 
that is a composed index measured by the cleanness aspect that can be seen by the interviewer 
and health care instruments provided in the facility. The source of the information comes from 
IFLS public community health center questionnaire and IFLS private facility questionnaire.  
 
To compose the quality facility score, we sum up all the response for all items and get the total 
score. The score then divides into binary codes, code 1 indicates the quality of facility is good, 
and 0 indicates the quality of facility is not really good. The facility has good quality facility if 
the cleanness items are all in clean indicator, and health care instruments are available in the 
facility. The quality of facility is categorized is not very good if one or more cleanness items are 
indicated dirty and health care instruments are not available completely in the facility. 
 
Table 3B. 8 Cleanness aspect from public facility and private facility questionnaire 
 
Public facility questionnaire 
BOOK Public community health center  
Section F 
Private facility questionnaire 









How clean is the floor in this 
room? 
Dirty ................................ 1 
Clean ............................... 3 
Dirty = if a lot of, food 
remnants, scattered garbage 
is found. 
E1 How clean is the floor in this 
room? 
Dirty ................................ 1 
Clean ............................... 3 
(dirty=if a lot of dust, food 
remnants, scattered garbage are 
found) 
F2 How clean are the walls in 
this room? 
Dirty ................................ 1 
Clean ............................... 3 
Dirty = if lots of spider webs, 
scribblings, moisture or paint 
peeling off 
E2 How clean are the walls in this 
room? 
Dirty ................................ 1 
Clean ............................... 3 
(dirty=if many spider webs, 
scribbling, dust, moisture, paint 
peeling off are found) 
F2b Does the room have: 
G. Trash can  
Yes ........................... 1 
No ............................ 3 
E5 What provisions are made for 
washing hands in this room? 
Washing stand with running water 
...... 1 
Wash basin with clean water ... 3 
Nothing available .................... 6 
F5 What provisions are made for 
washing hands in this room? 
Wash stand with running 
water …………………… 1 
Wash basin with clean 
water……………………. 3 
Not available ................... 6 
E6 Is there a waste basket in the 
room? 
Yes ........................... 1 





Table 3B. 9 Health care instruments from public facility and private facility questionnaire 
 
Public facility questionnaire 
BOOK Public community health center  
Section E 
Private facility questionnaire 
BOOK Private facility  
Section C 
Type of instruments 
(E1 type) 
The number of 
instruments 
owned by this 
Puskesmas that 
are in good 
repair? 
> 0 ..................1 
0 .....................3 
Kinds of instruments  
(C1 type) 
Do you have […] 
that is still 
function properly?  
3. No 1. Yes  
 
a. Regular stethoscope   a. Regular stethoscope   
b. Stethoscope for pregnant 
mothers  
 b. Stethoscope to examine 
pregnancy  
 
c. Blood pressure meter  c. Blood pressure monitor   
d. Sterilization/autoclaves   d. Sterilization/autoclaves   
e. Scales for adults   e. Adult scales   
f. Scales for infants   f. Baby scales   
g. Measures for body 
height  
 g. Measurers for body height   
h. Thermometer   h. Thermometer   
i. Beds   i. Beds   
j. Delivery kit   j. Normal delivery set   
k. Forceps   k. Forceps   
l. Vaginal Speculum   l. Vaginal Speculum   
m. Sahli Set   m. Sahli Set   
aa. Microscopes   aa. Microscopes   
ca. Syringes   ca. Syringes   
da.Cholesterol test kit   da. Cholesterol test kit   
ea. Blood sugar test kit   ea. Blood sugar test kit   
 
 
Table 3B. 10 Health care instruments from public facility and private facility 
questionnaire 
 
Public facility questionnaire 
BOOK Public community health center  
Section E 
Private facility questionnaire 
BOOK Private facility  
Section C 
Type of instruments  
(E2 type)  
Does this facility 
have […]?  
3. No 1. Yes  
Kinds of instruments  
(C2 type)  
Does this practice 
place have a […]?  
3. No 1. Yes  
a. Antiseptic :  
1. Alcohol  
2. Betadine  
3. Whitfield cream  
 a. Antiseptic :  
1. Alcohol  
2. Betadine  
3. Whitfield cream  
 
b. Bandages   b. Bandages   
c. Gloves   g.Gloves  
d. Infuse instruments and 
needles  





Public facility questionnaire 
BOOK Public community health center  
Section E 
Private facility questionnaire 
BOOK Private facility  
Section C 
Type of instruments  
(E2 type)  
Does this facility 
have […]?  
3. No 1. Yes  
Kinds of instruments  
(C2 type)  
Does this practice 
place have a […]?  
3. No 1. Yes  
h. Pregnancy test (strip)   l.Pregnancy test (strip)  
j. Glucose urine tests (strip)   n.Glucose test (Strip)  
m. Cholesterol test kit   t.Cholesterol test kit  
n. Blood sugar test kit   u.Blood sugar test kit  
 
 
Quality of treatment 
 
The quality of treatment comes from composed index of vignette questionnaire. The survey staff 
will interview the physician using several study case that describes the patient’s symptoms. The 
physician will be asked to mention how to approach several questions to patient in order to find 
the correct diagnosis such as asking the current patient’s condition, patient’s medical history and 
behavior, physical examination, and laboratory examination. Physician with good quality of 
treatment will treat the case simultaneously while the not very good physician needs to be 
prompted using questionnaire by the interviewer.  
 
There are four sections of vignette available in the IFLS questionnaire, curative care for adult, 
curative care for adult with diabetes, curative care for children, and prenatal care. We only use 
one of the vignettes which is curative care for the adult because most facilities provide this 
treatment and the rate of response is quite high. The physician indicates providing good 
treatments if most of the answers are mentioned spontaneously without being prompted by the 
interviewer. The summations of all score in the vignette will be used in our regression model of 
quality affect. We underline that the lower score indicates that the quality treatment is good as 
physician responses simultaneously for almost the case to diagnose the study case. While the 
higher score means that quality treatment is not really good because physician mostly have to be 
prompted in diagnosing the study case during the interview.   
 










Mr.Widyono came to this facility with a complaint of 
coughing and a fever. Now I would like to ask you 
exactly what you would do for this patient. 
H10 HPR10 
What questions do you ask the patient about his cough 




How long have you suffered from this condition? H11a HPR11a 
Any shortness of breath? H11b HPR11a 
Is there any blood when you cough? H11c HPR11a 
What was the color of the sputum? H11d HPR11a 
Do you have any pain in the chest? H11e HPR11a 
Any weight loss? H11f HPR11a 











Any contact with others with respiratory problems/TB? H11h HPR11a 
Any night sweats? H11i HPR11a 
What medicine have been taken? H11j HPR11a 
Any fever? H11k HPR11a 
Feeling weak? H11l HPR11a 
Any headache H11m HPR11a 
Losing appetite? H11n HPR11a 
Nauseous? H11o HPR11a 
What questions do you ask the patient about his medical 
history and behavior? 
H12 HPR12 
Previous TB case or took TB medicine? H12a HPR12a 
BCG immunization or ever positive PPD? 
*Note: PPD = Purified Protein Derivative or Mantoux, 
examination of TBC 
H12b HPR12b 
History of asthma or COPD? *Note: COPD = Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, chronic lungs disease 
H12c HPR12c 
History of cardiac problems? H12d HPR12d 
History of malignancy or gastric surgery? H12e HPR12e 
Medications recently or currently taking? H12f HPR12f 
Drug allergies? H12g HPR12g 
Smoking history? H12h HPR12h 
Number of packages/quantity of smoking? H12i HPR12i 
Alcohol use? H12j HPR12j 
Live alone or with others? H12k HPR12k 
Employment? H12l HPR12l 
Family health history? H12m HPR12m 
Sanitation, ventilation at home? H12n HPR12n 
What do you do when you conduct a physical 
examination of the patient? 
H13 HPR13 
Examine general appearance? H13a HPR13a 
Take temperature? H13b HPR13b 
Listen to respiration? H13c HPR13c 
Check for sore throat? H13d HPR13d 
Palpitate / feel throat / lymph nodes? H13e HPR13e 
Is chest indrawing? H13f HPR13f 
Palpate abdomen? *Note: palpation = examination by 
palpating and pressing 
H13g HPR13g 
Pulse 
*Note: vital signs = breath, pulse 
*Note: IPPA = Inspection, Palpation, Percussion, 
Auscultation 
H13h HPR13h 
Blood pressure H13i HPR13i 
What laboratory examinations would you conduct? H14 HPR14 
Chest x-ray H14a HPR14a 
PPD ormantoux test H14b HPR14b 
Sputum exam for TB H14c HPR14c 











Liver function H14e HPR14e 
CD4/cell count 
*Note: blood test to see the immune system 
H14f HPR14f 
Urinalysis H14g HPR14g 
 
 
Quality of physician 
 
The quality physician is measured using the identification whether physician have received 
additional training since graduated for the medical school. The code from the questionnaire is 3 
if physician have never received additional training since graduated while code 1 if physician 
have received additional training since graduated. We recode the code 3 into 0 in order to match 
with the regression process in the quality model. 
 
Table 3B. 12 Question for physician quality 
Public facility questionnaire 
BOOK Public community health center  
Section E 
Private facility questionnaire 
BOOK Private facility  
Section C 
H19. 
Have you received 
additional training since 
you graduated? 
No ................... 3 
Yes ...................1 
HPR5. 
Have you received additional 
training since you graduated? 
No .................... 3 







Why Physicians Engage in Dual Practice? 





















This research studies dual practice in two aspects. The first is the direct effect of 
physician’s valuation on dual practice by analysing the factors that affect physician’s 
decision to get involved in the dual job activity. The second is the indirect effect on 
equilibrium price of private sector from dual practice existence and health insurance 
coverage.  The study takes Indonesia as a case of study and uses the Indonesian Family 
Life Survey (IFLS) 5 in 2014. Using alternative specific conditional logit and 
multinomial logit model the results show that income and experience affect the 
physician’s decision of dual practice. The indirect effect of dual practice shows that the 
existence of dual practice might decrease price level, while more population under 
insurance coverage increases the price of treatment.     
 















Dual physician practice where the doctor can work in both public and private facilities is a 
common practice to increase health care access in many developing countries. Although 
this double job is broadly happening, its presence is rarely getting attention, as it is hardly 
accompanied by the regular evaluation. Current reports show a substantial amount of 
physicians engage in dual practice such as reported by Gruen, Anwar, Begum, 
Killingsworth, & Normand (2002) in Bangladesh, Berman and Cuizon (2004) in 
Indonesia, and Prakongsai, Chindawatana, Tantivess, Mugem, & Tangcharoensathien 
(2004) in Thailand.  
 
Our research analyses how physicians value dual practice activity by describing factors 
that influencing physician’s decision of working place, whether they choose to work in 
public sector, in a private facility or engaged in dual practice. The latter term is when 
physician works in public facility and private facility. The study emphasizes the entry step 
of physicians into the market of health care supply. The study uses Indonesia as case of 
study. Public physicians might open private practice in their own place or work in private 
health care facilities such as private clinics or private hospital after their public working 
hours. The private practice by dual practice physician refers to private facility that 
completely different in term of location or management from public facility and not refers 
to public physician who opens the private practice using public facilities that are also 
commonly found in health care system. For example that is practiced in Austria and 
Ireland where public physician can serve private patient in special section of hospital 
(Kiwanuka et al, 2011). In Indonesia, it is forbidden for public physician to use public 
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facility for their private practice. Factors affecting dual practice decision consist of 
income, physician’s residence, potential demand factors and individual physician’s 
characteristics. The research will propose further possible policies regarding dual practice 
in Indonesia’s setting by considering factors that importantly influence physicians on 
working in one sector or holding two jobs. We provide the simulation of increasing public 
physician salary that affecting the decision on being a dual practitioner. We find that while 
additional income is one of the motivations for a physician to engage in dual practice, 
physician characteristics such as working experience and geographical location influence 
the decision to work as dual practitioners. Dual practice is important in Indonesia because 
physician highly value the practice especially physicians at the beginning of the career. 
The simulation on increasing the public salary shows it has to be increased into significant 
level to keep physician working in public sector if the government of Indonesia wants to 
diminish dual practice physician from the system. The second purpose of the paper is to 
analysis the change of the price equilibrium related with the dual practice in the health 
care system. This analysis is related with our analysis in Chapter two. It shows that the 
existing dual practice lead into different price equilibrium because of change in demand 
as a direct consequence of dual practice. The empirical result using Indonesian data on 
dual practice and price of outpatient care shows that price of health care treatment in 
private practice is decreasing along with the increasing percentage of dual practice 
physician in the area. On the other hand, insurance coverage has positive relationship with 
the price of treatment.  
 
In most developing countries due to many limitations, dual practice is allowed without 
strict regulation.  In Indonesia, the dual practice law first appeared in the 1970’s as part of 
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health care access enhancement. This system allows the public physician to have private 
practice or work in private facilities after his public working hour. The increasing 
percentage of outpatient health utilization in Indonesia, from 15.1% in 1996 to 33.7% in 
2006 is partly because of the existence of health workers dual practice such as physician, 
midwife, and nurse (Rokx, Schieber, Harimurti, Tandon, & Somanathan,  2009). The 
change in Indonesia health system towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) program 
and the growing of private sector lead to the importance of the review of the presence 
physician regulation especially related with dual practice.  To propose new policy, one 
way to start with is to consider how physician decides his working place and because the 
physician is the central player in the health care system that undoubtedly affected with the 
new policy. 
 
Concern regarding dual practice is that it might bring negative impact to public service 
provider. Some of common disadvantages of dual practice physician are a high rate of 
physician’s absenteeism on the public working place and the decreasing quality treatment 
in public sector because public physician put more effort on his private practice rather 
than his public work (Hipgrave & Hort, 2014).  Besides providing more services for 
people, dual practice seems to have a positive influence in term of public quality 
treatment. Theoretical work by Gonzalez (2010) points out that the quality of treatment in 
public facility increases because physician builds his reputation in public sector by putting 
higher efforts of service to the public facility rather than service of his private facility. 
This will attract more patients to physician’s private practice. The unofficial report from 
Indonesian local newspaper indicates that a dual physician gives more priority on his 
private practice in term of time or quality.  A study using different wave of IFLS by Rokx, 
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et al., (2010) presented a quality study between public and private facilities using vignette 
questionnaires filled by the physicians. The result shows difference quality in adult 
treatment, maternal, and children care. The public facility has better quality on maternal 
care while the private facility has better quality treatment on adult and children care. We 
explore specifically the indication of different quality among dual practice physician and 
non-dual practice physician using available data. Based on data processing using 
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 5, we provide a simple difference analysis of 
physician quality based on the dual practice involvement. The result shows that dual 
practice physicians have better quality on providing adult care compare to physicians 
working in private sector only. We measure the quality component using the physician’s 
response on diagnosing a particular symptom. Dual practice physicians might have better 
quality than private physician because they have more opportunity to get additional 
training offered by public sector. Using the same data, the analysis on total working time 
and time devoted to serving patients in public facility show that dual practice physicians 
in public facility have lower total working hours and time of service patients compared to 
physicians of non-dual practice in the public facility. This result indicates a different 
behaviour between dual practice physician and non-dual practice physician in the public 
sector that affects the working hours between dual practice physician and non-dual 
practice physician.  
 
The private sector in Indonesia is growing and it is essential for health care provision. The 
existence of dual practice regulation allows doctors to work flexibly from public to 
private sector. A private facility such as a private hospital or private clinics usually 
consists of a physician who has a primary job in the public sector and physician that 
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purely working in private sector. This condition creates complications for the health 
authority to figure out the scale of private provision served by physicians. The number of 
physicians working in private increased in almost 10,000, from 19,967 physicians in 1996 
to 29,634 physicians in 2006 (Rokx, et al., 2010). Following the typical pattern, the 
highest increases in the number of physicians working in private service happen more in 
an urban area, where the physician ratio is 28 physicians per 100,000 residents compared 
to only 4 physicians per 100,000 residents in the rural area. The large differences of 
physician ration between urban and rural areas indicate that dual practice role in urban 
area might be no longer as health care enhancement because in fact the number of 
physician compare to population  in urban area is already high so that people can access 
to health care services more easily then people in rural area. This indicates that dual 
practice policy in Indonesia should get more attention from decision maker because of 
situation changing related with dual practice role in health care system. 
 
Dual practice study of developing country is closely related with residence areas and 
potential demand of health care. Theoretically the potential demand relates with the health 
care supply, such as the number of people who need health care with the numbers of 
facilities or physicians available in the area. In Indonesia case, the leading causes of 
differences physician ratio among areas are from the geographical conditions and the 
unevenly distributed population. For example, provinces in Java Island have more 
physicians to provide health care services, while physicians in provinces of eastern part of 
Indonesia are still lack of number. The ratio discrepancy also occurs between rural and 
urban areas, while around 70% of the Indonesian population lives in rural areas, but only 
20% of the physicians base their practice in the countryside. Among the total number of 
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9,731 public community health services, 5% of them still do not have a physician and 
around 9% of the public facilities have a physician, but living far away from the facility 
because of its remoteness. The Government of Indonesia then implemented systematic 
programs to strengthening public sector provision. The latest regulation on public 
physician recruitment in 2013 also puts dual practice as one of the advantages of working 
in the public sector. A public physician will get a higher salary level and a shorter 
assignment period if the physician undertakes a placement in remote areas. Other 
attractive factors for being a public physician are additional living allowance from 
regional government and further specialist education opportunities. Another attempt to 
manage the quality treatment of physician, regarding the latest regulation in 2011 health 
authority issues a practice permit for a physician that allows physician to have three 
practices at most, whether in a public facility, a private facility or by owning a private 
practice. A physician can get several career opportunities after he finishes his training and 
takes the clinical path. They can work as a public physician, an employee in a private 
facility, or establish their own private practice. A physician has to acquire a practice 
permit that is issued by the health authority. The limitation however is not strictly 
monitored and is not accompanied with the punishment system.  
 
Dual practice is categorized as an illegal practice in Canada. Governments in Spain, 
Portugal, and Italy offer rewards for physicians who work solely in public, while in 
Austria and Ireland, physicians are encouraged to perform private activities. In general, 
dual practice regulation can be divided into banning the dual practice, allowing the dual 
practice, allowing dual practice with some limitations in term of income or working 
hours. Theoretical works have already discussed the different effects of dual practice 
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regulation - Brekke and Sorgard (2007), Kuhn and Nuschelar (2013), Gonzales and 
Stadler (2013). There is still no consensus on whether its net effect is positive or negative. 
This is reflected by the different approaches to regulation of dual practice among 
countries, although these differences are also related to the heterogeneity of health care 
systems and environments (Hipgrave & Hort, 2013).  
 
We use a health facility dataset containing information on health workers working in 
public and private facility. The IFLS data is one of the datasets that provides information 
on the physician. The survey is a longitudinal survey, and we use the IFLS wave 5 which 
is the latest wave that fielded in 2014. The data takes public community health centre, 
private clinics, and private practice to represent the nearest health facility to the 
community. There are several steps to draw a physician’s sample, as the main purpose of 
the survey is not focusing on the physician but on the facility. The difficulties arise 
especially for the private clinics as the physician is not commonly involved in the 
interview process, where it is mostly a nurse or the front desk officer answering the 
survey. To guarantee the validation process, we eliminate private clinics which consist of 
more than one physician. We only include the single private physician practices, which 
consist of one physician representing a private facility sample. So that the physicians in 
the sample have complete information needed for our research. 
 
The demand and supply identification starts by writing the demand function and supply 
function in a simple form, 𝑄𝑡
𝑑 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑡,  𝑄𝑡
𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡. The  𝑃𝑡 is the price, and  
𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝛽0, 𝛽1 are the structural parameters. In this model, there is no exogenous variable. 
Setting an equilibrium condition as 𝑄𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑄𝑡
𝑠 there are only two reduced form coefficients 
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to determine four structural parameters. The model is said to be under identified because 
there are many combinations of values of the four structural parameters that consistent 
with the two values of the reduced form coefficients. The broad point of demand and 
supply that is shown above is that we usually see only the equilibrium point of demand 
and supply. Therefore we will need system of equation or instrument variable to identify 
each side. However, the demand part in our case is more likely linked to the health shocks 
that are independent to supply than anything else Our study is closer to decision entry into 
a market (Schaumans & Verboven, 2008). It is not how much to supply in terms of 
treatment to patients (i.e. time spent with each patient). The decision to be or not to be a 
dual practice physician is a decision of entry into a market. 
 
Our research identifies income, physician’s residence, potential demand factors, and 
individual physician’s characteristics that are involved in the physician decision of 
working place.  The IFLS data provides information on public wage, revenue from 
practice profit, and other primary jobs. We use an estimation process with physician 
characteristics to estimate public wage for a private physician, and profit revenue for the 
public physician. We provide simulations based on the estimation result to show the 
importance of public salary for the physician and the decision of becoming a dual 
practitioner. We propose a policy that involved the rise of public wage into several 
scenarios. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 consists of selected literature review and 
testable hypothesis. Section 4.3 we describe the institutional setting and the database. 
Section 4.4 presents the identification strategy. The descriptive statistics and estimation 
358 
 
process in completing income data is presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 shows the 
results. Section 4.7 is the policy exploration on salary. Section 4.8 provides the effect of 
dual practice and insurance to price analysis. The final section concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
The physician is one of the players in health care system. The dual practice policy is 
closely related to the physician decision of working place, whether public, private, or 
both. The expectancy theory of motivation in Lawler III and Suttle (1973) reveal that job 
preference of dual job holding practitioners could be seen as a conscious decision based 
on the expected result of alternative behaviour. In the relationship between employee and 
employer, as labour, the individual prefers to work more hours in their highest-paying job 
rather than hold multiple jobs (Lang, 1994). The employers restrict their employees not to 
be involved in another job, to keep their attention at work, and the ordinary workers 
cannot work in two firms at the same place (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991).  
 
The doctors’ behaviour is influenced by an internal trade-off between two rewards system: 
those derived from their government job and those derived from private practice (Gruen, 
et al., 2002). Based on Evans (1974), the extent to which dual job holders pursue income 
maximizing behaviour or to merely achieve a target income will depend on a range of 
factors, including the elasticity of demand for the services offered and the degree of 
competition in the market segment.  Besides, professional ethics and the income level 
from government earnings play a role in these decisions. The form and prevalence of 
physician’s simultaneous engagement in public and private clinical activities critically 
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depends on local factors linked to the health system’s governance (regulation and 
implementing institutions), as well as to the structure of the market for physician services: 
supply, demand, and product (Russo, McPake, Fronteira, & Ferrinho, 2014). 
 
Previous research mentioned other factors that also become motivation for physician in 
engaging dual practice activities. Gonzales (2004) describes that an improving 
professional practice as an additional factor, while Chawla (1996) adds that 
complementarities between public and private sector affect physician’s engagement in the 
dual practice. The other motivations are: expanded or complementary use of professional 
skills, clinical autonomy, broader professional contact, reputation building, and flexibility 
of private practice (Garcia-Prado & Gonzales, 2011). Humphrey and Russel (2004) 
identify the motivation behind the dual practice as the access to alternative facilities. They 
also mention that physicians involve in dual practice to relief pressure and lower 
appreciation in public environments. The summary of previous literature is available in 
Table 4A.1 of Appendix 4A. We limit our analysis to factors that affect physician’s 
decision on dual practise. The study is based on data availability particularly Indonesian’s 
data on dual practice activities that becomes our study case such as income, physician’s 
residential, potential demand, and physician’s individual characteristics. 
 
Generating additional income is believed as physician’s primary motivation to engage in 
dual practice. Van Lerberghe, Conceiao, Van Damme, & Ferrinho (2002) describe a dual 
practice as individual coping strategy for the health care personnel in dealing with 
unsatisfactory living and working conditions. This refers to the usual situation of unfair 
salaries for physicians working in public sector that are usually happened in low and 
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middle income countries. Involving in dual practice means physicians can get additional 
income from private sector beside their main job in public facility. Income is a 
fundamental motivation that drives physicians to top up the individual income level to 
achieve a standard of living closer to what they expect. The study by Roenen, Ferrinho, 
Van Dormael,  Conceiao, & Van Lerberghe (1997) in sub-Saharan Africa identify some 
dual job activities by public physician driven by the motivation to get extra income. The 
common dual job activity for physician is developing a private practice, with different 
kinds of format such as formal private clinic, home visit service, and contract with private 
firm. The dual job is financially rewarding as doctor’s monthly income could be doubled 
with 15 days of private practice, even it could be achieved with 10 hours of private 
practice. Other source of extra income might also come from the non-medical activity 
such as agricultural work especially in rural area where the market for private sector is too 
small.  Besides that, physicians also reported to use public resources for their private 
practice. Study of physicians in Portuguese-speaking African country by Ferinho, et al., 
(1998) emphasize that income is important reason in motivating physician’s dual job. The 
reasons that mostly stated by physicians in engaging dual job are to meet the living cost 
and to support the extended family. The inadequate public salary in many African 
countries is a well-known fact that underlying the physician’s effort to find additional 
source of income. Public salary is still the main resource of total physician income, about 
55% of median in rural areas but only 10% median in urban area. In the latter case, the 
private sector hold almost 65% median of the physician’s total income. The salary in 
public sector appears to be important determinant influencing physician’s decision on dual 
practice activities. In more developed country setting, Askildsen and Holmas (2013) using 
Norway hospital physician data reveal that the increase of 11% salary increased the public 
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physician supply and reduce the dual practice.  The study analyses the effect of the 
increasing salaries for extended working hours and overtime work policy to tackle the 
brain drain from public to private hospital. Using different data set and methodology, 
Johannessen and Hagen (2014) show that income motive is important factor that attracts 
physician to involve in dual practice. The detailed result shows that the most significant 
internal hospital factor for choosing dual practice is high wages of extended working 
hours in public facility. The increasing wage level is significantly reducing the odds for 
physician being dual practice.  
 
There are limited evidences that show the relationship between individual characteristics 
of physicians and dual practice activities. Variables such as physician being a migrant 
worker, being on temporary contracts, and doing shift works are important (Ferrinho, Van 
Lerberghe, Fronteira, Hipolito, & Biscaia, 2004). They argue that the physician 
characteristics are important determinants for dual practice decision but the evidence is 
not conclusive or generalizable. The general results suggest that dual practice does not 
depend so much on the personal characteristics such as age and gender, social 
characteristics such as marital status, and professional characteristics such as professional 
group and specialities. The different perspective comes when dual practice physician is 
seen as labour supply. Hence the physician’s characteristics give important effect to it. 
Empirical analysis by Johannessen and Hagen (2014) and Johannessen and Hagen (2012) 
show the significant effect of gender on dual practice. The motivation of involving in dual 
practice activity may be quite diverse at the individual level. Study should consider that 
physicians have different expectation and career goals. The physician’s characteristics 
such as age, gender, marital status and number of children are important physician’s 
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characteristics that determining dual practice (Askildsen & Holmas, 2013). Dual practice 
decisions among physicians are also vary according to urban or rural residence. Previous 
researches using Portuguese case studies mention that the differentiation on rural-urban 
location is important for the extent for dual practice (Ferrinho, et al., 2003) and (Antunes, 
et al., 2002).  
 
Physician decision for engaging in dual practice is closely related with the workloads and 
attractiveness of the facility (Johannessen & Hagen, 2014).  Their study objectives are 
also motivated with the hospital reform that changes the structures of hospital in term of 
number and functions. Askildsen and Holmas (2013) mention it as work characteristics. 
Their research assumed that physician’s choice of working hours between main job and 
additional job follows utility maximization. The jobs characteristic matter when the 
physician wants to allocate his time in order to gain optimal result of wage increase. For 
example when hospital has too many occupied beds so that physicians have very high 
workload during the work day. Physician will have additional workload. The marginal 
effect of additional work is negative. The effect of wage increase on working hours 
because of this additional working load will be diminished compare to the situation before 
the increasing of physician’s workload. 
 
From the previous literature we construct our testable hypothesis on physician’s decision 
on dual practice by analysing physician’s choice of working place in public sector only, 
private only, and dual practice. 1. Income, as appeared in previous researches, positively 
affects the physician decision of working place. It means that physicians look for the 
highest income level.  2.Our research considers that physician’s decision also related with 
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the physician’s residence based on rural-urban residence and Java Island and Non-Java 
Island residence. We include the urban and rural specification as it represents the working 
condition for physician where urban area usually offers more convenience. This applies 
for Java and Non-Java specification.  For the Indonesia case, Urban and Java is more 
populated area compare to rural and Non Java area. We expect that physician in rural and 
Non-Java area will choose to work as dual practice physician. 3.The individual characters 
such as years of experience, gender, education, and ability of local language are important 
as determinant of physician’s decision. Physician with more years of experience is 
expected to work in non-dual practice sector. Female physician is expected to engage in 
public sector. Physician graduated from leading medical school is expected to work in 
private sector. Physician ability in speaking local language reflects physician’s 
qualification to communicate with patient. Physician who mastered the local language is 
expected to work as dual practitioner. 4.The percentage of elderly population and 
physician’s ratio will negatively affect the physician’s decision on dual practice.    
 
4.3 Physician Dual Practice: Context and Data 
 
This section gives information about the dual physician practice in Indonesian context and 
data that we use in this research. The sub chapter provides information on how physician 
usually decides on being a dual practice physician, the regulation, and monitoring system 





4.3.1 Dual physician practice in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia is the biggest archipelago country with around 17 thousands islands and total 
area of 7.81 Million Kilometres squared consists of 2.01 Million km
2
 main land, 3.25 
Million km
2
 oceans, and 2.55 Million km
2
 of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The 
geographical conditions are potential sources for country’s development but create 
obstacles as well. One of the potential resources comes from the human resource with the 
total population is estimated around 255 Million in 2015, and 60% of them is in 
productive age between 15 to 64 years that provides work force supply. One of the 
difficulties is the unevenly population distribution. Among 17 thousands islands only 
around 12% of them is inhabitant while there is still 88% of uninhabited island. Almost 
60% of total population is concentrated in Java Island. Based on the administration 
division, Indonesia consists of 34 provinces since 2015, and Java is divided into 6 
provinces. Therefore Java Island is usually identified as a centre of economic activities 
and it has more rapid infrastructure development compare to the other islands.  
 
Health care services are provided in public and private health care facilities. The public 
health care facilities use referral system that starts from public community health centre 
and community health sub-centre that available in sub district and village level. There is 
no referral system in private facility and patients can visit any private facility such as 
private clinics, physician practice, or private hospital. The community health centre 
primarily provides outpatient care although about two third of them also provides 
inpatient care. The health personnel structure in public facility usually consists of general 
physicians, midwives, nurse and supporting staffs like dentist, nutritionist, and 
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pharmacist. The average ratio of public community health centre per province level is one 
community health centre per 300,000 populations. Some provinces in Indonesia have 
lower ratio due to the densely populated such as provinces in Java while province with 
low population density such as West Papua has 5 community health centres per 300,000 
populations. The secondary care is provided in public hospital level in the public referral 
system and private hospitals. The public hospital is completed with the service of 
advanced cases and inpatient treatments. There are 2,488 total hospitals in Indonesia with 
around 309 thousands total beds where 64% of them is public hospital, and consist of 
general hospital and specialized hospital. The bed ratio for the general hospital is in 
average one bed per 1,000 populations.  
 
Physician is the main component of health care personnel who can deliver the health care 
services. However, health care delivery in Indonesia still relies on non-physician health 
care personnel such as midwives. The available regulation still allows midwives to 
provide health care services particularly maternal and children health care services. 
Midwife has the largest percentage on the public community health centre component 
around 31% from total human resources in the facility while physicians have the 9% from 
total human resources in community health centre.  Based on Indonesian Medical Council 
in 2015, the registered general physician in total is 109,597 from total 168,832 of general 
physicians, dentist and specialized physicians. The detailed number is available in the 
Figure 4A.6 of Appendix 4A. 
 
Dual practice formerly existed to fulfil the demand of public health care in limited 
resources. Number of physicians in Indonesia is 95,976 doctors who serve around 243.6 
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million populations in 2014. A physician serves around 2,538 residents. This figure is 
slightly higher compare to WHO recommendation that a physician should serve 2,500 
residents. The ratio also relatively high compares to Indonesia’s neighbouring countries 
such as Malaysia, with one physician for 835 populations, and Singapore, where one 
physician serves 513 people. Similarly, other calculations show that, on average in 2013 
the number of medical doctors per 100,000 people was 37.2. This later figure represents 
the average physician ratio per 100,000 populations in 33 provinces in Indonesia, with the 
respective minimum and maximum values of 8.9 and 151.5 physicians per 100,000 
individuals, by province. This achievement is relatively remarkable compared to the 15.7 
physicians per 100,000 people in 1996. Based on “Indonesia Sehat” program indicator, 
which is a government’s program to increase health quality in Indonesia, the physician 
ratio should be 45 per 100.000 people, in a national scope; Indonesia has not yet reached 
the target as only eight provinces have already achieved the goal.  Looking further in 
detail, the ratio per area shows the difference gap between the minimum and the 
maximum is still significant (Ministry of Health, 2015). This indicates the unevenly 
distribution of physician in Indonesia.  
 
Community health centre located in sub-district area is the main point of services for the 
population to get primary care. However, some of the community health centres available 
still have unideal proportion in term of health personnel. Around 26% from total public 
community health centre is still lack of general physicians while almost 47% is lack of 
dentist. Most of the community health centres with lack of physicians are located in the 
eastern part of Indonesia, for example: in Papua province 66% of its community health 
centres is lack of physicians, 60% in Maluku province, and 51% of community health 
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care centre in Nusa Tenggara Barat is lacking of general physicians. This is contrast with 
provinces in Java Island that in average only has around 18% of the facility that still lacks 
of general physicians.  
 
Indonesia Ministry of Health also has particular program by recruiting physician to work 
as temporary public physicians in order to fill the physician position in public community 
health centre. The contract usually last between 2-3 years based on the area category that 
can be differentiated as, normal, remote or very remote. The last category offers the 
shortest working contract and has the highest salary rate and higher opportunity to be 
permanent public physician.  Based on the active temporary general physicians, most of 
them, or about 57% is placed in the very remote areas in all of Indonesian. The 39% is 
placed in the remote areas and only 4% in the normal area. Most of the placement is on 
the provinces outside Java Island.   
 
The existing regulation on dual practice in Indonesia controls public physicians working 
in private practice outside the public office hours. The newest adjustment of dual practice 
regulation is by putting the maximum number of medical practice for each physician into 
only three practices. Suppose public physician works in the public community health 
centre during work day from Monday to Friday from 8 AM to 5 PM. This public 
physician might also work as dual practice physician by opening private practice from 
Monday to Wednesday at 6 PM to 8 PM   and working in different private clinics from 
Thursday to Friday at 6 PM to 8 PM. This particular physician is said to meet the 
maximum number of practice and cannot have another practices anymore. From health 
care authority perspective, this limitation relates to quality control and monitoring for 
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physicians, although in fact there is no meaningful punishment for a violation of the 
working hours or number of practices. A warning letter is a punishment for common cases 
but usually not followed by more severe punishment. 
  
Dual practice physician is a career choice commonly for the public physician to open 
private practice after public working hours. The general career path for the physician in 
Indonesia and the dual practice decision can be described in the Appendix 4D. The 
physicians finish the education including clinical competency, then take the medical oath 
and get the competency certificate. The physicians then continue to work in internship 
program by working in public or private health care facility to perform clinical 
competency under senior physician supervision. The internship program is usually taken 
in two years and at the end of the internship program, the physicians get the registration 
letter from the medical council. The registration letter is valid for five years and can be 
renewed after. The letter indicates that the physician has already completed the academic 
and internship education and ready to start working in public or private path. 
 
The usual career starting for the fresh graduate physician is taking the public sector path 
by applying as a permanent civil servant or temporary public employee in public 
community health centre. The first option is a highly competitive job where the number of 
works offered is based on civil servant formation needed in the Ministry or in the regional 
level. The competition occurs because the positions are limited while the applicants are 
abundant. Besides civil service option, there is a temporary public employee which is a 
particular program to support health care provision in the areas that categorized as remote 
based on the Ministry of Health criteria. These areas are usually rural areas, in remote 
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islands or mainland with difficult access and geographical barriers. The contract duration 
varies from 2-3 years, two years if the placement areas are categorized as very remote and 
3 years if categorized as remote.  After being accepted as civil servant or temporary 
public employee, the physicians will apply for the practice permit particularly for those 
with assigned job descriptions in medical practice. But for the ones who get the non-
practice duties, they are unnecessarily taking the permit. Some jobs in civil servant 
formation might not have job description on medical practice but all temporary public 
employees will be assigned with medical practice job description. Each practice permit is 
valid for one practice and based on the regulation, each physician can only registered 
maximum in three practice permits. The change between non-medical practice and 
medical practice is quite easy. When they want to move into medical practice job they just 
need to apply for the practice permit at any point of time. After having the permit, the 
dual practice decision then takes place. These public physicians (civil servants and 
temporary employees) are opening the private practice or working in private clinics after 
public working hours. The public sector path although in highly competition environment 
but usually attracts the fresh graduate physicians to start their medical career. The 
temporary contract option although for short time period and placement area is in the 
difficult area but this job is offered with competitive salary level compare to the 
permanent civil servant. 
 
The other career option for physicians is taking the private sector by directly applying for 
the practice permit from the public health office in district area level. The permit is 
mandatory for a physician who wants to provide health care services in this case is 
working in private facility such as private clinics or private hospital or establish his own 
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private practice. The change into dual practice physician is when private physicians 
working in public facilities, in practice or non-practice jobs in the same time periods when 
they also still working in private facilities. Some physicians are taking the private path in 
the beginning because they decide to work as private physicians. Some other is taking the 
private path while waiting the opportunities to work as permanent civil servant or 
temporary public physicians.  
 
Due to the dual practice identification using IFLS wave 5, public community health centre 
and private facility questionnaire, our research narrowed into two types of dual practice 
physicians. The first one is a public sector physician who has a private practice after 
public working hours. The public sector physician is not necessarily a permanent public 
physician or usually called a civil servant physician but he also could be a temporary 
public physician who works in public facility for a specified period based on the contract. 
The second type of dual practice physician is identified using private facility 
questionnaire. Dual practice physician is a physician who provides service in private 
health care facility, this means that he works in private sector but also identified as having 
job in public facility, and therefore he works in private sector and public sector. The 
public facilities are not necessarily a public health care facility but could be an 
educational jobs or government owns administration such as university or health office. 
The work status in public facility is not limited as a civil officer but in general as 
temporary workers are also included. From this type of identification, we can sure that the 
private side part is medical activity related but we cannot distinguish the other part of the 




The physicians particularly those whom are prefer to work in practice job first recorded in 
the medical council through the registration letter application. Then the public health 
office in district level will register the physicians and the place where they practice. The 
public physician performance and dual practice activity will be monitored by Ministry of 
Health. The private physicians are monitored only when they apply for the practice permit 
in the public health office. Annual data from each district public health office will be sent 
to the Ministry of Health. From this report, the general information in each province can 
be monitored. However this report does not contain the dual practice physician 
information. The decentralization policy in Indonesia since 1999 causes each public 
health offices manage their own physicians. Most of public health office issues the 
practice permit and stores the information manually. So that the dual practice physician’s 
activity is somehow not being monitored in higher level.  This is also the main reason 
why our research utilizes the survey data of IFLS wave 5 and the explanation is available 




We use the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 5, which was fielded in the late 2014 
and early 2015. The IFLS is a longitudinal survey and the first IFLS in 1993 was held 
initially in 13 provinces of 33 provinces in Indonesia.  The most recent of IFLS survey is 
IFLS wave 5 that covers 23 provinces out of 33 provinces in Indonesia. The selected 
provinces represent all provinces from the western to the eastern of Indonesia with some 
excluded provinces because of the expensive interview cost due to the access difficulties 
and security issue. The provinces excluded from IFLS wave 5 come from three main 
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islands in Indonesia: Sumatra (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Riau, Jambi, Bengkulu), 
Kalimantan (west, central, east), and Sulawesi (north, central, southeast).   The survey is 
conducted by RAND and Survey Meter. It is based on sample of larger scale survey by 
Indonesian National Statistics Office, the social economics survey (SUSENAS). We use 
the IFLS data because this survey provides us the complete information particularly dual 
practice physician identification that we cannot find in other data sources.  
 
Our research extracts the particular information of physician from IFLS facility 
questionnaire. One of main challenges in this research is on the sample selection that will 
be discussed in detail in the sub chapter of sample selection. The purpose of the IFLS 
survey is to collect the information on the households and community facilities, which are 
village administration, schools, and health facilities. The information on physician for our 
purpose is collected using the facility information as an approximation, by using the 
information available in the health facility questionnaire. The physician sample 
representation hence follows the health facility location and the inclusion criterion is more 
to the completeness of the physician information. We can get physicians detailed 
information as long as their work places are included as IFLS wave 5 community sample. 
Regarding data collection, the obstacle also comes from the missing values on physician 
information especially from the private facilities. The interviewing process in the private 
facility sometimes only include the front office staff, nurse or other non-physician 
component, hence the information of physician will be lost. The public facility interview 
more successfully captured the physician information as most of the interviews involved 




To match the physician data with potential demand factors such as doctor ratio, we merge 
the physician data from IFLS wave 5 with Indonesia Potential Village Survey (PODES) 
year 2014 based on the area code. This PODES data provides basic information from the 
smallest administration area level which is village level and we get the data of the number 
of health worker, and health facilities. The matching process with IFLS wave 5 data uses a 
sub-district which is an administrative level consists of several villages. The number of 
the population comes from Census Population (SP) 2010.  
 
Thus, the final dataset used in this chapter results from merging the data from different 
surveys and databases. 
 
4.4 Empirical Strategy and Estimator 
 
The empirical strategy in this research is designed to answer the research question on the 
factors that affect the physician decision to engage in dual practice. Our hypothesis is that 
income motivation is the main factor influencing physicians on decision to do dual 
practice. The rising income from single income source might reduce the physician 
willingness on being dual practice. The physician’s residence such as rural urban and 
island specification have important influence to the physician’s decision. The physicians 
from rural and outside Java Island will have higher probability of engaging in dual 
practice. Beside the income and physician’s residence, there are two groups of factors that 
affect the physician’s decision, the potential demand factor that consists of population size 
and the need of population and individual physician factor such as years of experience, 
gender, and education. Physicians consider the competition among them when deciding 
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on being dual practice. If the area still has low number of physicians compared to 
population, a physician might have higher chance on being dual practice to fill in the 
market. The decision also reflects the need of health care and workloads. In the region 
where it is indicated the high need of health care, the dual practice occurrence might be 
higher compare to the area with lower rate of health care need. Dual practice decision also 
related with the individual physician characteristics such as education, language ability, 
gender, and experience.  The dual job might be more attractive for male physician rather 
than female physician. Dual practice might be a good option for the less experience 
physicians, as they will need benefits offered in public sector and additional income from 
private sector in the beginning of their career. There are two models in the research to 
explain how physician decide on dual practice job based on the assumptions for each 
model which suit to  the available data. 
 
4.4.1 Main Model 
 
It is important to have clear definition of physician dual practice before we construct the 
empirical strategy because it indicates in the introduction that dual practice can be defined 
in many ways. In general, a physician has to deal with several choices of working place, 
from a primary care provider such as public community health centre or private practice 
to secondary care such as public or private hospital. Physician basically can choose to 
work in one place only or engage in several places in the same period. For example, 
physician decides to work in public hospital only. While in other case physician decides to 
work in public hospital in the morning and open private practice in the afternoon. The 
latter case is the example of dual practice. The kind of job can be related with the medical 
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practice or administrative work. We simplified the choices into three aggregate categories 
based on the sector of public, private, and dual practice. In our model, the dual practice 
includes the physician work in primary care and secondary care. The kind of works is not 
only related with the medical practice but might be administrative too. Our model 
describes dual practice as a dual job by physicians based on sector. As long as they work 
in two or more places and those places can be identified as public sector and private 
sector, these physicians are categorized as dual practice.  The facility sector is based on 
facility ownership. A public facility is owned by the government while the private facility 
is run by an individual or private company. A public community health centre, public 
hospital, administration office, military, university, and public company are categorized as 
public. Private clinics, private practice, private company and other unspecified working 
place are a private facility. Dual practice is a category when physician works in both types 
of facility.  
 
In our main framework, income variable can be treated as an alternative specific regressor 
by assuming that physician has the income information from all alternatives before he 
made his decision. Each physician will have sets of income for each sector, dual practice 
sector, public sector, and private sector.  The income per sector will reflects the potential 
income if physician would join in the chosen sector. We face the problem because the 
survey only captures the observed income from the chosen alternative. For example, we 
have a private physician in the sample. The income information available is income from 
his private sector, while information on remaining alternatives: public sector and dual 
practice are not available. We estimate the unobservable income using estimation process 
explained in Sub chapter 4.5.2.  The income variable uses as alternative specific in the 
376 
 
physician decision of working place between public, private, and dual practice. Using this 
information, physician’s choice of working sector will depend on alternative specific 
which is income per sectors and several characteristics specifics such as experience, 
gender, education, local language ability, geographical identification, percentage of elder 
population, and physician’s ratio. 
 
We want to analyse the physician choice of working sector among a set of alternatives. 
We have physician as unit analysis and uses physician characteristics as explanatory 
variables. The model also contains a set of alternative for each physician and the 
explanatory variable is this alternatives. The conditional logit focuses when we want to 
model the choice of the alternatives as a function of the characteristics of alternatives 
(Hoffman and Duncan, 1988). Our case fits the alternative specific conditional logit 
which is the specific case of the more general conditional logistic regression model 
(McFadden, 1974) which allows the explanatory variables consist of alternatives 
characteristics and case characteristics. Following the explanation in (Greene, 2012), 
physician’s choice of working sector is unordered choice generated from the random 
utility model. For the 𝑖 th physician deals with 𝐽 choices, the utility choice of 𝑗 is1: 
 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜃 + 𝑖𝑗 (4. 1) 
 
If the physician makes choice 𝑗 then we assume that 𝑈𝑖𝑗 is the highest utility among all 𝐽 
utilities. The probability of physician takes choice of 𝑗 is  
                                                          
1
 These presentation follows Greene(2009) and Cameron and Trivedi(2009) with the adequate change to 
fit in our content. 
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 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑘) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 (4. 2) 
 
The model is made by considering particular choice for the disturbances. As unordered 
discrete choice case, we consider to use logit model. It has been widely used in many 
fields, including economics, market study, politics, and finance and the same time it offers 
simpler interpretation compare to the other model that is often used, Probit model. 
Suppose 𝑌𝑖 is a random variable that indicates the choice of working sector by physician. 
The 𝐽 disturbances are independent and identically distributes with Gumbel (type extreme 
value 1) distribution, 
 
 𝑓( 𝑖𝑗) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝑒𝑥𝑝( 𝑖𝑗)) (4. 3) 
 
Then the probability is, 









The utility depend on 𝒛𝑖𝑗that consist of aspects specific to the individual and the choices. 
The 𝒛𝑖𝑗 = [𝒙𝑖𝑗, 𝒘𝑖]  and 𝜃 = [𝛽
′, 𝛼′]. The 𝒙𝑖𝑗 is known as attributes of choice and it is 
varies across the choice of working sector by physician. The 𝒘𝑖contains the character of 
physician and therefore the same for all choices. The model in 4.4 then becomes, 
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝒙𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜷 + 𝒘′𝑖𝜶)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝒙𝑖𝑗












The case specific regressors which are variables that are related with physician 
characteristics in this research are whether the physician is a male physician, graduated 
from well-known university, speak the local language, live in urban area, located in Java 
Island, years of experience, the number of population in the area of physician’s residency, 
and physician ratio in the area of residency. The alternative regressor is a variable that 
relates with dependent variable or in this case is income of working sector that relates 
with a choice of physician.  
 
4.4.2 Alternative Model 
 
We provide the alternative model to provide comparison analysis on factors that effects 
physician decision on working sector. The multinomial logistic regression works for 
characteristics specific regressors. The model represents the individual choice that is 
affected by the individual characteristics and not from the alternative characteristics. In 
our main model, we have income variable per sector that represent the alternative 
characteristics of working choice. In this model, we assume that income is a physician 
characteristic that varies for each physician, and will be the same for all alternatives. We 
use income of main job which is an observable variable taken from questionnaire. Income 
variable together with the other general physician characteristics such as physician’s 
residence (urban-rural identification and island location), individual characteristics 
(gender, education, local language, experience), and potential demand (population per 
area, and physician ratio per area) will characterized the physician’s choice of working 
sector between dual practice, public, or private sector. The model of physician’s choice in 
multinomial logit is 
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, 𝑗 = 0,1,2. 
(4. 6) 
 
The estimated equations provide a set of probabilities for the 𝐽 + 1 choices of physician’s 
working sector with physician’s characteristics of 𝒘𝑖. We eliminate the indeterminacy in 
the model. Suppose we have 𝜶𝑗
∗ = 𝜶𝑗 + 𝒒 for any vector 𝒒.  The calculation in 4.6 using 
𝜶𝑗
∗ instead of 𝜶𝑗 will generate the identical set of probabilities because all the term 
involving q is drop out.  To solve the problem and because the sum of probability equals 
to one, we use 𝜶0 = 0. Only 𝐽 parameters are needed to get the 𝐽+1 probabilities.  The 
probabilities are 
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗|𝒘𝑖) = 𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝒘′𝑖𝜶𝑗)
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝒘′𝑖𝜶𝑘)
𝐽
𝑘=1
, 𝑗 = 0,1, . . 𝐽. 
(4. 7) 
 





] = 𝒘′𝑖(𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼𝑘) = 𝒘′𝑖𝛼𝑗  𝑖𝑓 𝑘 = 0 (4. 8) 
 
The odds ratio, 𝑃𝑗/𝑃𝑘 is independent from remaining choices. This property is called the 
independence from irrelevant alternative (IIA). The IIA property is convenient from the 
estimation point of view but, it is not very practical in real decision making process. 
Multinomial logit model requires IIA property checking in order to have valid result. 
Hausman and McFadden (1984) proposed by omitting the subset of the choice set from 
the model altogether, if the parameter estimation does not changes systematically, then the 
380 
 
choice set is irrelevant.  The exclusion will be inefficient but will not lead to 
inconsistency, while letting the choices when the odd ratios is not independent will lead to 
inconsistency. If IIA holds, the statistics for the Hausman’s specification test is: 
 
 𝜒2 = (𝛼?̂? − 𝛼?̂?)′[𝑉?̂? − 𝑉?̂?]
−1
(𝛼?̂? − 𝛼?̂?) (4. 9) 
 
Where s is the estimator based on the restricted subset, f  is the estimator based on the full 
set of choices. The 𝑉?̂?, 𝑉?̂?are the respective estimates of the asymptotic covariance 
matrices. The 𝜒2 is Chi-square distribution with degree of freedom equals to number of 
row in 𝛼?̂?.  
 
4.5 Variables  
 
The definitions for dependent variable and independent variables are as follows. The 
dependent variable is physician choice of working environment and categorized into three 
choices: private physician, public physician, or dual practice physician. 
 
Private physician.   
A physician is categorized as private physician if the physician only works in non-
government owned health care facilities. This refers to a facility that run by private 
individual or private company such as private practice and private clinics. The private 
facility questionnaire of IFLS covers the private practice and private clinics. Using the 
identification of IFLS wave 5 questionnaire, a physician is categorized a private physician 
if he does not have any other practice beside his private clinics or private clinics. 
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Physician might have another jobs but it must been indicated in private sector whether it 
is related with medical practice or administrative.  
 
Public physician.  
A physician is categorized as a public physician if physician only works in the public 
facility, a government owned health care facility. The IFLS community facility only 
covers the public community health centre and excludes the public hospital. The 
physician works in public facility usually also a civil servant or permanent worker but in 
this research we include the non-civil servant physician or temporary contract physician 
as long as the physician only works in public facility. We identify public physician using 
public community health centre questionnaire that listed all physicians available in the 
facility. But only one physician for each facility is included in our sample because the 
detailed physician information will be asked only to one physician per facility. Based on 
the IFLS questionnaire public community centre questionnaire, a public physician is a 
physician working in public community health centre only and not having any private 
practice.  
  
Dual practice.  
The general term of dual practitioner is a physician who works both in public facility and 
also in the private sector. The identification process can be seen in the graphic of 
Appendix 4A, Figure 4A.5 on how dual practice identification process to guarantee a 
valid identification. There are two different ways to classify physician being dual practice 
based on the availability data of IFLS wave 5. From the public community health centre 
sample, a dual practitioner from this sample group is a public physician who has a private 
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practice. We indicate physician as dual practice physician if the answer from a question 
“does the head of public community health centre have a private practice?” is yes. The 
structure ignores the possibility that physician may not have a private practice, but he 
might work in other private facilities. From private facility sample, we classify physician 
as a dual practitioner if a physician has primary jobs in one of the following places: public 
community health centre, a government hospital, office/health administration, a military 
agency, a government-owned company, another public department, and university. The 
dual practice identification from the questionnaire comes from the question item of 
“Where is your primary place of work?”  If the physician has primary work on the public 
facility, hence he will be identified as dual practice physician. We also match the question 
to validate the information of dual practice on the question of “Which category best 
describes the work you did in the primary job?” The answer of the question should be 
other than “government worker” to indicate a dual practice physician. Those questions are 
available in IFLS wave 5 community facility questionnaire and will be answered by 
physicians during the interview process. 
 
 The independent variables are:  
 
Education  
This variable represents the quality of the physician from his educational background. We 
use the educational background to identify the physician ability although it quality aspect 
should be composed from many aspect but this is the only instrument in the IFLS 
questionnaire that fit our purpose. We code one if physician graduates from top five 
medical schools in Indonesia: University of Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University, 
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Airlangga University, Padjajaran University, and Diponegoro University. The description 
using QS world university ranking places the University of Indonesia in rank of 277, the 
highest among of them. While Gadjah Mada University has 401-410 ranking, Airlangga 
University is in 701-750, Diponegoro University is in 801-1000, and Padjajaran 
University is number 201-250 in Asian University Ranking. We code 0 if physician 
graduates from others universities.  
 
Male  
This variable indicates male physician as coded 1 and female as 0. 
 
Language  
Variable of the local language is a coded 1 if the physician can speak the local language 
and 0 if the physician does not speak the local language. The ability to master local 
language is one of quality measurement to maintain communication ability between 
physician and patient. Indonesia has many local languages, and although there is the 
national language, most people usually speak local language especially in rural areas. 
 
Java  
The variable is coded 1 if physician lives in Java Island and 0 otherwise. 
 
Urban  






Variable of experience measures number of year’s physician has graduated from medical 
school. The experience year is the subtraction between the year of the survey, 2014 with 
the graduation year of the physician. The approach neglect the possibility that physician 
might not directly involving in medical practice. The IFLS questionnaire provides 
information on which year physician working in the facility. It would be a good indicator 
if the physician work in the same place since the beginning of the career but the question 
applies only on the facility being interviewed and cannot track the physician working 
history before. Hence we avoid this information. Another attempt to measure experience 
is from the physician’s age but the age information is only available for the private facility 
questionnaire and not for the public facility questionnaire. 
 
Population   
We have full set of population data in general. But in the final model, we use the elderly 
population. This is the percentage of population aged 65 years and above in the region. 
Data is from Indonesia Population Survey 2010. We also consider several indicators to 
represent health care demand in the area such as: percentage of population age 5 years and 
bellow, percentage of population aged 1 year, and population of productive age between 
14 years to 65 years old. The final indicator that provides satisfacotry result is the 
percentage of population aged 65 years and above.  
 
Physician ratio  
This variable together with the variable of population describe potential demand and 
workloads of physician. The physician ratio also shows the physician supply for each sub-
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district compare to the population whom potentially needs health care treatment. 
Physician ratio is the number of people divided by the number of physicians. We get the 
information for the number of physicians from Village Potential Survey (PODES) in 
2014. Total physician in a sub-district based on the definition in the survey is some 
physicians who reside in the area. This definition has the consequence that a sub-district 
might have low number of physician although health facilities exist in the area, this is 
again due to the definition of physician reside in the sub-district and not based on facility 
records. 
 
Main income  
Variable of main income is per month income in Indonesian Rupiah from physician’s 
primary work. This is included as physician’s characteristics in the alternative model. 
There are two different approaches to get this information and this is described in Figure 
4A.2 of Appendix 4A. The first approach is using main income to represent physician’s 
income from working sector based on physician’s declaration. From the private sample 
(physician being interviewed using private facility questionnaire), physician will 
determine his primary job and mentions the total income from it,” What is the 
approximate total income of the primary job per month?”  If physician only has one job, 
the income from this job is categorized as primary work. For physicians who have several 
jobs, the primary work is based on physician’s declaration on which job he will categorize 
as primary job without referring to the highest wage or the longest working hours. From 
the public sample (physician being interviewed using public facility questionnaire), main 
income comes from a question of “What is the revenue per month earned from 
employment as Head of Community health Centre”? Here we assume primary job for 
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public physician sample is as Head of public Community Health Centre and usually 
associated with the public salary regardless the physician status as civil servant or non-
civil servant (temporary contract physician). This variable failed to separate income based 
on sector, public sector, private, or dual practice. The main income represent physician’s 
income from a job that he categorized as primary job, whether it is based on the most 
working hours spent in the kind of job or the highest income if physician works in more 
than one job. The purpose of using the main income variable is to measure income motive 
from one job that classified as primary job regardless its sector. To accommodate the 
income based on the sector, the next variables explanation will reveal our attempt of 
second approach to get more accurate information on the income based on physician’s 
working sector.  
 
Private income 
Variable of physician income of private sector is the income that comes from private 
clinics, private practice, private company and unspecified categories working place.  The 
private income variable indicates total income of the physician from private sector only 
and to be differentiated from the main income variable. The sources can be a regular 
monthly income from private clinics or treatment fee charged from the patients, but all 
will be calculated to be a monthly income in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). The extraction 
process using questionnaire appears in Figure 4A.4 of Appendix 4A. The private income 
information comes from physician who interviewed using IFLS private facility 
questionnaire, after physician is being identified as a private physician or dual 
practitioner. The questionnaire is used to identify the private income from private 
physician and private income from physician that is indicated as dual practice physician. 
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Ideally data also provides the private income for public physician if the physician is 
working in private sector. This kind of data will be useful to estimate our alternative 
model. Unfortunately such data is rarely available in the survey. We estimate the private 
income for the public job position holder using regression process that is provided in Sub 
chapter 4.5.2. The estimation process follows the general idea that public physician will 
have similar private income if he shares the same characteristics with the private 
physician. Some of the characteristics are gender, physician’s experience, Java island 
identification, and income from primary work conditional that physician is working in 
private sector.  
 
Public income  
The public income is the total income of physician from working in public sector. The 
variable indicates the monthly public salary and the measurement unit is Indonesian 
Rupiah. The public salary comes from public facility questionnaire; see Figure 4A.3 of 
Appendix 4A. The information available in the questionnaire that is related with public 
income is straightforward and can be used for our purpose. The estimation process of 
public income is applied for the private physician because we do not have any data for 
private physician if he works in the public sector. We assume that the similar private 
physician characteristics with public physician characteristics will share the similar level 
of public salary. These characteristics are physician’s experience, urban-rural 
identification, Java island identification, and number of working hours dedicated to serve 
patients. The complete steps obtaining the estimation public salary for private physicians 




Dual practice income  
The dual practice income is the total income for physicians who are working as dual 
practice physicians. In the public facility questionnaire, the dual practice income is the 
summation of public salary and income from private practice. Of course we have to 
identify first whether physicians are dual practice or public physician. The estimation 
process is applied to get dual practice income for public physician as if he works as dual 
practitioner. In the private facility questionnaire, if physician is identified as dual practice 
physician, the dual practice income is the total income between income from private 
facility being interviewed and income from the main job that categorized as public. If the 
physician is identified as private physician then the total income from data available refers 
to private income. It is the summation of income from private practice and income from 
the main job that also categorized as a private sector. To get the dual practice income 
information from private physician, the estimation process is needed as available in Sub 
chapter 4.5.2. 
 
4.5.1 Building the sample 
 
Selecting sample for this research from IFLS wave 5 data is a challenge because the 
available information is designed to focus more on the health care facility and not 
particularly on dual practice physician activities. The sample selection for this research is 
by considering the completeness of the information of the physician. The detailed process 
of sample selection can be described in the graphic of Appendix 4A, Figure 4A.1. The 
physicians come from two kinds of questionnaire based on the health care facility 
questionnaire of IFLS, the public health community centre and private practice 
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questionnaires. There is 961 public community health centre, and 3,529 private clinics 
and private practices. The rate of non-response for the private facility is high, about 
54.75%, therefore the valid facility in the private facility sample is only 1,597 facilities. 
Ideally, from each facility that are willing to participate in the survey, one physician will 
be interviewed to answer the general questions on the facility and specific question on 
physician including the technical questionnaire on treatment management. In most of the 
interview process, the survey officer cannot interview the physicians and only meet the 
facility representative hence the facility questionnaire can be filled but the specific part of 
questionnaire on physician will be left missing. More than half of the public facility can 
be presenting physicians during interview so that we have sample of 540 physicians from 
the dual practice identification using public community health centre questionnaire. The 
private facility in contrast, most of them cannot involve physician during interview. The 
low number of the physician is caused by low chance of physician being interviewed 
because most of them are unable or unwilling to do the interview and most of the facility 
interviews are answered by nurse or midwives. There are 380 physicians from private 
facility that can provide the physician’s information for our purpose. The complete pooled 
physician information from facility sample is 920 physicians from both facilities 
questionnaire. The physicians mostly have complete information on the physician 
characteristics such as physician choice, male or female, education and geographical 
identification. The sample then reduce to 721 when entered the first regression model due 
to missing values mostly come from the main income variable.  
 
Physician in public facility is classified as a dual practitioner if a physician has a private 
practice. We neglected the fact that dual practice physician can work in any private 
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facility and it does not have to be having his private practice. The questionnaire cannot 
track further information such as physician working in another private facility. Physician 
in private facility is recognized as a dual practitioner if he has a primary job in public 
facilities such as public hospital, public community health centre, public health office, 
military hospital, a public company, public department, and public university. The other 
question to control the validity dual practice classification is an occupation in primary job 
whether the physician is categorized as a civil servant.  
 
4.5.2 The estimation process of alternative incomes 
 
Physician’s information on income from IFLS data is only available when physician is 
working in one particular sector whether it is public, private, or dual practice sector. Our 
main model assumes that income per sector is the alternative specific variable therefore 
we need the information of income for all sectors for each physician even when the 
physician only related with one particular sector. Suppose a physician is a public 
physician, the information that we have is income of public sector, while the income of 
private sector assumed that the physician is working in private sector and income of dual 
practice as if physician working in dual practice sector are not available.  
 
The first attempt of estimation process, we will refer to this as Model 1 to get the 
alternative incomes assumed that physicians will share equal characteristics that 
determined the income level for each sector. The estimation is linear regression model  
 
 y𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖1𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑖1𝛽1 + ⋯ + 𝑥𝑖𝐾𝛽𝐾 + 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑛 (4. 10) 
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Where 𝑦 is income of physician, 𝑥 is the explanatory variable that affects physician’s 
income, and the random part of 𝑖. In the first attempt, we differentiate the estimation 
process based on the origin of income information, whether physician is interviewed in 
public facility (public facility questionnaire) or private facility (private facility 
questionnaire). This differentiation is needed because we concern on different 
information captured between those two data sources. 
 
The estimation process of alternative income if physician working in private sector  
 
The estimation process uses the data from private practice facility questionnaire by 
considering the same information available in the public facility questionnaire. The total 
income from private facility comes from the questionnaire item of A21B, “What is your 
overall montly income from all practices you have?”. We double check the amount in 
A21B with A5B, “What is your estimated monthly income from working in this 
place?”. The question of A5B refers to the income from the visited private facility 
during interview of the survey. The amount of monthly income between A5B and A21B 
should be the same if the physician is a private physician and only work in one private 
practice. The monthly income of A21B should be larger than A5B if physicians work in 
more than one health care facility. Although most of the physcians work in one place, 
but there is about 20 percent of them who work in more than one practice place. The 
next identification is by classifying whether the physician also a dual practitioner so that 
the total income should be separated from the public sector, and we include only the 
income from private sector into estimation process. In this case, data transformation into 
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log value is need to get a better prediction. See Table 4C.2 of Appendix 4C for the 
complete output.  
 
 
ln(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑣) = 6.704246 + 0.1576236𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 − 0.0078889𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 0.6148936 ln (𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) − 0.2276822𝐽𝑎𝑣𝑎 
(4. 11) 
 
The variables determine the amount of total income from private sector are: gender, 
experience, main income, and Java Island identification. The last two variables more 
likely measure the physician ability in gaining more revenue in private sector. The main 
income is the income from physician’ main job, whether it is public or private sector 
based on physician convession. We then apply the estimation equation to data from 
public facility questionnaire, which are public physician or dual practice, assume that 
they are working as private physician. 
 
The estimation process of alternative income if physician working in public sector 
 
We use data from public community health centre questionnaire which has a specific 
question on public salary. It captures monthly income for physician working in public 
community heatlh centre. The working status is unable to differentiate between the 
permanent government worker or temporary contract physician hence we do not 
distinguish physician based on permanent or temporary contract. The sample from 
public facility data is 540 physicians, and the missing values for this variable is about 13 
percent and being imputated using the average salary based on the administration level: 
region and province. It is assumed that salary might be equal among physicians in the 
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same administration area. We regress the salary to variables that related with salary 
level: experience, urban, Java, and number of working hours dedicated to serve patients. 
Those variables are the variables that most affected the public salary level among 
physicians. See Table 4C.1 of Appendix 4C for the complete output. 
 
 
salary = 1,056,474 + 156,616.4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 − 1,266,074 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛
+ 1,078,308 𝐽𝑎𝑣𝑎 + 60,142.31 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 
(4. 12) 
 
The next step is applying the estimation equation to the data from private facility 
questionnaire to get the estimate public salary assume that they are working as public 
physician. The estimation process in private facility data involves 380 physcians.   
 
The estimation process of alternative income if physician working in dual practice 
 
Physicians from public facility sample can be identified into two category: public 
physician and dual practice physician. The dual practice income consist of monthly 
public salary in Book Puskesmas question A5A, “Approximately, what is the amount of 
revenue per month you received as the head of Puskesmas ?” and income of private 
practice from Book Puskesmas question A10A, “Approximately, what is the amount of 
revenue per month you received from all the private practises” ? The public physicians 
will have the answer on question of A5A but zero on A10 A, while dual practice 
physicians will have both questions filled in. The estimation process is needed to get 
dual practice income for public physician assumed that he works as dual practitioner. 
The estimation starts by regressing the total income of dual practice using the available 
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information from public sample. The regression equation gets, see Table 4C.3 of 
Appendix 4C for the complete output.: 
 
𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒
= 138751.6𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 1392283𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛
+ 0.9651807𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 3517709 
(4. 13) 
 
The estimate value is filled for the public physician assumes that he work as dual practic 
physician. 
 
The physicians from private facility sample can be differentiated into private physician 
and dual practice physicians. The total income of dual practice physician comes from 
the private practice questionnaire number A21B, “What is your overall montly income 
from all practices you have?”. The answer of the question will be identified to be a total 
income of private physcian if the physician does not have any duties in public facility, 
and identified as total income of dual practice if the physcian indicates having a job in 
public facility as well. Among 380 physicians in the private facility sample, 57 percent 
of them are dual practice physicians. The estimation result (see Table 4C.4 of Appendix 
4C for the complete output) is: 
 
𝐿𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
= 0.2477796𝑆𝑒𝑥 + 0.2404429𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒






By putting the dual practice variable to 1, it will indicate the estimate income for the 
dual practice as the variable identify 1 as dual practice and 0 for the non dual 
practictioner. We also put the variabel of income from one private practice, to measure 
the average income from their private practice.  The estimation values will place the 
dual practice income for the private physcian using the approach as if these physcians 
are working as dual practitioners. 
 
The estimation process of alternative income considering endogeneity problem 
 
We provide other method to estimate the income per sector of physician regardless his 
actual working sector. The estimation process is important to get good measurement for 
income variable in the main model of physician choice of working sector using 
alternative specific logistic model. The second model of income estimation (here we 
refer as Model 2) considers the endogeneity issue because neglecting the problem will 
provide false picture regarding sectoral total income of physician.  
 
The previous estimation has different estimation equation based on data sources. One 
can argue that the alternative income from this estimation results dissimilar conclusions 
because this different treatment. Hence in this approach, we work on pooled physician 
data from public facility questionnaire and private facility questionnaire. The physician 
income is extracted from public facility questionnaire which is the summation of item 
number A5A and A10A, which are income of public salary and income from private 
practice. While it is extracted from the summation of item number A21A and A21B of 
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private facility questionnaire which are income from main job and income from all 
private practices.   
 
The approach will be used to estimate the physician income in public and private sector. 
The specification is,  
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑤1𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽1 + 𝜖1𝑖 (4. 15) 
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑤2𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽2 + 𝜖2𝑖 (4. 16) 
 
 𝐼𝑖
∗ = 𝛿(𝑙𝑛𝑤1𝑖 − 𝑙𝑛𝑤2𝑖) + 𝑍𝑖𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖  (4. 17) 
 
The 𝐼𝑖
∗ is a latent variable that determines the sector where physician 𝑖 mainly work or 
getting his main income; 𝑤𝑗𝑖 is the physician 𝑖 income in sector 𝑗; 𝑍𝑖 is the vector that 
characterized the physician’s sector to work. The 𝑋𝑖 is the physician’s characteristics 
that will influence physician’s total income. The 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛾 are vector pf parameters, and 
𝑢𝑖, 𝜖1, 𝜖2 are disturbance terms. The latent variable of 𝐼𝑖
∗ is observed using the 




𝐼𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖
∗ > 0 




In this framework, the physician’s main working sector is endogenous to total income. 
There are unobservable characteristics influences physician’s main sector might also 
affecting the physician’s total income once any particular working sector is selected. 
Considering the endogeneity assumption will correct the selection bias in sectoral 
physician’s income estimation. Using simultaneous ML, the sectoral total income of 
physician will be estimated. 
 
The physician choice of sector is 1 if physician’s main income comes from public sector 
and zero if it comes from private sector. The total income equation will estimate log of 
monthly total income of physician. The exogenous variables in total income regressions 
are physician characteristics (gender and years of experience), and regional dummies 
(urban and java). The physician sector identification involves two binary variables of 
education and local language ability. These variables will affect physician sectoral 
working choice but not the total income. The simultaneous ML is applied in Stata 
command of “movestay”. The command implements the full-information maximum 
likelihood method to simultaneously fit binary and continuous part of the model to get 
consistent standard errors (Lokshin & Sajaia, 2004). The estimation for income in 
public sector is, 
 
 
𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 0.230𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 − 0.206𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 − 0.167𝐽𝑎𝑣𝑎 −
0.010𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑓𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 16.156  (4. 19) 
 





𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 0.158𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 − 1.045𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 − 0.208𝐽𝑎𝑣𝑎 −
0.018𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑓𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 18.667   (4. 20) 
 
The complete output of getting these equations is Table 4C.5 of Appendix 4C. After 
getting the total income estimation for public and private sector, the total income of dual 
practice sector is the summation of total income in public and private sector. We match 
the total income estimation to the original data set so that each physician will have 
complete information of total income from the actual working sector (observable data) 
and the alternatives income from the other two sectors assumed that he work in these 
sectors (total income from estimation procedure). 
 
4.5.3 Physician characteristics 
 
There are 920 physicians in the sample from the IFLS data. The descriptions are available 
in Table 4.1. Almost half of them or about 53% are dual practice physicians, 23% of 
physicians work in private only, and 24% of physicians work in public sector only. In 
general, our sample confirms the fact that most physicians in Indonesia are engaging in 
dual practice. Our sample consists of 57% female physician and 43% male physician. The 
sample has been corrected from anomaly entries in data set by excluding the case with 
outlier or extreme values. For example, variable of primary income and experience 
contain outliers that can be conformed into the survey code book. These outliers represent 





Table 4. 1 The descriptive statistics of physician characteristics 











Graduated from 5 famous medical school 











Speaking local language 

















The physicians’ representation based on geographic identification shows that most of 
them, about 87% work in urban area; only 13% work in rural area. The difference gap 
between urban rural assignment of the physician is prevalent in Indonesia where most 
physician usually prefer urban area to live or to work, some because of broader 
opportunities in private market and some are because of practical reasons such as better 
environment or supporting facilities. Indonesian consists of thousands island but most of 
the Indonesian population lives in Java island. The size of Java Island is only around 7% 
from total area of Indonesian but about 60% of Indonesian population lives in Java Island. 
About 73% physicians of our sample are in Java Island and only about 27% is outside 
Java Island. 
 
The physicians in our sample are also differentiated based on the origin of the medical 
school. We naturally followed the classification as appears in the questionnaire whether 
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physicians graduated from well-known medical school. These are among the top five 
medical schools and also categorized as the best medical schools in Indonesia. In 2014, 
there are 73 medical schools both public and private medical schools. Only around 32% 
of the physicians graduated from 5 well known medical schools while the rest of them 
graduated from other medical schools.  
 
The cross tabulation between variables provides more precise description on physicians. 
Table 4.2 shows cross tabulation between variables and physician’s category. Among male 
and female physicians, being dual practice physicians are still the most favourable choice, 
with percentage of male physician being dual practice is 59.55%, and it is higher than 
female physician that is 47.70%. Female physician has higher percentage of being a 
public physician of 35.82% and it is higher than being private physician which is 16.47%. 
The percentage of male physicians who choose for being private physicians is 32.66%, 
and it is higher than being public physician (7.79%).  The high percentage of female 
physicians being public physicians might be caused by a common knowledge of working 
in public facility that it provides stable income as civil servant and less pressure 
workloads compare to work in private sector. 
 
We classified physician’s residence based on urban-rural and Java-Non Java Island. 
Physician chooses to work as dual practice in Non-Java Island has higher percentage of 
64.37% than in Java Island with 48.59%. Physicians in rural area who choose being dual 
practice is 76.42%, while the percentage of dual practice in urban area is 49.18%. The 
strictly difference percentage appears on the percentage of private physician, where the 
urban area has as much as 25.73% of private physicians compare to 8.95% of private 
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physician in rural area. This percentage indicates important role of dual practice physician 
in providing health care service in Non-Java Island and rural area rather than Java Island 
and urban area.  
 
Table 4. 2 Cross tabulation between variables and physician’s choice 
Variables Number of Physicians (percentage) TOTAL 
(percentage) Private Public Dual 
Practice 

















Graduated from 5 famous 
medical school 















Speaking local language 


































Indonesia has as many as 652 identified local languages not included dialect and sub 
dialect, but it has 733 local languages based on the accumulation of regional language 
spread by province. The most spoken local language is Javanese with almost 84 Million 
out of 231 Million populations in Indonesia. The ability to speak in local language 
indicates whether physicians came from the same native area with the area of assignment. 
Other indication might be the physician adaptive skill in order to ease the examining 
process with the locals. Most of the physicians, about 95% of the sample are speaking 
local language and most of them are dual practitioners. It seems that mastering local 
language is a common thing for physicians. 
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 The cross tabulation between physician choice and education shows similar pattern 
between physician from well-known medical schools and other medical schools. Both 
categories shared almost the same percentage of physician working as dual practitioners, 
about 52% to 53%. It shows that being dual practice is still a popular choice of practice 
among physicians without looking into their education background. 
 
Table 4. 3 Statistics summary of variables 
Variable observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Main income (all sample)* 
Main income (Private physician)*  
Main income (Public physician)* 





















Total income of private physician 213 14.2 9.09 1.60 90 
Total income of public physician 218 7.86 5.72 0.54 39 
Total income of dual practice physician 485 15.90 10.30 1.60 69 
Experience (years) 863 15.90 9.97 0 48 
Percentage of elderly 918 5.26 2.20 2.16 13.44 
Physician ratio 892 7,928.79 13922.65 498.60 182,460 
*Unit currency is Million Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 
 
On the average, a physician gets 8 million IDR per a month from primary work without 
considering whether the primary job is from public or private sector (Table 4.3). The 
question on physician’s income in the IFLS questionnaire is a single question and filled 
based on physician’s answer without any other approach questions. The physician will be 
asked on the income of his primary work. For the public or private physicians, the answer 
represents their income from public or private sector. The dual practice physician 
however, as physician has dual jobs both in public and private sector, the answer of main 
income represents the income from one of sector that he considered as a main job. The 
average of main income that is differentiated between main income of private, public, and 
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dual practice means that the value represents the main income for physician that is 
indicated as private, public or dual practice. The primary income of private physician is 
higher compare to primary income of public physician. The average main income of 
private physician is around 13 million IDR, while in public physician is around 8 million 
IDR. The dual practice physicians have an average of main income about 6 Million IDR, 
which is the lowest average among the three categories.  It should be noted that main 
income represents one income side of dual practice physician, whether it comes from 
public sector or private sector. In our case, it seems that the main income of dual practice 
comes from public sector. This refers to the physician structure job in Indonesia that 
physician usually works in public sector and then open private practice. This is also 
showed in the data that most of dual practice physicians stated that their primary job is in 
public sector. The total income that reflects a monthly physician’s take home pay shows 
that the dual practice physician has the average income of 15.9 Million IDR, while the 
public physician and private physician has the average of 7.86 Million IDR and 14.20 
Million IDR. The total income has cleared out from extreme values and missing values by 
imputation process using the average of physician per sector in the same area. 
 
From Table 4.3, the average experience of the physicians in the sample is around 16 years. 
This figure represents a number of years that the physician graduates from medical 
school. From the tabulation result in Table 4.4, the physicians with experience years 
below the average has higher proportion on working as dual practitioners compare to the 
physician with the experience years above the average. The physicians with more 
experience above the average are working more as private physicians rather than public 
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physicians. The fact is contrast to the physicians with experience below average where 
more physicians working as public physician rather than working as private physicians.  
 
The potential demand factor in Table 4.3 shows that the average percentage of elderly 
population aged 65 years and above is 5%, with interval from 2% to 13%. The physician 
ratio ranges from 499 residents per physician to 182,460 per physician. The median of 
physician ratio is 7,929 residents per physician. This figure indicates that there is large 
difference of potential demand among areas. Physicians seem to have different workloads 
based on the area where they reside. 
 
Table 4. 4 Number and percentage of physician distribution below and above the  
average experience 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Below average(15.9) 97(20.59) 103(21.87) 271(57.54) 471(100) 
Above average (15.9) 119(26.50) 115(25.61) 215(47.88) 449(100) 
Total 216 218 486 920(100) 
 
The description of physician’s experience year with physician working decision is 
provided by grouping the experience years into ten years of interval as appears in Table 
4.5. The experience years bellow 30 shows that being dual practice is still being most of 
the physician’s option. It means that in general physicians are favouring the dual practice 
starting in the early stage of his career. In the higher interval, it shows that most of 
physicians choose to work in private sector; even in the experience more than 40 years 
shows that none of the physician works as public physicians. This is because the 
physicians are in the retirement age of being public physician, which is 60 years in 
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Indonesia. The number can also be interpreted that some of the retired physicians in the 
public still working as a private physician. 
 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
<10 67(27.02) 56(22.58) 125(50.4) 248(100) 
10-<20 49(14.98) 65(19.88) 213(65.14) 327(100) 
20-<30 43(20.57) 63(30.14) 103(49.29) 209(100) 
30-<40 37(63.80) 8(13.80) 13(22.40) 58(100) 
40++ 19(90.48) - 2(9.52) 21(100) 
 
The cross tabulation in Table 4.6 shows that physician who have main income below 
average has the highest percentage of being dual practitioners rather than working as 
public physician or private physician.  
 
Table 4. 6 Number and percentage of physician distribution below and above the  
average main income 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Below average(8.32) 105(17.47) 127(21.13) 369(61.40) 601(100) 
Above average (8.32) 111(34.80) 91(28.53) 117(36.68) 319(100) 
Total 216 218 486 920(100) 
 
The percentage difference is striking, with 61% of physicians are dual practice physicians, 
while only 21% of physicians are private physician and 22% of physicians are public 
physician. In the different group where physicians are in the higher level of main income, 
being dual practice is still physician’s favourite with around 37% of physicians although it 
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has slightly different with working in private sector with about 35% of physicians. The 




4.6.1 The result of main model 
 
The main model requires income data in alternative choice by physicians. This 
information is not provided during the IFLS survey hence the estimation process is 
needed. Using this process on main income data, a physician will have full set 
information of income if physician working in the different working places from the 
actual one. For example in the data from the survey, a physician work in private sector, 
hence the information on the main income comes from the actual income in private 
facility.  
 
Table 4. 7 The descriptive statistics for the physician income based on estimation  
process and sector * 
Income of being Obs         
Mean     
Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation  process of Model 1  
Private physician 920 9.80 8.83 0.0005 120 
Public physician 920 7.09 3.49 0.54 39 
Dual practice physician 920 15.28 9.64 0.6 100 
 
Estimation process of Model 2 
Private physician 920 43.32 28.95 0.175 147.42 
Public physician 920 8.07 3.34 0.54 44 
Dual practice physician 920 40.77 33.71 0.175 160 
*in Million IDR. The estimation process of Model 1 uses linear regression, while 
Model 2 is the model after correction to endogeneity problem. 
407 
 
The estimation process provides the income estimation for the physician if he works in 
public facility and if he works in dual practice facility.  At the end of the process, we have 
a full set of income information, from the observed physician choice and the alternatives 
for all 920 physicians in the full sample. The income descriptive statistics per sector using 
two models of estimation appears in the Table 4.7. The estimation without correcting the 
endogeneity shows that among the three working choices, the average income of dual 
practice physician is the highest income, which is 15.29 Million IDR, while being a public 
physician is the lowest average income with 7.09 Million IDR. After correcting the 
endogeneity issue in the estimation model, the result shows that the alternative income per 
sector is higher than previous approach. Both estimation process of alternative of 
physician per sector shows similar outcome with public physician has the least income 
but the average of private physician is higher than dual practice physician. 
 
The result of alternative specific conditional logit estimation with dual practice as base 
category appears in Table 4.8, while the relative risk ratio appears in Table 4.9. Income 
variable positively affects the physician decision of working place. Although it appears 
slightly higher than one in term of odds ratio in Table 4.9, the increasing income per 
sector has positive effect for physician working in related sector. The result shows 
statistical significance but it provides small effect in term of economic magnitude. One 
unit increase in income will increase 0.06 the likelihood of physician working in the 
particular sector. Using the odds ratio in Table 4.9, the increasing of one Million IDR of 
public physician income, the odds of physician in choosing this sector is increasing by 6% 
while holding all other variables in the model constant.  Here we can see that the 
percentage of likelihood is actually relatively small and one can argue that the percentage 
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of physician working in particular sector is small in magnitude although it is showing the 
positive significant sign. 
 
Table 4. 8 Parameter estimates of asc multinomial logit 
Variable Model1  Model 2  
Public Private Public Private 




























 (0.224) (0.217) (0.240) (0.221) 
language -0.516 -1.127 -0.711 -0.160 






















 (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 









 (0.054) (0.047) (0.057) (0.050) 
Physician ratio -0.00002
**
 -0.00001 -0.00002* -0.00001 










 (0.604) (0.679) (0.819) (0.744) 
N 2505 2505 2505 2505 
i. Standard errors in parentheses 
ii. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
iii. Model 1 uses alternative income from linear regression estimation without 
correction of endogeneity. Model 2 uses alternative income from estimation 
process with correction of endogeneity. 
iv. Number of observations in Model 1 and Model 2 is 835 physicians that resulted in 








Table 4. 9 The odds ratio of the main model 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 





Variables Public Private Public Private 

































































* Standard errors in parentheses.  
**Based on the result in Table 4.8. Model 1 uses alternative income from linear 
regression estimation without correction of endogeneity. Model 2 uses alternative 
income from estimation process with correction of endogeneity. 
 
The male physician is less likely working as a public physician over working as a dual 
practice then female physician, but the male physician is more likely being private 
physician over being a dual practitioner.  The result supports the conclusion that female 
physician are less interested in dual job due to the working loads while public sector 
seems more attractive for female physician as it is offered less working pressure and more 
time for family. Physician graduated from top five medical schools in Indonesia is more 
likely working as a private physician over being dual practice then physician graduated 
from other medical schools. Physician lives in the urban area, and Java Island is more 
likely to be private physician over the dual practice. The effect of location is also 
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significant for Java variable in the comparison between public and dual practice. 
Physician in Java is more likely to work in public over the dual practice. The increasing of 
physician’s experience increases the likelihood that he will work in one sector only, public 
or private; the effect of having more years of experience is the same for these two choices 
of work. The increasing percentage of elderly population in the area decreases the 
likelihood that physician will work in one sector only, public or private. This shows us 
that the more potential demand of health care leads to decision working as dual practice. 
The rise of physician ratio decreases the likelihood of physician working in public or 
private only. The increasing of physician ratio means that one physician will serve more 
people and in this situation the physicians prefer being dual practice rather to engage in 
one sector only. The increasing of physician ratio can be translated that the number of 
physicians is less in the area, therefore physicians are more attracted on becoming dual 
practitioners. 
 
The marginal effect of income for each alternative in Table 4.10 gives a clearer picture of 
how income per sector effects on physician decision. The result shows that the increasing 
income in each sector, whether it is public, private of dual practice, gives the indication of 
increasing probability for physician to work in the particular sector. For example, the 
increasing income in public sector will increase the probability of physician choosing this 
sector, while the probability of physician choosing for private sector or being dual 
practice is decreasing. The increasing income in private sector also leads the increasing 
probability of physician working in private sector while the probability of choosing public 
and dual practice is decreasing. The same goes to the increasing income in dual practice 
sector. The value of probability however is relatively small although shows significant 
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effect, for example using the income estimation of Model 1, for each Million increasing in 
public salary, the increasing probability of physician choosing in this sector is 0.0059, 
while the decreasing probability to work in dual practice and private sector are 0.0081 and 
0.0023, while holding other variables at their average values. 
. 
Table 4. 10 The marginal effect of income from the main model* 
Pr(choice = dualpr|1 selected) =  Pr(choice = pub|1 
selected) =  
Pr(choice = pv|1 
selected) =  
variable     Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
0.5977 0.6126 0.1704 0.1474 0.2319 0.2400 





























* All the P>|z| =0.000 
**The marginal effect using the result in Table 4.8. 
***Model 1 refers to the estimation process in getting alternative income using linear 
regression. Model 2 refers to estimation process after correcting for the endogeneity. 
 
 
The predicted probability for income of physician per sector also appears in Figure 4.1, it 
is based on the result of Model 1. Under all variables at their mean, the increasing income 
per sector leads physician to work in that particular sector. For example, when public 
salary is increasing, physician prefer this sector compare to other two sectors. The 
predicted probability in private income shows slower increasing rate compare to other two 
sectors. The increase in public sector has relatively sharp pattern of increase in the early 






Figure 4. 1 Predicted probability of physician choice and years of experience using  
the main model (Model 1) 
 
The marginal effect of case specific variables in Table 4.11 shows the marginal effect of 
particular variable when other variables are at their mean. There is indication that male 
physicians have higher preference in working in private sector and dual practice sector 
than female physician but lower preference for working in public sector. Physician in 
urban area has lower preference in working dual practice and has high preference in 
private sector compare to physician resides in rural area. Physician in Java Island has less 
preference working in dual practice then physician in Non-Java Island. The different 
preference appears for physician in Java Island working in public and private sectors, that 
physician in Java Island has higher preference to work in both sectors then physician in 
Non-Java island. It is indicated that public and private sector is more attractive for 
physician in Java Island, while dual practice is more attractive for physician in Non-Java 
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Table 4. 11 The marginal effect of variables in main model 
Pr(choice = dualpr|1 selected) =  Pr(choice = pub|1 selected) 
=  
Pr(choice = pv|1 
selected) =  
variable     Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 

































































































































*The marginal effect using the result in Table 4.8. 
**Model 1 refers to the estimation process in getting alternative income using linear 
regression. Model 2 refers to estimation process after correcting for the endogeneity. 
 
The marginal effect of experience indicates that there is a lower chance for physician 
choosing dual practice with an increase in years of experience. There is a higher chance 
for physician choosing public sector and private sector with an increase in years of 
experience. We present the predicted probability pf physician choosing the working sector 
related with the years of experience in Figure 4.2. The predicted probability of physician 
choosing dual practice is decreasing along with the increasing years of experience. This 
suggests the conclusion that dual practice attracts fresh graduate physicians as dual 
practice provides larger benefits in term of physician experience and opportunity for 
physician to maintain the physician’s network. The same decreasing pattern with different 
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steepness appears in predicted probability of physician working as public sector. It is also 
shown that public sector is attractive for fresh graduate, which is also relevant with the 
previous result on predicted probability of working in dual practice. The decreasing 
pattern is caused by the age limit when entering the public sector that is maximum 40 
years in Indonesia. The different one happens in the predicted probability of physician 
working in private sector is increasing when physicians have longer years of experience. 
Physicians tend to enter private sector after gaining some years of experience. At the 
beginning of their career physicians choose to work in public sector or dual practice. After 
having more adequate experience, physician tends to work in private sector.  
 
 
Figure 4. 2 Predicted probability of physician choice and years of experience based  
on Model 2 
 
The marginal effect of percentage of elderly indicates that there is higher chance for 
physician working in dual practice with an increase in percentage of elderly. It reflects 


























higher probability of physician working in dual practice with an increase of physician 
ratio. This indicates that the more population need health care, the physician has higher 
chance for being dual practice physician.  
 
We also try to expand the hypothesis that income per sector has different implication to 
physician choice of working sector when it is analysed based on geographical identities 
(urban and Java island identification) and experience. We put the interaction term in the 
model between income per sector with java, income per sector with urban, and income 
per sector with experience. None of the interaction term is significant and the complete 
result can be found in the Appendix. The insignificant sign of interaction term might be 
explained from the data source of income per sector in our study. The income per sector 
contains the unobservable income from the alternative sectors that we approach using 
estimation process. In the composition process, the income per sector has already 
contained some influence from geographical identification and experience. Therefore the 
interaction term shows no significant effect on affecting physician choice of working 
sector. 
 
4.6.2 The result of alternative model 
 
The analysis of alternative model is done mainly to support the finding in our main model 
about factors that involving physician’s decision to work in private facility, public facility, 
or dual practice. In this alternative model, we use the main income instead of physician 
income per sector. It is the physician income from one particular sector that is categorized 
as primary work based on physician acknowledgement. We employ multinomial logit 
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regression assuming that main income is case specific variable so that it will vary among 
physicians. The alternative model includes 761 physicians due to the combination of 
incomplete case from several variables such as main income, experience, percentage of 
elderly, and physician ratio. The complete result of estimation is available in the 
Appendix. 
 
The alternative model has advantage of omitted variable biased, because in this model, we 
use the main income information instead of income per sector. The main income variable 
is the observed variable as all physicians will report the income from his main job, 
whether it is public sector or private sector. The disadvantage of using the alternative 
model is that we have less data observations compare to the main model. The previous 
model has 920 observations to enter into regression, while in the alternative one, the 
number of observations is 761 physicians. 
 
The statistics descriptive of the 761 observations that is used in the regression appears in 
Table 4B.1 to Table 4B.6 of the Appendix 4B. In general, the interpretation based on the 
descriptive statistics is similar with the interpretation of full sample in sub chapter 4.4.2. 
The first analysis is on the comparison between private and dual practice. Variables that 
statistically significant at different significance level start from 10%, 5% and 1% level 
are: the dummy variable of male, education, urban, Java, main income, and experience, 
while variables of language, population elderly and physician ratio are not significant. 
The second analysis involves the comparison between physician’s choice being public 
physician and dual practice. It has fewer significant variables than first comparison of 
private and dual practice, which are: male, Java, main income, population elderly and 
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physician ratio. The other variables such as education, language, urban, and experience 
are not significant at 5% or 1% level. 
 
Table 4. 12 The Relative Risk Ratio of the alternative model 
Variable Private vs. dual 
practice 
Public vs. dual practice 
(1) (2) (3) 
Male 1.53 0.16 
Education 0.52 1.19 
Language 0.64 0.49 
Urban 4.23 1.25 
Java 2.48 2.02 
Main Income 1.07 1.04 
Experience 1.03 1.00 
Percentage of elder population 0.92 0.79 
Physician ratio 0.99 0.99 
* The alternative model is multinomial logit model. 
 
The analysis of relative risk ratio might give a clearer insight of the model as it is 
provided in Table 4.12. It should be noted that in our study, becoming a dual practice 
physician is a choice and not a random risk.  As shown in Table 4.12 column 2, the 
comparison between private and dual practice shows that male physicians are more likely 
than female physician to prefer working in private sector over dual practice. For physician 
in urban area relative to physician in rural area, the relative risk for preferring private 
sector relative to dual practice would be expected to increase by factor of 4.24 given the 
other variables held constant.  Physicians in Java Island are more likely to work as private 
physician. . The interpretation for the risk ratio of main income and years of experience 
indicate that although it provides significant statistics result but it is not very high in term 
of economic magnitude. The result provides evidence for the effect of these variables to 




The second comparison is between public and dual practice as appears in Table 4.12 
Column 3. Male physician will be more likely to choose being dual practice rather than 
being public physician while female physician is more likely for working in public sector 
only. The reason is that male physician is usually associated to have greater responsible to 
the family while female physician role is more to take care of family. Physicians in Java 
Island are more prefer to work in public sector compares to dual practice sector. Our 
results show that dual practice activities are more preferable for physicians living in rural 
and Non-Java Island.  Thus based on physician’s residence, dual practice policy is more 
relevant in those areas. The additional percentage of elderly population and physician 
ratio leads to dual practice activity among physicians. The result can be interpreted into 
two folds. The first one relates with the workloads or opportunity window for the 
physician. The percentage of older people represents the opportunity for the physician, as 
elderly might need more health care treatment compares to other age group. The more 
elderly group in particular area, the physicians has higher probability on working as dual 
practice compare to only working in public sector. The second explanation relates with 
physician reaction to the competition among physicians. Besides as a part of health 
indicator on physician availability in the area, the physician ratio also describes the 
competition among physician in the area. The coefficient from multinomial logit result 
shows that the lack of physicians in the area will have an implication on higher 
probability of physicians being dual practitioners. The result is in line with the field fact in 





The next analysis emphasizes the importance of main income as it is also appeared in the 
previous literature as important factor for physician working as dual practice. The 
explanations will lead to the suggestion that physicians prefer non-dual job work as long 
as the income particularly in private sector has already high enough. The marginal effect 
of primary job income in Figure 4.3 indicates that the higher income in primary job, the 
physician has a higher probability to involve in the private sector. In this figure, we 
describe the significance values as entirely appear in Table 4.13.  
 




Outcome=Private Outcome=Public Outcome=Dual practice 
Margin P[|Z|>z] Margin P[|Z|>z] Margin P[|Z|>z] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.5 0.18 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.62 0.00 
5.5 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.56 0.00 
10.5 0.26 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.50 0.00 
15.5 0.31 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.44 0.00 
20.5 0.37 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.38 0.00 
25.5 0.42 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.32 0.00 
30.5 0.47 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.27 0.00 
50.5 0.66 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.07 
100.5 0.90 0.00 0.09 0.40 0.006 0.49 
150.5 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.63 0.0003 0.66 
200.5 0.99 0.00 0.007 0.73 8.78e-06 0.75 
250.5 0.99 0.00 0.002 0.79 3.01e-07 0.79 





Figure 4. 3 Predicted probability of income using the alternative model 
 
While for public and dual practice outcome, the increase in income of primary job gives 
the mix interpretation. The higher income in the primary job will increase the probability 
of physician to work in public sector only. However, the increasing probability changes 
into decreasing pattern after 28 million IDR of income level. The decreasing pattern 
continues until the marginal effect is no longer significant at 66 Million IDR income 
level. The possible explanation for the change of pattern is that physician starts working at 
a low-income level hence will be more likely to involve in the public sector, where this 
place can provide more stable condition and offers other conveniences such that training 
and reputation that will be a potential asset for the physician in the future. After certain of 
income level, working in public is less interesting; hence, the predicted probability is 
decreasing. The other explanation is that when physician working in public sector, the 
chance to gain a certain amount of high income is directly proportional with the position 
in public facility structure organization. It is common assumption that fewer positions 
offers such high salary or in this case is income. The predicted probability in dual practice 
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outcome shows a physician prefers working in one sector only, public or private. The 
increasing main income is followed by a decreasing probability of physician being dual 
practice. Increasing main income causes working in one sector is more attractive for a 
physician compares with working as dual practice. 
 
Income from primary jobs somehow provides difficulties in term of interpretation because 
we cannot directly address from which income sector affect physician decision between 
working in private, public, or dual practice.  The primary jobs between public sector and 
private sector might give different treatment to handle. The governments for example will 
more interest with the main income from physicians who have primary job in public 
sector because it is closely related with the payroll policy for the public physicians.  Later 
we will show the counterfactual analysis related with the salary from policy maker point 
of view. 
 
To provide detailed analysis of public salary on the physician decision on being dual 
practice, we split the sample based on the sample sectors that are public or private. The 
public sector sample comes from public community health centre, a government owned 
health care facility that mainly provides primary care in the sub-district level. The sample 
consists of 540 physicians and identifies as public physician or dual practice.  Almost 
60% of them are involving in dual practice activities. The detailed descriptive of the 
sample from public facility is available in the Appendix 4B, Table 4B.7 and Table 4B.8, 





The effect of public salary on the physician decision of being dual practitioners will be 
analysed using the logit regression between dependent variable of physician working as 
public physician or dual practice and the same explanatory variables that appear in the 
main model with the exception that in this regression we use the public salary to represent 
the physician’s income. The detailed result of logit regression is available in the Appendix 
4B, Table 4B.9. We shows the  predicted probability of being dual practice in the 
physician public sample using a logit model to get a clearer picture of the effect of public 
salary on physician decision to become dual practice in Table 4.14.  
 
Table 4. 14 Predicted Probability of choosing dual practice using pooled sample and  
public physician sample using the alternative model 
Public salary level 
(Million IDR) 
Predicted Probability 
from Multinomial logit 
(pooled sample)* 
Predicted Probability 
from logit (public 
physician sample)** 
Margin P[|Z|>z] Margin P[|Z|>z] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.5 0.59 0.00 0.66 0.00 
1.5 0.58 0.00 0.65 0.00 
2.5 0.58 0.00 0.65 0.00 
3.5 0.58 0.00 0.64 0.00 
4.5 0.58 0.00 0.63 0.00 
5.5 0.57 0.00 0.62 0.00 
6.5 0.57 0.00 0.61 0.00 
7.5 0.57 0.00 0.59 0.00 
8.5 0.56 0.00 0.58 0.00 
9.5 0.56 0.00 0.57 0.00 
*The pooled sample is 761 observations 
**The public physician sample is 419 observations 
***The alternative model is multinomial logit model. 
 
The interpretation confirms the result that the increasing public salary will decrease the 
predicted probability of public physician from being dual practice. The table is the 
comparison of predicted probability of being dual practice physician on several levels of 
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income. The interesting result appears in the marginal effect of experience. We provide 
further explanation based on Table 4.15. 
 
Table 4. 15 The predicted probability of outcomes using the alternative model 
Variables Outcome=Private Outcome=Public Outcome=Dual practice 
Margin P[|Z|>z] Margin P[|Z|>z] Margin P[|Z|>z] 














































































*The alternative model is multinomial logit model. 
 
The more years of experience, the probability of choosing dual practice will be lower, but 
in the different side, the probability of physician being a private physician is increasing.  
The predicted probability of working in public is decreasing along with the increasing of 
experience. The rate of decreasing probability in public is slow in the public sector to 
compare to the rate of increasing probability in private or decreasing rate in dual practice. 
The decreasing rate of working in public sector indicates that public sector usually attracts 
physicians who just start their early career. The public sector usually provides benefit on 
training opportunities and experience in spite of the usual issue on the low salary level in 
public sector. The result also confirms the fact that senior physician will be less likely to 
work as a dual practice and prefers to private sector. One typical example for this case is 
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that a senior physician who usually works in public sector as a civil servant and dual 
practice then he retires and continue working in private sector only.  
 
The interpretation of predicted probability of geographic identification supports our 
previous result on coefficient estimation. Physicians in rural area and Non-Java Island 
have higher probability of being dual practice rather than physician in urban and Java 
Island. Being private physician is more interesting for physician in urban area compare to 
physician in rural area.  
 
4.6.3 Robustness check 
 
We provide robustness check for the main model.  The fit statistics for Model 1 and 
Model 2 are in Table 4.16.  
 
Table 4. 16 The fit stat result for the main model 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Wald chi2(17) 208.87 256.66 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
LR chi2(19) 439.24 548.082 










AIC 1433.45 1324.601 
BIC 1544.14 1435.296 
     *Fit stat for the result in Table 4.8 
   ** Model 1 refers to the estimation process in getting alternative income   
using linear regression. Model 2 refers to estimation process after 
correcting for the endogeneity. 
 
The Wald test of physician’s choice of working sector using the alternative income from 
linear regression and estimation after correcting for endogeneity show that the coefficients 
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are not simultaneously equal to zero therefore including all variables related create a 
statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model. The LR test of both models 
shows that adding all variables together results in a statistically significant improvement 
in model fit. The main model can explain the physician’s choice between private, public, 
and dual practice. We also reports the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and The 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics to compare between Model 1 and Model 2 
in the main model. The model 2 which uses the estimation process after correcting the 
endogeneity provides better model than Model 1. It also better model compares to the 
alternative model. The McFadden R-squared indicates that the model can predict about 
30% of the outcome. 
 
Table 4. 17 The result of VIF for the main model 
Variables VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dual practice 1.08 0.93 1.10 0.91 
Male 1.05 0.95 1.07 0.94 
Education 1.18 0.85 1.18 0.85 
Language 1.03 0.97 1.03 0.97 
Urban 1.19 0.84 1.24 0.80 
Java 1.15 0.87 1.15 0.87 
Income 1.11 0.90 1.19 0.84 
Experience 1.11 0.90 1.11 0.90 
Population elderly 1.17 0.86 1.17 0.86 
Physician ratio 1.08 0.92 1.08 0.92 
Mean VIF 1.11    
*The VIF for the result in Table 4.8 
 ** Model 1 refers to the estimation process in getting alternative income   using 
linear regression. Model 2 refers to estimation process after correcting for the 
endogeneity. 
 
We test the model for collinearity which might cause a standard error to be inflated. The 
Variance Inflating Factor (VIF) in Table 4.17 is around one, and therefore a tolerance of 
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VIF is higher than 0.5 (1/VIF). However, our model does not suffer from inflated standard 
errors, and the mean VIF at 1.11 is satisfactory. 
 
The alternative specific conditional logit model that is a discrete model with more than 
two categories in outcome requires the satisfaction of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption. The test for IIA uses a Hausman test, a Suest-based 
Hausman test or a Small-Hsiao test, in Table 4.18. The Hausman test provides the Chi2>0 
and therefore our model meet the asymptotic assumptions of the test. It cannot reject the 
null hypothesis at the 5 percent level. Therefore the main model is not violated the IIA 
assumption. 
 
Table 4. 18 The Hausman test of IIA assumption for the main model 
Outcome Model 1 Model 2 
chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df P>chi2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
private 27.62 9 0.0006 1.71 8 0.9887 
public 9.38 9 0.3109 305.42 8 0.0000 
dual practice 122.62 9 0.0000 30.83 8 0.0002 
*The Hausman test for the result in Table 4.8 
** Model 1 refers to the estimation process in getting alternative income   using 
linear regression. Model 2 refers to estimation process after correcting for the 
endogeneity. 
 
We perform the measurement of fit and diagnostics check for the Multinomial Logistics 
regression as the alternative model in Table 4.19.  The purpose of robustness check in this 
sub section allows us to justify the validity of the results. It is also completed with 
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statistical evidence to support our selected estimation process. The variables turn out to be 
significant at the margin, and also the overall decision for a physician to engage in 
working place can be captured in the model.  
 



























*The fit stat for the result in Table 4.12 
** The alternative model is a multinomial logit model. 
 
Table 4. 20 The result of VIF for the alternative model 
Variables VIF Tolerance 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dual practice 1.16 0.86 
Male 1.05 0.95 
Education 1.20 0.93 
Language 1.03 0.97 
Urban 1.21 0.83 
Java 1.19 0.83 
Main Income 1.07 0.94 
Experience 1.11 0.90 
Population elderly 1.19 0.84 
Physician ratio 1.09 0.91 
Mean VIF 1.13  
*The VIF for the result in Table 4.12 




As indicates in Table 4.20, the alternative model does not suffer from inflated standard 
errors, and the mean VIF at 1.137 is satisfactory. To test for independent variables, we run 
the likelihood ratio test (lr) as well as a Wald test (Wald) in Table 4.21.  
 
Table 4. 21 The LR tests of alternative model for independent variables  
Variables pchi2 df P>chi2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1.male 83.732 2 0.000 
1.educ1 11.756 2 0.003 
1.language 2.661 2 0.264 
1.urban 14.042 2 0.001 
1.java 18.760 2 0.000 
Main income 30.119 2 0.000 
experience 7.630 2 0.022 
Percentage of elderly 17.903 2 0.000 
Physician ratio 7.321 2 0.026 
          *Number of observations=761 
**The LR test for the result in Table 4.12 
   *** The alternative model is a multinomial logit model. 
 
Both test the null hypothesis whether all coefficients associated with the given variables 
are in fact zero (Williams, 2015). Both tests reject the null hypothesis for all variables at 
the 5% level except for the language variable. For this one, the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 5% level. Hence each variable’s effects are highly significant in the model. 
 
Table 4. 22 LR tests of alternative model for combining alternatives 
Comparison chi2 df P>chi2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
private &public  111.77 19 0.000 
private &dual practice 114.348 9 0.000 
public  &dual practice 137.228 9 0.000 
*The LR test for the result in Table 4.12 




In Table 4.22 we also check the possibility whether the categories of the dependent 
variable should be combined into less categories than three. Again, there is the option for 
a Likelihood-Ratio Test as well as a Wald test in Table 4.19. The null hypothesis is that all 
coefficients except intercepts associated with a given pair of alternatives are in fact zero, 
meaning that the alternatives can be collapsed for a more efficient estimation (Williams, 
2015). Overall, both the LR and the Wald Test confirm that none of the categories should 
be combined. They are significant at the 1 percent level. It can be concluded that the 
outcomes are distinguishable on the variables included in the model.  
 
The multinomial logit model requires the satisfaction of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption. The test for IIA is either based on a Hausman test, a Suest-
based Hausman test or a Small-Hsiao test, Table 4.23. It should be noted that the tests 
have been criticized because they are typically inconclusive or even contradictory. The 
Small-Hsiao test results in different outcomes every time because it splits the sample into 
two halves and also the Hausman test results in different outcomes if one changes the base 
category. This is why it is often recommended to instead focus on the Hausman test which 
uses seemingly unrelated estimation (SUE) as a methodology (Long and Freese, 2005). 
The Hausman test provides the Chi2>0 and therefore our model meet the asymptotic 
assumptions of the test. Second, the Suest-based Hausman test provides strong evidence 
support the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the sample. It cannot reject the null 






Table 4. 23 Tests of IIA assumption for the alternative model 
Outcome Hausman  Suest-based 
Hausman 
Small-Hsiao 
chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df chi2 df P>chi2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
private -9.838 9 . 26.321 10 4.826 10 0.902 
public -4.956 9 . 12.212 10 14.849 10 0.138 
dual practice 1.144 9 0.999 14.633 10 14.185 10 0.165 
*Observations=761 
*The test of IIA assumption for the result in Table 4.12 
 ** The alternative model is a multinomial logit model. 
 
The result of diagnostic checks and irrelevant independent assumption shows that the 
alternative model is a good model that can explain the physician’s decision on being 
private, public, or dual practice physician.  
 
4.7 Policy Exploration on salary 
 
The objectives of the policy exploration are to analyse how income intervention might 
affect the dual practice decision. The first policy is to see how dual practice decision 
changes after the intervention on primary income. The claim is based on the previous 
theoretical work and our empirical finding that physicians might want to avoid dual 
practice and prefer to stay in public sector or private only. The second policy is how dual 
practice decision will differ after the increasing of public salary. The intervention policy in 
public sector might easier to implement because the only determinant is the government 
just by setting the salary level. It will completely different for the private market 
especially in Indonesia because there are many factors that involve the physician’s income 
in private sector. For example price of the treatment where competitive private treatment 
fee exists among private practice and private clinics. Our theoretical framework has 
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shown how private sector determines its price treatment and quality level
2
. Using the 
main model we simulate policy related to public salary and the alternative model to 
simulate policy relates with primary income. We calculate the predicted probability for 
each individual, then we apply one policy and then we calculate the percentage of 
individuals which experiencing the change on the predicted probability. 
 
The policy exploration is using the main model of Model 1 to show the effect of 
increasing primary income. The simulation uses double increase and five times increase in 
public salary level. In Table 4.24, the increase of public salary two times from the initial 
level slightly changes the average predicted probability, even when we classify based on 
rural and urban location, the figures provide similar conclusion. The double increase in 
public salary level do change the average predicted probability or in other word, not many 
physicians change their decisions as they thought that the offer is not worth enough to 
give the dual practice or private sector. We simulate on higher level of increase in the 
public salary level. In this case we multiply public salary into five times. The result shows 
that the average predicted probability changes more substantial different than the initial 
predicted probability. From Table 4.25, the increase on public salary level attracts more 






                                                          
2
 The theoretical framework on price and quality in private sector is available in Chapter 2. The empirical 
evidence regarding price of treatment using Indonesian case is available in sub Chapter 4.6.2. 
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Table 4. 24 The average predicted probability before and after simulation* 
Outcomes The average 
predicted 
probability on the 
initial model 
Predicted probability 
after simulation of 
double public salary 
Predicted probability 
after simulation in five 
time multiplication 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Private 0.25 0.25 0.22 
Public 0.22 0.23 0.31 
Dual practice 0.53 0.52 0.47 
Note: Number of observation is 835 physicians. Based on the result in Table 4.8, 
Column (2) and (3) 
 
Table 4. 25 The average predicted probability in rural and urban area before and  
after simulation 






































in five time 
multiplicatio
n 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Private 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.28 0.27 0.24 
Public 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.25 0.33 
Dual 
practice 
0.79 0.78 0.75 0.49 0.48 0.43 
Based on the result in Table 4.8, Column (2) and (3) 
 
One consideration by increasing public salary is whether government can afford the 
increasing salary rate. The Figure 4.4 shows that the physicians mostly attracted into dual 
practice at the beginning of their career. The data description on the years of experience 
and number of dual practice physicians shows that most of physicians are doing dual 





Figure 4. 4: Number of dual practice physicians based on the years of experience 
 
 
Figure 4. 5: The comparison of average predicted probability before and after the  
increasing public salary level for the first and second quintile of year 
experience 
 
To show how specific group of physicians will choose public sector with the increasing 
public salary, we increase the public salary level into three folds for the physicians that 




The physician group represents the first and second quintile of physician’s experience 
(year) from our data. The fresh graduate physicians react almost the same indicates by the 
similar predicted probability to work in public sector. Physicians with five or more years 
of experience have larger probability to work in public compare to the initial level of 
public salary. These physicians are willing to work as public physicians and not involving 
in dual practice activity. Using the increasing public salary for certain physicians still 
attract physician to work in public and avoid being dual practice.  
 
The main findings of the policy exploration imply that it is costly to take physicians only 
work in public sector, which makes dual practice an attractive strategy for government. 
The level of public salary might be low but still attract physician to work in public sector 
due to potential additional income from private sector by implementing dual practice. 
Increasing public salary is more relevant for physician with higher years of experience. 
Thus preventing doctors to work only in public facility is more attractive for physicians 
with 9 to 10 years of experiences. 
 
Primary income describes physician’s income from one side of the sector. This will be 
important to see how physician’s decision to involve in dual job activity compares to 
work only in one sector that measured from the income level. The result from main model 
and alternative model suggests that physicians are interested in working as a public 
physician but it decreases after reaching a certain level of income. Physician’s choice of 
sector might change after they have the ability to earn high income in the private sector. 
The decreasing rate is  slow that describes the fact that physician views working in public 
sector are a solid and proper choice, especially for physician at the beginning of the 
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career. The increasing public salary will decrease the predicted probability of physician 
working as dual practice. The private sector attracts physician along with the more years 
of experience. The growing years of experience will decrease the probability of physician 
working as dual practice. A physician who works in private sector will be more likely to 
stay working in private sector.  It is also supported by the fact that joining public sector 
usually has to follow more strict rules, such as age limitation in civil servant recruitment 
and inflexible working hours in public sector. These existing conditions cause the 
physician to favour more public sector at the beginning of the career. The senior physician 
already has a stable financial condition and built reputation, hence reduce the urge to 
move to the public sector as public physician or dual practice. 
 
Table 4. 26 The average predicted probability after simulation 
Outcomes The average predicted 
probability on the initial 
model 
The average predicted 
probability after simulation 
(1) (2) (3) 
Private 0.24 0.31 
Public 0.22 0.23 
Dual practice 0.54 0.46 
Note: Number of observations is 761 physicians. This simulation is using result from the 
alternative model in Table 4.12 (multinomial logit) 
 
The first policy is to multiply the physician’s primary income into double than previous 
main income. In Table 4.26, the double increase of primary income changes the average 
predicted probability. The outcome of dual practice has lower average predicted 
probability after simulation. The double increase in primary income provides smaller 




The difference physician decision might be from the difference location based on 
geographical characteristics. The predicted probability before and after simulation into 
two different groups, rural and urban is in Table 4.27. The classification using rural and 
urban shows that urban area has higher decrease on the predicted probability physician 
working as dual practice. 
 
Table 4. 27 The average predicted probability in rural and urban area after  
simulation 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.34 
Public 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.24 
Dual practice 0.80 0.76 0.50 0.42 
Note: Number of observations is 761 physicians. This simulation is using result from the 
alternative model in Table 4.12 (multinomial logit) 
 
The policy exploration using the main model and alternative model show that the effect of 
income to the choice of physician working sector is relatively small although it is positive 
and significant. Therefore our simulation shows that although public salary has increased 
five times from the initial value, the change in probability of physician choosing each 
working sector is less meaningful. When we look back to the data source of IFLS 5, the 
physician’s information is collected by self-enumeration, so that physicians fill the 
questionnaire by themselves, and the interviewer will collect after that. The data from 
self-enumeration especially income data is usually under reported. In this case, we are 
unable to confirm the income information as the data is not linked to other financial data 
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source such as tax report that applied in the study of physician in Norway by Johannessen 
& Hagen (2014). 
 
4.8 The effect of dual practice and insurance to price analysis 
 
The analysis is to analyze the second purpose of this paper. The discussion is related 
with the policy implication of dual practice physician and insurance coverage. This part 
is the empirical evidence as the continuation of the framework that we have already 
described in Chapter 2. The discussion is on the price effect on the policy implication. It 
appears here in the same discussion with the physician’s decision on choosing working 
place as part of the supply side in our framework on dual practice study.  
 
Our theoretical framework shows that dual practice existence in health care system 
functions to lower the price of treatment in private facility. Dual practice allows 
physician to have additional private practice outside his duty in the public facility. The 
additional provider affects the patient’s demand so that patient has more option to get 
health care treatment. The competition will be responded by private facility to lower the 
price. The insurance in other hand will affect in different direction with dual practice. 
The definition of insurance is a percentage of treatment fees that will be covered by 
insurance company. The shifting demand between patient choosing between public 
facility and private facility makes treatment price in private facility is increasing as the 




To provide evidence on the relationship between price of private facility, dual practice, 
and insurance coverage, we directly show the price in private facility effect in the 
regression form: 
𝑝2
= 𝑓(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛, % 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) 
(4. 21) 
We use data from Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) wave 5 in 2014. The survey 
has a questioner to capture the public and private facility data in the selected survey 
area. We combine the data with the public community health center; a government 
owned facility to represent public health care facility. The private facility questionnaire 
is used to get the information of the treatment fees while the public facility 
questionnaire is used to approximate the percentage of dual practice physician in 
particular area. Both facilities mainly provide primary care in the area. The total sample 
in the survey is 1.597 private facilities consist of private physician practice and clinics. 
The sample reduction happens along with regression process as there are missing values 
in from price, insurance, or dual practice data.  
 
We use a particular treatment of treating the wound in the private facility to capture the 
price information. The price is in Indonesian Rupiah currency. This specific treatment is 
chosen because this treatment includes a standard care that usually provided in private 
health care facility. The other practical reason as this treatment has the lowest rate of 
missing value in the data set. There are other prices of private facility service available 
from IFLS data, but most of them are severe from having large missing values. To show 
that price of treating wound is a good measurement in representing the price of private 
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facility, we provide correlation coefficient between price of treating wound and other 
prices of: first stitching of wounds, changing of wound dressing, blood sugar test, 
combination between examination, injection, and medicine,  and combination between 
examination and medicine. After clearing out the extreme values and filling the missing 
values with the average price, the correlation coefficient between price of treating 
wounds and other prices show positive correlation a relatively modest relation. This is a 
good sign that the price of treating wound is satisfied enough to represent the price of 
private facility. The complete result for other correlation coefficients is in Table 4B.13 
of the Appendix.  
 
The number of dual practice physician in the area is approximated by the ratio between 
dual practice physician and total physician in public facilities. The questionnaire in the 
IFLS is not designed to capture the dual practice activities in Indonesia directly. We get 
the information on the number of dual practice physician from the public community 
health center questionnaire. The ratio count in public facility as the data can only 
identify the dual practice physician in public facilities. The questionnaire on private 
facilities cannot directly approach the information on dual practice activity because 
there is no specific question on whether physician also engaged in public facility. The 
public physician can be differentiated to be a dual practice by filter question on whether 
the physician working in private practice after public working hour. We sum up the 
number of dual practice physician and total physician in the same district, region, and 




Percentage of population with insurance measures the percentage between individual 
with insurance (any insurance scheme) and the total population in the sample. The 
insurance schemes in the questionnaire covers the possible insurance schemes in 
Indonesia, from the public insurance, company insurance, private insurance, and also 
insurance from government aids. The full options that appeared in the questionnaire are: 
health insurance from PT ASKES, labor (social) insurance (ASTEK JAMSOSTEK), 
employer provided health insurance benefit, employer provided clinic, private 
insurance, saving-related insurance, JAMKESMAS, JAMKESDA, JAMKESSOS, 
JAMPERSAL, and JKN.  
 
In addition, we use the location identification as a control variable in the regression. We 
use urban rural identification and Java- Non Java Island as control variables. The urban 
variable is a dummy variable that has value of one when private facility located in the 
urban area and zero if it is located in rural area. The java variable equal to one if private 
facility is located in Java Island and zero if it is located in Non-Java Island. Other 
control variable is number of people in the area where private facility is located.  
  
We regress between price in private facility, the percentage of dual practice physician in 
the region, and percentage of an individual with insurance using two level of areas, 
district level, and region level. The physician dual practice ratio and percentage of an 
individual with insurance have three kinds of number based on the area scope. From a 
“kecamatan” (or a district: a group of villages), a “kabupaten” (or region:  a group of 
kecamatan), can be associated with municipal, and a “province” (a group of the region). 
We provide the result for district and region level.  
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Table 4. 28 The descriptive statistics for the price analysis 
Variables observation mean Standard 
deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price 1,418 38,487.7 32,996.0 
% dp physician (district) 1,597 .642 .212 
% dp physician (region) 1,597 .640 .180 
%insured population (district) 1,597 .513 .175 
%insured population (region) 1,597 .506 .145 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.28 shows that the number of observation is 1,418 
and the price information from private facilities has average price of 38,488 IDR. The 
price data shows the reduction of the number of observation from 1,597 to 1,418. The 
missing values around 11%, it means that not all of facilities filled the price information 
on price of treatment wounds. The percentage of dual practice physician per area using 
district level and region level are almost the same, around 64%. This means that around 
100 public physicians working in public facility in the area, there are 64 of them are 
actually also dual practice physicians or 64 public physicians have private practice 
outside their public working place. The percentage of insured population per area using 
district level and region level data shows similar figure that around 51% of the 
population has already covered under insurance scheme regardless the insurance type. 
There are several insurance types available such as private insurance, public insurance, 









Table 4. 29 The coefficient estimate using district level data and region level data 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

















Number of observations 1418 1418 
F(2,1415) 13.7 17.7 
R-Squared 0.020 0.025 
 
The first attempt to analyze the relationship between price, dual practice physician, and 
insurance is by regress the price to dual practice and insurance without control variables 
using different level of data. We use district and regional level to check the consistency 
of the data from the imputation process in preparing the data. In general, from Table 
4.29, the regression model is significant in explaining the relation between price, the 
number of dual practice physician, and percentage of the population with insurance. The 
dual practice physician ratio mostly has a negative sign, although it appears significant 
only in the regression using district area and median number. The R squared is small 
indicates that the model needs more variables to explain the price in private facility. We 
use the district level data and put the control variables. The regression result using 













(1) (2) (3) 
Number of dual practice physician -2645.5 
(4380.4) 
0.546 




















The dual practice variable and insurance variable are both insignificant but provide the 
same sign as previous result. The increasing of dual practice physician in the system 
will decrease the price sets in the private facilities. Variable of percentage population 
with insurance consistently shows positive and significant sign in all regressions. The 
increasing insurance coverage leads a higher in the price in the private facility. The 
urban variable indicates that the private facility in urban area has higher price of 
treatment than rural area. The population coefficient indicates that more population has 








Our result suggests that physician prefers to work in one sector only, public or private and 
not being dual practice. The income and experience variables are important for the 
physician to decide a choice of being public, private, or dual practice. Physician’s location 
also affect physician to engage in dual practice especially in rural and Non-Java Island as 
those areas provides more challenges such as less population, lack of facility and 
transportation difficulties. 
 
The existence of the dual practice in Indonesia initially is a compensation of low salary in 
public sector. The increasing salary rate indeed reduces the existence of dual practice 
among public physician. However, the increasing salary mostly attracts the fresh graduate 
physician and only has a small effect for the senior physician. The growing of private 
sector is more interesting for a physician to involve in a private facility. It needs higher 
increase in salary to keep the physician from being dual practice and stay in public. The 
increasing salary rate can maintain physician to stay in public sector and become potential 
human resources in the future along with their experiences. The more profitable option is 
that government works hand in hand with the private sector, rather than competes with the 
private sector through salary rising to attract physician as it will be costly and harm the 
available budget.  
 
The physician in urban and Java Island prefer on private sector while rural and non-Java 
Island is dominated with dual practice physician. The government should pay more 
attention to strengthening public sector on rural and Non-Java Island, as health provision 
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on these areas depends much on public instead on private. The existing program on 
provides 1-2 years temporary contract for a fresh graduate physician to work in public 
facility of remote areas is an excellent approach to continue providing services in the rural 
and non-Java island. Those areas can be covered by physician services in the short term. 
The further policy is needed to provide physician availability in the long term. The 
proposed policy is to increase benefit working in public. Not merely increase the public 
salary, as this must be deal with the limited budget, but this can be translated into another 
additional benefit such as the chance to have specialist education in the future.  
 
The implications of our finding to the dual practice policy emphasizes that it will be very 
costly to have physicians working only in public sector and banning the dual practice. We 
measure it by calculating how much payment is required to have them moving from dual 
practice to public sector only. Giving more income or wage is only relevant after 
physicians have some years of experience and the effect is overall small in magnitude. 
Physicians are not sensitive to the increasing of public salary can be interpreted that rising 
the public salary in our case does not compensate for the opportunity loss from being dual 
practice. The theoretical analysis predicted that an advantage of dual practice is a 
downward pressure on the price of private provider thus bringing an indirect benefit from 
dual practice. This seems to be presented in our data. These two facts combined suggest 
that dual practice is a sensible policy in the context of Indonesia. This policy is difficult to 
replace in term of physician’s choice by public service only as income increases would 






Table 3A.1. Summary of previous literature on variables of health care demand 
Variables Author (year) Definition Significant to 
healthcare 
demand? 
Insurance Akin, Griffin, 
Guilkey, & 
Popkin (1986) 
Category variable indicates if 
the individual is covered by 
health insurance 
Insignificant  
 Gertler & Van 
der Gaag (1989) 







Income Akin, Griffin, 
Guilkey, & 
Popkin (1986) 
assets value which is the value 
of personal assets-house, lot, 






wealth (assets) of the 
household, income of the 
household (lowest 20%) 
Significant 





Price Akin, Griffin, 
Guilkey, & 
Popkin (1986) 
Standard fee schedule,  cash 
prices associated with each 
service 
(including visit price, drug cost, 
and transport cost) 
Significant 
Gertler & Van 
der Gaag (1989) 




The prices for outpatient 
registration 
Significant 




User fees Significant 
Sarma (2009) Consist of total medical 
expenditure, transport and 
lodging, personal medical 
appliances, any reimbursement, 





Travel cost Akin, Griffin, 
Guilkey, & 
Popkin (1986) 
Transport time, transport cost to 




Variables Author (year) Definition Significant to 
healthcare 
demand? 
Sarma (2009) The categorical variable 
represent the distance of patient 
from the nearest facility; the 




while the bus 
service 





Quality Akin, Griffin, 
Guilkey, & 
Popkin (1986) 






Expenditure on care per person 
in population served, Drug 
availability (percentage of time 
available), Physical condition of 
facility index 
Significant 












Age, Mother’s age, sex, baby’s 
sex, education, mother 
education, seriousness illness, 






Gender, education, urban 
residence, symptoms of the 
illness, seriousness of the 
illness  
Significant 
Sarma (2009) Age; Male/Female; Household 
education; number of children 
Significant. 
Gertler & Van 
der Gaag () 











Table 4A.1. Summary of dual practice physician’s motivation 
Dual practice motivations Main results and authors 
Hours restriction approach Number of hours spent in primary job will affect 
decision to commit in second job (Culler and Bazolli, 
1985) 
Job complementarities:  
   
 Complementary earning 
 Additional non-pecuniary 
benefits 
 New skills and experience 
 Low public salary especially in developing countries 
induce physicians to work in private sector to 
complement their income, study in Bangladesh 
(Gruen, Anwar, Begum, Killingsworth, and 
Normand, 2002) and Cambodia (Soeters and 
Griffiths, 2003). 
 One sector  offers professional training, 
improvement, prestige, etc.   
 Working in private is a chance to add skills and 
experience (Heineck, 2003). 
Professional and institutional 
factors 
 Workload and physical comfort (Askildsen and 
Homas, 2004). 
 Professional satisfaction and self-realization that 
sometimes not offered in primary public job (Macq et 
al., 2001). 
 Interaction and influence among physicians in public 
sector (Eisenberg, 1986). 
Personal factors  Personal characteristics such as sex, age, and family 
structure affect physician’s decision to involve in 
dual practice (Chawla, 1996). 
 Evidence in Australian and New Zealand where men 
physician tend to have private practice compare to 
women physician (Dent, 2004). 
Access alternative facilities, relief 
from high pressure and low 
appreciation in public 
Private sector run together with public sector provide 
access for health care treatments. Workload in public 
sector sometimes not balanced with high appreciation for 







Appendix 4A. Sample process and dual practice identification 
 











•Public community health 
centre=961 facilities 
•Private facility=3,529 facilities 
Facility 
questionnaire 
•Public community health centre=961 
facilities 
•Private facility=1,597 facilities 
Facility 
questionnaire 
•Public community health 
centre=961 facilities 
•Private facility=1,597 facilities 
Physicians 
•from public facility=540 





Figure 4A. 2 Validation process of getting main income information 
 
 
Figure 4A. 3 Validation process of getting salary information of public facility sample 
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A21a. 
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estimated 
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Appendix 4B. Results 
Table 4B. 1 The descriptive statistics of physician charactheristics (for the alternative model of 
multinomial logit 













Graduated from 5 famous medical school 













Speaking local language 






























<10 60 45 113 218 
10-<20 42 62 190 294 
20-<30 36 52 92 180 
30-<40 32 8 12 52 
40++ 15 - 2 17 










Table 4B. 3 The Variables and physician choice 
Variables Number of Physicians (percentage) TOTAL 
(percentage) Private Public Dual 
Practice 

















Graduated from 5 famous medical 
school 














Speaking local language 












































Table 4B. 4 The physician experience based on physician choice of working place 








Below average(15.8) 88(20.80) 91(21.51) 244(57.68) 423 
Above average (15.8) 97(28.70) 76(22.49) 165(48.82) 338 
Total 185 167 409 761 
 
Table 4B. 5 The physician main income based on physician choice of working place 








Below average(8.15) 100(18.18) 111(20.18) 339(61.64) 550 
Above average (8.15) 85(40.28) 56(26.54) 70(33.18) 211 
Total 185 167 409 761 
 
Table 4B. 6 The descriptive statistics of the sample regression 

























Experience 761 15.82523 9.92112 0 48 
Percentage of elderly 761 5.240382 2.201292 2.209758 13.43876 




Table 4B. 7 Variable description from public facility sample 











Graduated from 5 famous medical school 














Speaking local language 























Table 4B. 8 The descriptive statistics from public facility sample 



















Experience 484 14.91942 7.983661 0 33 
Percentage of elderly 539 5.189271 2.177596 2.165087 13.43876 











Table 4B. 9 Logit Regression Result from public facility sample  
Variable Coefficient 






























Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***















Table 4B. 10 Variable description from private facility sample 











Graduated from 5 famous medical school 














Speaking local language 





















Table 4B. 11 The descriptive statistics of from private facility sample 





349 15.10747 16.01678 .175 120 
Experience 379 17.15831 11.93839 0 48 
Percentage of elderly 379 5.36578 2.241079 2.413653 13.43876 











Table 4B. 12 Parameter Estimates of Multinomial logit 
Variables private  vs dual 
practice 
public  vs dual 
practice 










 (0.229) (0.233) 
1.language -0.439 -0.718 
















 (0.0160) (0.0183) 
Years of experience 0.0259
**
 0.00303 
 (0.00965) (0.0112) 
Percentage of elder population  -0.0795 -0.227
***
 
 (0.0486) (0.0569) 
Physician ratio -0.0000144 -0.0000224
*
 




 (0.705) (0.635) 
   
N 761  
Pseudo R-Square 0.16  
LR chi2 (18) 246.05  
Prob>chi2 0.00  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***













Table 4B. 12 Parameter estimates of the main model (Model 1) with interaction term 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |    m1          m2          m3          m4       
-------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
income       | .04012618**  .0698271**    .05447978**  .04982905 
             |  .02040476    .03173985    .01669381    .03858715   
inc*exp_pub  |  2.328e-08                              2.278e-08   
             |  2.181e-08                              2.214e-08   
inc*exp_pv   |  1.157e-08                              1.151e-08   
             |  2.732e-08                              2.772e-08   
Income*urban |              -1.343e-08                -1.235e-08   
             |               3.306e-08                 3.410e-08   
Income*java  |                            4.293e-09    2.640e-09   
             |                            1.965e-08    2.031e-08   
-------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
public       | 
       male  |-1.5872705***-1.586829*** -1.5843996***-1.5901982***   
             |  .24889185    .24888757    .24871047    .24906528   
       educ1 |  .12377818    .12940289    .12581078     .1257502   
             |  .22373704    .22388374    .22384352     .2239666   
    language | -.52344896   -.51795016   -.52244414   -.52348613   
             |  .42626621    .42541828    .42471167    .42691721   
       urban | -.06268269   -.14114683   -.03987892   -.15130649   
             |  .35836853     .4304954    .35776326    .43452047   
        java |  .61557522**   .61520374** .64843381**  .63130403**   
             |  .24528016    .24511086    .28173839    .28306892   
  experience |  .00707012    .00521433    .00526234     .0070784   
             |  .01145491     .0107015    .01070811    .01146439   
    &elderly | -.25543855*** -.2592304***-.25775646***-.25634468***   
             |  .05407369    .05402392    .05391889    .05422363   
    phyratio | -.00002399** -.00002391** -.0000242**  -.00002371**   
             |  .0000114     .00001146    .00001146    .00001141   
       _cons |1.4095316**   1.5217691**  1.4013899**  1.4823639**   
             |  .60934835      .649221    .61415856     .6597563   
-------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
private      | 
        male | .58928011*** .59438829**   .59578165**  .58530148**   
             |  .19103092    .19073398    .1908887     .19138358   
       educ1 |-.59264467**  -.58599057** -.59085433** -.58994494**   
             |  .21707985    .21695519    .21706116     .21730186   
    language | -.12148991   -.12780311   -.12702351    -.1216492   
             |  .48233168    .48024795    .4805407      .4824248   
       urban |  1.2732822** 1.2365866**  1.279213**    1.2374847**   
             |  .41519344     .4273492    .41466877    .42980758   
        java |  .99896502*** 1.0069926***1.0270319***  1.0051392***   
             |    .234495    .23435622    .24526899    .24609072   
  experience |  .04084701     .0405184    .04068473    .04079189   
             |   .0096283    .00925102    .00925163    .00962134   
    &elderly | -.13959292** -.14288442** -.14239788** -.13976419**   
             |  .04741057    .04716901    .04719512    .04742712   
    phyratio | -.00001349   -.00001347   -.00001348   -.00001336   
             |  9.009e-06    8.970e-06    8.985e-06    9.011e-06   
       _cons | -2.2348192** -2.1917056** -2.2472684** -2.2049824**   
             |  .68272793    .68775135    .68290808    .69339386   
-------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
Statistics   |                                                     
           N |       2505         2505         2505         2505   
          LL | -697.07482    -697.6339   -697.69922   -696.99974   
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001; b/se                                      
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Table 4B. 13 Summary statistics and correlation among the price data (Sub Chapter 4.9) 
 
    Variable    |     Missing          Total     Percent Missing 
----------------+----------------------------------------------- 
         price6 |         174          1,597          10.90 
         price5 |         860          1,597          53.85 
         price4 |         465          1,597          29.12 
         price3 |         659          1,597          41.26 
         price2 |         523          1,597          32.75 





    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   price6 |      1597    38487.66    31090.65       5000     700000 
   price1 |      1597     36882.7    30327.57       1000     300000 
   price2 |      1597    23668.85    14322.03       2000     200000 
   price3 |      1597    18238.56    5467.197       4554      80000 
   price4 |      1597    46423.69    30862.35       5000     500000 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 




         |  price6   price1  price2   price3  price4    price5 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
  price6 |   1.0000 
  price1 |   0.2349   1.0000 
  price2 |   0.3446   0.3112   1.0000 
  price3 |   0.2274   0.0566   0.1023   1.0000 
  price4 |   0.8473   0.2056   0.3305   0.2576   1.0000 
  price5 |   0.1879   0.0808   0.0902   0.4369   0.1859   1.0000 
 
Note: price6=Treating wound;  price1=first stitching of wounds, ;  price2=changing of wound 
dressing, ;  price3=blood sugar test, ;  price4=combination between examination, injection, 












Appendix 4C Estimation process to get alternative income in Model 2 (after correcting 
endogeneity) 
Table 4C. 1. Coefficients of alternative income from linear regression (public physician) 
-------------------------- 
    Variable | linreg_pub   
-------------+------------- 
  experience |  156616.42   
             |  31874.781   
       urban |  1266073.9   
             |  647887.28   
        java |    1078308   
             |  563659.79   
Workinghours |  60142.311   
             |  20138.498   
       _cons |  1056473.8   
             |  794776.27   
-------------+------------- 
Number of obs =     319 
F(  4,   314) =   15.62 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.1660 
Adj R-squared =  0.1553 








    Variable | linear_pv    
-------------+------------- 
        Male |  .15762359   
             |  .08940387   
  experience | -.00788891   
             |  .00366458   
        java | -.22768219   
             |  .09281511   
 main income |  .61489379   
             |  .05002223   
       _cons |  6.7042457   
             |  .77143179   
-------------+------------- 
Number of obs =     345 
F(  4,   340) =   41.35 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.3272 
Adj R-squared =  0.3193 





Table 4C. 3. Coefficients of alternative income from linear regression (dual practice 
physician) from public physician data 
--------------------------- 
    Variable | linreg_d~b   
-------------+------------- 
 experience  |  138751.56   
             |  25079.634   
       urban |  1392283.1   
             |  570861.25   
incpv_practi |  .96518071   
             |  .02606805   
       _cons |    3517709   
             |  670840.42   
-------------+------------- 
Number of obs =     490 
F(  3,   486) =  476.43 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.7463 
Adj R-squared =  0.7447 




Table 4C. 4. Coefficients of alternative income from linear regression (dual practice 
physician) from private physician data 
--------------------------- 
    Variable | lineardp~v   
-------------+------------- 
        male |  .24777962   
             |  .08142654   
      dualpr |   .2404429   
             |  .07941993   
 inc_1pvprct |  .23203713   
             |  .02184831   
       _cons |  12.201636   
             |  .35740162   
-------------+------------- 
Number of obs =     378 
F(  3,   374) =   46.43 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.2714 
Adj R-squared =  0.2655 









Estimation process to get alternative income in Model 2 (after correcting endogeneity) 
Table 4C. 5. Coefficients of alternative income from endogenous switching regression   
Variable     |    Coefficient 
     se       
-------------+------------- 
Public physician income   
          
        male |  .23037007   
             |  .09295455   
       urban |  -.2056807   
             |  .12094184   
        java | -.16722221   
             |  .09545603   
  experience | -.00960023   
             |   .0057528   
       _cons |  16.155567   
             |  .13407877   
-------------+------------- 
Income of private physician 
 
        male |  .15852128   
             |  .16002977   
       urban | -1.0446692   
             |  .33565426   
        java | -.20793661   
             |   .1884005   
  experience | -.01824297   
             |  .01099541   
       _cons |  18.666632   
             |  .66248898   
-------------+------------- 
-------------+------------- 
Statistics   |              
           N |        821   













Appendix 4D Physician decision diagram 
This diagram visualizes the process of the physician choosing working sector, only for a physician 

























* Registration letter (STR) is valid for five years and can be renewed after. 
Physician finishes education, 
including clinical competency, takes 
medical oath, and gets competency 
certificate 
Internship program: working in 
public or private health facility 
under senior physician supervision. 
Get registration letter (STR) from 
Medical Council* 
Working in private sector: 
 employee in private clinics 
or private hospital 
 establish his own private 
practice 
Working in public sector: 
 As a civil servant 
 Temporary employee in 
public sector with contract 
between 2-3 years based on 
placement area, remote or 
normal area. 
Get practice permit (SIP) from public 
health office** 
Having private practice or working 
in private clinics after public 
working hour 
Working in public sector as civil 
servant or temporary employee 





** Practice Permit (SIP) is valid for five years, each physician will get maximum three practice 
permits, and each permit is valid for one practice only. This regulation limits number of practice by 




This thesis aims to understand the dual practice aspects in health care system. The section 
provides a summary of the primary results, policy recommendations and suggestions for future 
research. We also conclude the broad overview of dual practice role in health care system. 
Our empirical study on dual practice is divided into two components, the first one is demand 
side which appears in Chapter 3 and the second one is supply side which available in Chapter 
4. 
 
First, a theoretical framework on the relationship between patient’s decision on health facility 
and physician’s working choice on dual practice was developed in Chapter 2. The model uses 
insurance scheme as a comparison with dual practice policy as the same tools in increasing 
health care access of population. The model shows that price in private sector is following the 
price in public set by government. The quality of treatment will follow the increase or decrease 
of the price. Dual practice existence will lower the price in private, as it allows more physicians 
to participate in the dual practice activities; it means more option for patient to choose health 
care facility. The model has testable implications to the total welfare of health care system in 
the long run and short run. The former refers to the welfare effect where all agents adjust 
equilibrium state after dual practice or more insurance is allowed after the policy shock. The 
short run is defined as situation prior to any price adjustment. The dual practice policy might 
have higher or lower total welfare compare to  insurance policy and the leading cause of the 
difference lies on the demand switching when patient change the health care facility between 
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public or private facility. After the theory framework being laid down, its implications are taken 
to the data using the Indonesian experience.  
 
Chapter three concentrates on the demand side of the dual practice physicians. The outpatient 
health care demand framework is used to explain how dual practice influences people deciding 
their health care facility: private, public, or non-physicians treatment (include here is nurse 
practice, midwife practice, and traditional healer). Allowing dual practice in the system is one 
of the government efforts to increase health care utilization by providing more health care 
services for the people. On the other hand, insurance is another tools increasing health care 
coverage by relieving financial barrier. Comparing between two policies, subsidizing insurance 
has more significant impact on changing individual choice from non-physician health care 
facility to private or public health care facility. The more health care services available in the 
area do not necessarily imply that people can easily get health care treatment. Price of the 
treatment and non-monetary factors such as travel cost has significant influence for individual 
to keep visiting non-physician health care facility. The insurance has direct affect to the 
individual decision on health care treatment because insurance benefit will be perceived by the 
recipient only. The dual practice seems to have smaller effect on individual level but actually it 
provides larger impact in community level because more people will be exposed with the 
presence of more dual practice physicians in the system. Quality aspect is less significant for 
individual when choosing between public or private facility. The insignificant of quality 
components explains that most of quality components are not observe by health care user. 
Patient priority is on getting treatment first rather than choosing based on quality criteria. The 
geographic characteristics shows that health care demand is differentiate based on the location. 
Population in rural and outside Java Island still rely on non-physician health care facility while 
population living in urban and Java Island choose to visit private and public health care facility.  
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Chapter four analyses the dual practice physician from the supply side that consists of two 
aspects. The first one is the direct effects of physician choices of dual practice, private sector, 
and public sector. The second is the indirect effects on equilibrium prices of private sector from 
dual practice existence and insurance coverage. Income becomes essential factor that driven 
physicians involving in dual practice activity. Physicians decide on dual practice as a response 
to potential health care demand and physician availability. In the area where more elderly 
population that can be referred to more potential health care demand and number physician is 
low, the physicians tend to work as dual practice. In line with this results is that physicians in 
urban and Java island is less likely being dual practitioners contrast with the physicians in rural 
and Non-Java Island that more likely to engage in dual practice. The equilibrium price of 
treatment shows that dual practice existence is pressing down the price of treatment thus creates 
indirect benefit of the existing of dual practice physician in health care system while the 
insurance coverage is boosting the price. Both conclusions are in line with our finding in 
theoretical part. 
 
Figure 5.1 summarizes the overview of dual practice physician in demand and supply side. 
The dual practice physician affects demand of health care by slightly reducing demand in 
private facility. The empirical evidence shows that dual practice physician in health care 
system influences patient’s choice between public facility and private facility but has small 
effect on driving individual from non-physician facility (midwife, nurse, and traditional 
healer) to public or private facility. In the supply side, physician’s main motivation from 
being a dual practice physician is additional income motive. Allowing dual practice in health 
care system is an additional benefit that can be used to attract physician staying in public 
sector. Without dual practice in the system, it will be very costly for health authority to set a 







Figure 5.1 Overview of dual practice physician in demand and supply 
 
Indonesia has been regulated dual practice physician since 1970 by allowing public physician 
to work in private sector. The purpose of the regulation is to provide access to health care for 
the population when the health care resources were limited. In the recent situation where 
number of physicians is increasing, the policy of dual practice is in call to adapt into different 
direction. Increasing health care access can be achieved by providing more access to health care 
insurance. Indonesian government should increase the insurance ownership through subsidizing 
scheme or self-participation. Having insurance is directly affected the individual health care 
demand compare to providing more dual practice. Indonesian government is still developing a 
national health insurance system under national health care security (BPJS Kesehatan), by 
encouraging people to voluntarily participate in the insurance scheme and subsidize insurance 
premium for the poor group. The infrastructure development such as building a good road to 
access health care facility might be a direct influence to health care access as our result shows 
that non-monetary cost is essential in health care demand. Regarding dual practice policy in 
Indonesia, physicians are shown to highly value this practice with additional income as main 
motive. Dual practice becomes a sensible policy in Indonesia to ensure the services in public 
Demand 
reduce demand in private  
slightly 
Supply small effect 
lots of money to 
induce dual 
practice 







sector. Banning dual practice and lets health care services been provided only by private sector 
and public sector will increase the price in private sector that potentially creates another barrier 
to health access.  A different policy on dual practice might be applied by recognizing different 
situation in specific areas in Indonesia. The classification area based on rural-urban and Java –
Non Java Island has shown that the difference condition of health care access does exist. The 
dual practice might be allowed in the area where there are still potential demand of health care, 
with low number of physicians, a specification that refers to rural and non-java island 
characteristics. While in the area where private sector is well developed and supported with 
high number of physicians, the dual practice activity might be strictly limited. Dual practice 
existence functions in lowering the price of treatment in private sector, thus the policy also 
brings more benefit than harm particularly from patient’s perspective.   
 
Our empirical analysis identifies dual practice physician using survey data that has many 
limitations such as it focuses only on primary health care provider and limited information on 
physician as the survey is not specifically observing physicians. Dual practice physician can be 
found in any level of health care providers, different kind of physician specialities, and also 
common practice among health care personnel other than physician, such as nurse and 
midwifes. It is important to analyse dual practice aspect on these particular case in the future. 
Some suggestions regarding Indonesian case, the dual practice physician data can be traced 
back from health administration office in regional level. It is crucial to report dual practice 
physician regularly into national scale as any other physician data so that can be use in 
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